Message-ID: <CAB8+WF1C2HHfokGc6shET91LMPya7J2EQkap+Kr1KrCaiX9Kyg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 18:23:03 +0000
From: Karn Ganeshen <karnganeshen@...il.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] BINOM3 Electric Power Quality Meter Vulnerabilities

*Universal multifunctional Electric Power Quality Meter BINOM3 - Multiple
Vulnerabilities*

*About*
The meters are designed for autonomous operation in automated systems:
• SCADA systems
• Data aquisition and transmission systems
• Automated data and measurement systems for revenue and technical power
metering
• Power quality monitoring and control systems
• Automated process control systems, Management information system

+++++
*Submitted to ICS-CERT *- May 25, 2016.
*No response from vendor till date.*
+++++

*Vulnerability Information*

*HTTP*

1. *Reflected **XSS* – multiple urls, parameters
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an
unauthenticated as well as authenticated, attacker to inject arbitrary
JavaScript in a specially crafted URL request where the response containing
user data is returned to the web browser without being made safe to display.

2. *Stored **XSS* – multiple urls, parameters
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an authenticated
attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript in specific input fields, which get
stored in the underlying db, and once accessed, the data including
malicious scripts, is returned to the web browser leading to script
execution.

3. *Weak Credentials Management *
The device comes configured with four (4) login accounts:
- admin / 1
- user / 1
- alg / 1
- telem / 1

3a) These passwords do not meet even basic security criterion.
3b) To further make it easier for attacker(s), the application design does
not provide the users, any option to change their own passwords in device
management portal. Only 'root' can change passwords for all other accounts.
(AFAIK)

4.* Undocumented root account *
In addition to the above four documented login accounts, there is a 'root'
superuser account:
- root / root
- root account details are not documented in the device administration
guide or manuals
- root account has multiple, additional functions accessible like user
management

5. *Sensitive Information stored in clear-text *
- all user passwords are stored / viewable in clear-text

Additionally, specific non-root, non-privileged users can access complete
device configuration file, which contains clear-text passwords and other
config information. This flaw can be used to gain privileged access to the
device.

6*. Vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery *

There is no CSRF Token generated per page and / or per (sensitive)
function. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can allow silent
execution of unauthorized actions on the device such as configuration
parameter changes, and saving modified configuration.

7. *Sensitive information leakage*

Every time ‘root’ logs in, a GET request is made to a specific url to
access password configuration file.

Response comes as xml data, and contains all accounts and their passwords.
As, by default, the management portal is configured for HTTP, a suitably
positioned attacked can sniff all login credentials, and gain privileged
access.

*Telnet *

1. *Access Control Issues*
By default, password authentication is not enabled on Telnet access (AFAIK).
- This access gives superuser-level access to device
- Access to the device provides detailed info on application,
configuration, device file system, databases (including Energy & billing),
consumption, Statistics, network information, as well as clear-text creds
(FTP)
- Easy vector to device & data compromise

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