Message-ID: <5556090B.5010009@erpscan.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 17:56:11 +0300
From: Darya Maenkova <d.maenkova@...scan.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Chinease attack on USIS using SAP vulnerability – Detailed review and comments

*Intro*

On 11th of May, a security headline broke out in the news, it was about 
an attack on USIS (U.S. Investigations Services) conducted potentially 
by Chinese state-sponsored hackers via a vulnerability in SAP Software. 
Hackers broke into third-party software in 2013 to open personal records 
of federal employees and contractors with access to classified 
intelligence, according to the government's largest private employee 
investigation provider [1].

USIS is a federal contractor which conducts background checks for DHS - 
the largest commercial provider of background investigations to the 
federal government. It has more than 5,700 employees providing services 
in all 50 states and U.S. territories and overseas. As the result of the 
breach, more than 27,000 personnel seeking security clearances likely 
were affected. Similar hacks also affected servers at the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), which holds information on security 
clearance investigations. Once hackers have a list of employees who 
possess government security clearances, they can exploit other aspects 
of those employees’ lives for malicious gain.

Within a couple of hours after information that it was a SAP 
vulnerability we contacted with journalists of DarkReading and gave them 
feedback and some comments.

Now we sharing all comments that were prepared as well as additional 
research conducted by us, to tell you what can be the next steps for 
organizations to secure their systems and prevent these attacks.

Below you can find the timeline of this attack investigation, the 
collection of historical facts from different resources, and our 
comments on the topic.

*Attack timeline*

*Late 2013*

Initial Attack against USIS Supplier potentially started [2].

*March 2014*

Attack continued against USIS [3].

    Both USIS and OPM were hacked around March 2014, and while the
    security controls in place at OPM’s networks shielded employee
    information, the networks at USIS were not as secured. At USIS,
    hackers deployed spyware designed to capture screenshots when a
    background check window was open,

- said Stroz Friedberg, Digital Forensic.

Hackers infiltrated a network belonging to one of USIS’s suppliers that 
stored enterprise resource planning software. That network was connected 
to USIS’s network.

According to NextGov, “the attacker was able to navigate from the 
third-party-managed environment into the USIS network in late (redacted) 
by successfully brute-forcing a password on an application server,” - 
wrote Padres, referring to a hacking technique that systematically 
checks all possible passwords. “Once the attacker was able to log in to 
that server, the attacker installed a malicious backdoor.”

*June 05 2014*

USIS reported about the cyberattack to federal authorities on June 5, 
more than two months before acknowledging it publicly [4].

*July 09 2014*

It was published, that Chinese hackers in March broke into the computer 
networks of some United States government agency that houses the 
personal information of all federal employees. But officials also said 
that neither the personnel agency nor Homeland Security had identified 
any loss of personally identifiable information [5].

*August 06 2014*

USIS published the press release stating that they were hacked. And 
potentially it was a state-sponsored attack. They also hired independent 
Forensic investigation company - Stroz Friedberg to perform an 
investigation [6].

*August 22 2014*

Detailed information about the breach appeared in the news.

    The agency has identified some 25,000 employees whose information it
    believes were exposed in the breach. While the number of employees
    affected is relatively small compared to breaches at retailers such
    as Target or Home Depot which have affected tens of millions of
    customers, nonetheless quite serious,

– one of DHS officials told Reuters.

Files on background checks contain highly sensitive data that foreign 
intelligence agencies could attempt to exploit to intimidate government 
workers with access to classified information.

This information includes Social Security numbers, education and 
criminal history, birth dates along with information about spouses, 
other relatives and friends including their names and addresses. [7]

*November 03 2014*

First detailed information about the attack appeared on Associated Press 
website. At this time without any details that attack on SAP ERP System 
was used for conducting attack [8].

“A cyberattack similar to previous hacker intrusions from China 
penetrated computer networks for months at USIS, the government's 
leading security clearance contractor, before the company noticed, 
officials and others familiar with an FBI investigation and related 
official inquiries.

