Message-Id: <20160930203821.49BE96D7F@ack.nmap.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 21:15:55 +0200
From: Matthias Deeg <matthias.deeg@...s.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Radioactive Mouse States the Obvious: Exploiting unencrypted
 and unauthenticated data communication of wireless mice

tl;dr

Today, SySS published a proof-of-concept video demonstrating a mouse
spoofing attack resulting in remote code execution due to insecure
wireless mouse communication:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkR8EODee44

-----

Radioactive Mouse States the Obvious

In the course of their research project about modern wireless desktop
sets using AES encryption, Expert IT Security consultant Matthias Deeg
and IT Security Consultant Gerhard Klostermeier noticed that the radio
communication of all tested wireless mice so far was unencrypted and
unauthenticated.

The insight that radio communication of many wireless mice is insecure
and can be exploited in specific attack scenarios is not new. The fact
that this well-known security issue still exists in current wireless
mice which are part of modern wireless desktop sets using AES encryption
for keyboard data, however, brought SySS to raise the awareness for this
security vulnerability and the associated security risks once again.

By knowing the used mouse data protocol, an attacker can spoof mouse
actions like mouse movements or mouse clicks. Thus, an attacker can
remotely control the mouse pointer of a target system in an unauthorized
way. Using trial & error and good educated guesses (heuristic method),
mouse spoofing attacks can result in remote code execution on affected
target systems.

Matthias Deeg and Gerhard Klostermeier developed a proof-of-concept
software tool named Radioactive Mouse for conducting automated mouse
spoofing attacks. A proof-of-concept mouse spoofing attack resulting in
remote code execution is demonstrated in the following video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkR8EODee44

Further information about vulnerabilities in affected wireless mice of
different manufacturers like Cherry, Microsoft, Logitech, and Perixx are
described in the following four security advisories:

SYSS-2016-058: CHERRY B.UNLIMITED AES - Insufficient Verification of
Data Authenticity (CWE-345), Mouse Spoofing Attack
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2016-058.txt

SYSS-2016-059: Microsoft Wireless Desktop 2000 - Insufficient
Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345), Mouse Spoofing Attack
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2016-059.txt

SYSS-2016-060: M520 (Mouse of Wireless Combo MK520) - Insufficient
Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345), Mouse Spoofing Attack
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2016-060.txt

SYSS-2016-061: PERIDUO-710W - Insufficient Verification of Data
Authenticity (CWE-345), Mouse Spoofing Attack
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2016-061.txt

Moreover, Matthias Deeg and Gerhard Klostermeier will present the
results of their research project about modern wireless desktop sets at
the following IT security conferences this autumn:

Hack.lu, October 18-20, 2016, Luxembourg
Hacktivity, October 21-22, 2016, Budapest
Ruxcon, October 22-23, 2016, Melbourne
DeepSec, November 10-11, 2016, Vienna
ZeroNights, November 17-18, 2016, Moscow

Currently, SySS recommends not using wireless mice without encryption
and authentication in security-sensitive environments.

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