Message-ID: <CAHGV2moyzQPsTufr6bJM+8C+TPViVeiFWDLghbOS7-9YqFwGFg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 09:53:22 -0400
From: Reggie Dodd <reggie.dodd30@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Taser Axon Dock (Body-Worn Camera Docking Station) v3.1 -
 Authentication Bypass

[TITLE]
Taser Axon Dock (Body-Worn Camera Docking Station) v3.1 - Authentication
Bypass

[CREDITS & AUTHORS]
Reginald Dodd
https://www.linkedin.com/in/reginalddodd

[VENDOR & PRODUCT]
Taser International Inc.
Axon Dock - Body-Worn Camera Docking Station
https://www.axon.io/products/dock

[SUMMARY]
The Axon Dock is the camera docking station component of Taser's body-worn
camera system. It charges body-worn cameras and automatically uploads
videos to Taser's Evidence.com after body-worn cameras are stored onto it.
System owners can remotely manage the dock through a web browser by
navigating to http://<IP>. Remote unauthenticated users can obtain
administrator access and reconfigure the Axon Dock.

[DESCRIPTION]
The Axon Dock stores its core management files in the http://<IP>/lua/
directory. These files are not protected with basic authentication. Remote
unauthenticated users can send HTTP POST requests to any of these files:
* http://<ip>/lua/set-passwd.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/set-config.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/reset-reg.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/etm-reboot.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/ssl-regen.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/diag-cmd.lua
* http://<ip>/lua/dvr-update.lua

Once a HTTP POST request with the proper payload body is sent to those
files, they will allow remote unauthenticated users to:
* Change the password of the default and unchangeable user named "admin".
* Change the network configuration.
* Reveal body-worn camera owner real names, typically law enforcement
officers.
* De-register a Axon Dock from Evidence.com to possibly disrupt or
dissassociate video uploads.
* Reboot a Axon Dock.
* Regenerate the SSL certificate
* Run Diagnostics on the Axon Dock
* Update the firmware of the Axon Dock and any attached cameras
* Repair any attached cameras
* It was discovered that an intentionally hidden feature could allow users
to transfer body-worn camera videos to any ftp server other than
evidence.com. The HTML DIV tag of this feature was hidden with CSS
(display:none). This feature uses ftp to transfer videos. It is accessible
to remote unauthenticated users, as well. The device uses the
/lua/set-config.lua file to enable this feature. I created a ftp server to
test it. The ftp credentials were sent via the GUI and re-sent several
times via Burp Suite. I was able to enable it, but it constantly showed as
not being properly configured (red instead of green status). I did not
notice any network traffic in wireshark on the ftp port of my ftp server.
However, I did not have a body-worn camera available to accurately confirm
that this feature does not work.

[AFFECTED VERSIONS]
Vulnerable Version(s): 3.1.160322.2252 and possibly all prior versions
Fixed Version: Version 3.2.160726.1852

[SOLUTION]
Taser stated that they would centrally push out version 3.2.160726.1852 to
all Axon Docks on August 8, 2016. If your dock is not updated, try to
update the dock manually in the firmware section of the remote console.
Contact Taser if you have any complications.

[TIMELINE]
July 18-20,2016 - Discovered and validated with multiple exploits.
July 21, 2016 - My findings and exploits were dislosed to Taser. They
immediately acknowledged the issues.
July 22, 2016 - Taser stated that a fix would be available in 2 weeks.
July 31, 2016 - CVE-ID was requested from MITRE.
August 1, 2016 - MITRE denied the CVE-ID request.
August 8,2016 - Allegedly, the fix was to be centrally pushed on this day.
Although, no docks were updated that were accessible to me.
August 12,2016 - Received reports that some docks were updated with the
fix.
August 13, 2016 - Taser sent a confirmation email stating that "all" docks
have been updated with the fix.
August 15, 2016 - Public Disclosure.

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