The breach, first revealed by the company and government agencies in 
August, compromised the private records of at least 25,000 employees at 
the Homeland Security Department and cost the company hundreds of 
millions of dollars in lost government contracts. In addition to trying 
to identify the perpetrators and evaluate the scale of the stolen 
material, the government inquiries have prompted concerns about why 
computer detection alarms inside the company failed to quickly notice 
the hackers and whether federal agencies that hired the company should 
have monitored its practices more closely,” – told The Associated Press [9].

In the private analysis prepared for USIS by Stroz Friedberg, a digital 
risk management firm, managing director Bret A. Padres said the 
company's computers had government-approved "perimeter protection, 
antivirus, user authentication and intrusion-detection technologies." 
But Padres said his firm did not evaluate the strength of USIS' 
cybersecurity measures before the intrusion.

So, what we can learn from that statement “government inquiries have 
prompted concerns about why computer detection alarms inside the company 
failed to quickly notice the hackers”?

As we have mentioned in many reports, SAP Security, much like any 
business application security area is rarely covered by traditional 
security tools such as vulnerability management and intrusion detection 
systems. SAP has very specific vulnerabilities and configuration issues 
that should be assessed by high-quality experts. To give you an example, 
there are thousands of parameters related to security in each SAP System 
just in application server. In addition to that, there were 3300+ 
vulnerabilities found in SAP from 2001 till 2015. Also, if we continue 
to speak about complexity, there are 1200 web services installed by 
default on SAP NetWeaver 7.2 (SAP’s application server), each web 
service is like a small website. So, you can get an idea of the 
complexity of this system and how many issues there can exist. Needless 
to say that “complexity kills security”. Even after the latest SAP’s 
marketing campaign “SAP is Simple” (which is a great idea), it will take 
you years to make it really simple with such amount of legacy systems.

*November 04 2014*

New information appeared in the news [10].

    The hackers attacked a vulnerable computer server in a connected but
    separate network, managed by a third party not affiliated with USIS,

- said Padres, Forensic Company.

Now we learned, that the actual attack was conducted via separate 
network owned by 3rd party, but still nothing special about how exactly 
it has happened.

*April 28 2015*

After almost 5 month of silence, finally some new information appeared, 
and this was the first resource where we found information that pointed 
us to the fact that the initial attack was against ERP System. And this 
ERP System was on the separate network managed by separate company. [11]

Hackers infiltrated a network belonging to one of USIS’s suppliers, 
which stored enterprise resource planning software. That network was 
connected to USIS’s network. [12]

    The attacker was able to navigate from the third-party-managed
    environment into the USIS network in late (redacted) by successfully
    brute-forcing a password on an application server,

– wrote Padres.

When we speak about business applications, we need to consider their 
highly interconnected nature. You can’t just implement dozens of 
business applications in a company and leave them unconnected. For 
example, to automate business processes, your ERP system should be able 
to automatically create an invoice in banking system, so these systems 
should be somehow connected on application layer even if they are 
separated by network. In the real life we see dozens or even hundreds of 
connections between different SAP Systems, and some of these connections 
(so-called RFC Destinations) store usernames and passwords (according to 
our statistics, average number of connections in SAP System is about 50 
while 30% of them usually store usernames and passwords).

Once an attacker gets an access to the weakest SAP System, he can easily 
get access to connected systems and from them to others, so on and so 
forth spreading his access like a spider’s web.

Another way how business applications can be connected is via Enterprise 
Service Bus, such as SAP PI, or process integration system, these 
systems also have vulnerabilities as reported by ERPScan Research team 
during BlackHat 2013 conference.

Finally even direct connections don’t exist, there is a research 
conducted by ERPScan Research team, with explanation of SSRF attack that 
can be used to bypass firewall restriction and attack systems using 
their trust connections [13].

Taking into account those connections, it comes as no surprise that 
attackers were able to get access to the connected network of another 
company.

Finally we would like to say that those connections can be even more 
dangerous if we talk about Manufacturing, Oil and Gas and Nuclear 
companies, where SAP can be connected with Field devices and Plant Floor.

