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Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:24:21 +1000
From: David Jorm <>
Subject: [FD] Grandstream VoIP phone: SSH key backdoor and multiple
 vulnerabilities leading to RCE as root

The Grandstream GXV3275 is an Android-based VoIP phone. Several
vulnerabilities were found affecting this device.

* The device ships with a default root SSH key, which could be used as a

/system/root/.ssh # cat authorized_keys
Public key portion is:
Fingerprint: md5 7b:6e:a0:00:19:54:a6:39:84:1f:f9:18:2e:79:61:b5

This issue has not been resolved.

* The SSH interface only provides access to a limited CLI. The CLI's ping
and traceroute commands will pass user input as parameters to underlying
system commands without escaping shell metacharacters. This can be
exploited to break out to a shell:

GXV3275 > traceroute $(sh)

This shell will only see stderr, so we then need to run sh with stdout
redirected to stderr:

sh 1>&2

This issue has been resolved in firmware version

* The web interface exposes an undocumented command execution API:


This issue has been resolved in firmware version

* The web interface allows unprivileged users to escalate privileges by
modifying a cookie on the client side:


Full details are available here:

MITRE was contacted repeatedly requesting CVE names for these issues, but
never replied.


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