Date: Wed, 06 May 2015 22:57:28 +0200
From: Security Explorations <contact@...urity-explorations.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] [SE-2014-02] Some additional GAE Java security sandbox bypasses


Hello All,

Security Explorations released technical details and POC codes for
additional security vulnerabilities found in Google App Engine for
Java. All relevant materials can be found at our SE-2014-02 project
details page:

http://www.security-explorations.com/en/SE-2014-02-details.html

The above link contains technical description of the following four
weaknesses discovered after initial 31 issues were patched by Google
in March 2015:
- Issues 32-33 (missing safeDefineClass methods in SafeClassDefine
   implementation), they are similar to previously reported Issues 12
   and 14 [1],
- Issue 34 (missing security check in the implementation of a bind
   method of MethodHandles.Lookup mirror class),
- improperly patched Issue 2 #2 (java.net.URLClassLoader instantiation
   via java.security.Provider.Service).

These issues could be easily exploited to gain a complete GAE for
Java security sandbox escape. Google hasn't provided us with a status
report regarding successful resolution of these weaknesses in its
production GAE, but we have observed that the POCs exploiting them
stopped working. According to our Disclosure Policy [2], that alone
constitutes a sufficient condition for a publication of the issues.

It's worth to note that a POC for Issue 2 #2 makes use of previously
reported Issues 19 and 22. Issue 19 was evaluated by Google as working
as intended (WAI) issue. Issue 22 should have been fixed, but this
hasn't been done (a status report from Google received on 04-Mar-2015
stated that all issues, except Issue 21, are fixed and shouldn't work
anymore [3]). It is likely due to Google's vulnerability evaluation
methodology focused on a root cause tracking. We have warned Google
that by focusing on the so called root cause, it could easily miss
an innocent vulnerability that may turn out to be helpful in a future
attack. We didn't need to wait long for that to happen.

Apart from Issue 22, we have also found out that Issues 23, 25, 26
and 27 have not been addressed by Google either (they could be also
successfully chained with Issues 2 #2 and 19 for a complete GAE Java
security sandbox escape). Google stated that it considered them as
working as intended issues (not exploitable except in conjunction
with other issues). It's however interesting that the company has
indicated that it may remove some of those [vulnerable] classes
from its runtime jar in the future.

We have also released a POC code for Issue 21. This is a very minor
modification of our POC for Issue 69 of SE-2012-01 project [4] that
was published in Oct 2013. This POC proved that:
- GAE for Java could be successfully hacked with the use of a public
   vulnerability / exploit code from Oct 2013 till Mar 2015,
- Issue 21 (1.5+ years old JRE) could be successfully exploited
   contrary to Google's claim that GAE has "mitigations in place that
   prevent the issue from being exploitable" ([3] 04-Mar-2015).

Finally, it's also worth to mention that there are three additional
complete GAE sandbox escape POCs (Issues 35-41) that still require
addressing and confirmation (Issues 37-41 in particular) from Google.

Thank you.

Best Regards,
Adam Gowdiak

---------------------------------------------
Security Explorations
http://www.security-explorations.com
"We bring security research to the new level"
---------------------------------------------

References:
[1] "Google App Engine Java security sandbox bypasses", technical report
      http://www.security-explorations.com/materials/se-2014-02-report.pdf
[2] Disclosure Policy
     http://www.security-explorations.com/en/disclosure-policy.html
[3] SE-2014-02 Vendors status
     http://www.security-explorations.com/en/SE-2014-02-status.html
[4] SE-2012-01 Security vulnerabilities in Java SE
     http://www.security-explorations.com/en/SE-2012-01.html


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