*May 10 2015*

 From the previous article we may make a decision that this ERP system 
was most probably SAP as the most popular one, and the new article 
confirmed this fact. NextGov became the first resource to tell that it 
was actually SAP.

“That software apparently was an SAP enterprise resource planning 
application. It’s unclear if there was a fix available for the program 
flaw at the time of the attack. It’s also not clear whether SAP—which 
was responsible for maintaining the application—or USIS would have been 
responsible for patching the flaw.

But in the end, sensitive details on tens of thousands of national 
security personnel were exposed in March 2014.

Assailants infiltrated USIS by piggybacking on an “exploit,” a glitch 
that can be abused by hackers, that was “present in a widely used and 
highly-regarded enterprise resource planning (‘ERP’) software package,” 
an internal investigation obtained by Nextgov found. USIS officials 
declined to explicitly name the software application, saying they would 
let the report, compiled by Stroz Friedberg, a digital forensics firm 
retained by USIS, speak for itself.” [14]

This report also includes a try to look deeper into SAP vulnerabilities 
and make a guess what has happened:

During the period of the hacking operation, which began in 2013 and was 
exposed in June 2014, 20 to 30 new critical vulnerabilities were 
identified in SAP’s enterprise resource planning software [15].

 From our point of view, real figures about potential vulnerabilities 
are much larger. If we assume that real attack was conducted in 2013, 
let’s say on the beginning of the year, the actual number of 
vulnerabilities patched by SAP from 2001 to the middle of 2013 were 
about 2000, according to the research “SAP Security in figures 2013” 
[16] based on information from SAP Support portal about all vulnerabilities.

The number of SAP vulnerabilities would have given attackers many 
options to target SAP directly, based on how USIS deployed the ERP 
tool,” - said Richard Barger, chief intelligence officer at 
ThreatConnect, former Army intelligence analyst.

This is more than true. In addition, more than 2000 potential 
vulnerabilities existed in SAP Applications, there also can be some 
vulnerabilities in custom programs developed by USIS subcontractor or 
even another 3rd party.

It is unclear which vulnerability the intruders exploited. Defects in 
programs used by the government and contractors sometimes aren’t fixed 
for years after software developers announce a weakness.

*May 11 2015*

Some other details appeared[17].

Lawmakers have been pressing for answers about the breach since last 
year. Suspected Chinese hackers got into the USIS systems in late 2013 
but weren’t discovered until June 2014. It is totally not surprising us. 
Some of the companies that we had a chance to assess don’t have any 
visibility to their systems. According to our research, only 10% of 
customers really configure and analyze SAP Security logs and other events.

*May 12 2015*

An article from DarkReading where we gave our first comments regarding 
this breach.[18]

So now, you can get the full picture of attack, and there is only one 
question left – how this attack was conducted. Let’s try to answer it.

*What kind of vulnerability was exploited?*

The news states that the vulnerability is “present in a widely-used and 
highly-regarded enterprise resource planning (‘ERP’) software package”

No other details about the vulnerability were provided.

Let’s try to understand what kind of vulnerabilities were used in this 
attack, but first of all let’s look at the history. We provide annual 
reviews about SAP Vulnerabilities, these reports usually called “SAP 
Security in figures”

  * 2011.*SAP SECURITY IN FIGURES 2007-2011*[19]
  * 2013*SAP SECURITY IN FIGURES 2007-2011*[20]
  * 2014*Analysis of 3000 SAP Security notes*[21]
  * 2015*Blog post with latest review*[22]

 From those reports we can get information about most critical 
vulnerabilities. Taking into account that the attack has happened in 
late 2013, only the first three reports will be relevant for us.

Another guideline provided by ERPScan Research team is focused on most 
popular vulnerabilities, taking into consideration their criticality as 
well. So, combining data from these reports we can give an overview of 
vulnerabilities that were most probably used in this attack. And even if 
this assumption won’t be true, we will anyway get the list of most 
critical and popular vulnerabilities affecting SAP ERP Systems. The fact 
that we are mostly looking for SAP ERP vulnerabilities also should be 
taken into account.

We also excluded most of the vulnerabilities that can be used only with 
combination with others, most of the specific vulnerabilities, and those 
vulnerabilities that require some user’s actions such as XSS. So finally 
we collected 15 vulnerabilities that are most likely were used against 
ERP System in this period of time and can give attacker and easy way to 
get full access to vulnerable SAP System.

And finally we limited the list of vulnerabilities by publication date 
and select only those which were published before Q2 2013.

We add a couple of parameters to each vulnerability to calculate final 
likehood that this particular vulnerability was used.

  * *Criticality*– Real impact to system, such as full administrative
    access or just an information disclosure.
  * *Popularity*– Amount of information in public sources such as
    presentations, whitepapers, and advisories with vulnerability
    description.
  * *Ease of exploitation*– If there is a publically available free tool
    with exploit, or exploit, or POC, or advisory, or some kind of details.
  * *Applicability*– our personal thoughts if this vulnerability is
    applicable to particular system that has been used in organization.
  * *Likehood*– overall probability that this particular vulnerability
    was exploited based on previously mentioned parameters.

*Below is the table with details of our analysis.*

Vulnerability Title 	Year 	Likehood 	Popularity 	Criticality 	Ease of 
exploitation 	Applicability 	CVSSv2 	Patch
Default passwords for administrative users 	???? 	100,00% 	5 	5 	5 
5 	N/A 	1414256
RFC Gateway remote command execution 	2007 	80,00% 	5 	5 	4 	5 	7.5 
1425765,1408081,1473017,1069911,1480644 ,614971,1525125
SAP/Oracle REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT 	2003 	40,96% 	4 	4 	4 	4 	7.5 
1622837,1639578
Remote code execution via TH_GREP 	2011 	38.40% 	4 	5 	3 	4 	6.0 	1620632
Unauthorized access to SAP Management console 	2011 	38.40% 	4 	3 	4 
5 	5.6 	1439348
SAP Host Control – Code Injection 	2012 	36,00% 	3 	5 	5 	3 	10 	1341333
SAP Dispatcher – DIAG protocol Buffer Overflow 	2012 	24,00% 	3 	5 
2 	5 	9.3 	1687910
Authentication bypass through Verb Tampering 	2011 	20,00% 	5 	5 
5 	1 	10 	1589525, 1624450
Authentication bypass through the Invoker servlet 	2011 
20,00% 	5 	5 	5 	1 	10 	1585527
SAP Message Server – Buffer Overflow 	2012 	16,00% 	2 	5 	2 	5 	10 	1649840
SAP NetWeaver DI – Arbitrary file upload 	2013 	10,24% 	2 	4 	2 	4 	9.3 	10
Message Server Auth Bypass 	2008 	7,68% 	3 	4 	1 	4 	7.5 	1421005
SAP GRMGApp – XXE and authentication bypass 	2013 	5,76% 	2 	3 	2 	3 
7.3 	1729293, 1725390
SAP NetWeaver J2EE – DilbertMSG SSRF 	2012 	4,32% 	3 	3 	3 	1 	7.3 	1707494
Buffer overflow in ABAP Kernel call 	2011 	3,20% 	1 	5 	1 	4 	4.8 
1487330, 1529807

So, most likely the vulnerability that was used was one of those:

  * Default passwords for administrative users
  * RFC Gateway remote command execution
  * SAP/Oracle REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT
  * Remote code execution via TH_GREP
  * Unauthorized access to SAP Management console

*Prevention*

We recommend you to implement some of the most critical SAP Security 
Notes, which were probably used during this attack, which listed in the 
table provided in the previous chapter.

Secondly, follow our guidelines [23] for initial assessment of SAP 
NetWeaver ABAP Application server – 33 Most critical security checks.

Thirdly, check this presentation, as well as all other slides and 
guidelines [24] about SAP Security and you are also welcome to follow us 
during security conferences worldwide. Here isthe list of nearest events 
<http://erpscan.com/category/press-center/future-events/>.

*Recommendations*

Since all steps discussed previously require a lot of workforces, we 
recommend you to check automatic solutions to assess and secure your 
system as soon as possible, as nobody knows, if your system is not under 
attack.

*Takeaways for CISOs are*:

As you see, when some researchers start flagging security loopholes by 
publishing information about one or another system's security 
vulnerability, it's only a matter of time before cyber criminals 
actually exploit it. Who will fall victim to be anybody guess. So, apart 
from the fact that it's better to take precautionary actions before a 
real example surfaces, we started to talk about this 8 years ago.

Our lessons are simply three:

  * You can't only trust traditional security solutions when we speak
    about advanced cyber attacks.
  * You can't be sure that everything is ok in your network unless you
    really monitor it from all angles, if we talk about SAP it means
    that VA, Custom code security, SOD and event monitoring - all areas
    should be on the radar.
  * And the most important for business applications is that they are
    highly connected within each other, and as you see in this example,
    and it's not only the problem of your infrastructure security, it's
    also a problem of all your external connections and 3rd party security.

So what it boils down to is that "a system is only as secure as its 
weakest link".

*References*

1.http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/05/third-party-software-was-entry-point-background-check-system-hack/112354/

2.http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/05/third-party-software-was-entry-point-background-check-system-hack/112354/

3.www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com%2Fdr20150430-breach-of-backgroundchecks-database-may-lead-to-blackmail 
<http://erpscan.com/press-center/blog/chinease-attack-on-usis-using-sap-vulnerability-detailed-review-and-comments/www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com%2Fdr20150430-breach-of-backgroundchecks-database-may-lead-to-blackmail>

4.http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/11/04/cyberattack-on-top-u-s-govt-security-contractor-went-unnoticed-for-months/

5.http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/chinese-hackers-pursue-key-data-on-us-workers.html?_r=0 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/chinese-hackers-pursue-key-data-on-us-workers.html?_r=0%3Cp%3E6.%20http://www.usis.com/media-release-detail.aspx?dpid=151>

6.http://www.usis.com/media-release-detail.aspx?dpid=151

7.http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/us-usa-security-contractor-cyberattack-idUSKBN0GM1TZ20140822

8.http://bigstory.ap.org/article/427fbd5d88f5481eab35f5a8bbc534be/security-contractor-breach-not-detected-months

9.http://bigstory.ap.org/article/427fbd5d88f5481eab35f5a8bbc534be/security-contractor-breach-not-detected-months. 
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/427fbd5d88f5481eab35f5a8bbc534be/security-contractor-breach-not-detected-months>

10.http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/11/04/cyberattack-on-top-u-s-govt-security-contractor-went-unnoticed-for-months/

11.http://www.ladailypost.com/content/background-checks-database-breach-heightens-blackmail-risk

12.http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/05/third-party-software-was-entry-point-background-check-system-hack/112354/

13.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/SSRF%20vs%20Businness%20critical%20applications%20final%20edit.pdf

14.http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/05/third-party-software-was-entry-point-background-check-system-hack/112354/

15.http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/05/third-party-software-was-entry-point-background-check-system-hack/112354/

16.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/SAP%20Security%20in%20figures%20-%20A%20global%20survey%202013%20RC.pdf

17.http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/241588-report-hackers-infiltrated-security-contractor-using-third-party

18.http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/first-example-of-sap-breach-surfaces/d/d-id/1320382

19.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/SAP-Security-in-figures-a-global-survey-2007-2011-final.pdf

20.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/3000-SAP-notes-Analysis-by-ERPScan.pdf

21.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/3000-SAP-notes-Analysis-by-ERPScan.pdf

22.http://erpscan.com/press-center/blog/sap-vulnerabilities-highlighted-in-many-reports-such-as-hp-cyber-risk-report-2015/#more-7858

23.http://erpscan.com/wp-content/themes/supercms/Publications/EASSEC-PVAG-ABAP.pdf

24.http://erpscan.com/white-papers/

-- 

Darya Maenkova

PR manager

<https://www.linkedin.com/profile/public-profile-settings?trk=prof-edit-edit-public_profile> 
<https://twitter.com/d_maenkova>

<http://erpscan.com/>

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