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Message-ID: <CANO=Ty3C4kfhp=A6zQksNzmNRgUBpUk4M__mhkcez=_RA8_Dew@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2017 19:29:40 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org, docker-user@...glegroups.com,
docker-dev@...glegroups.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [FD] [oss-security] Docker 1.12.6 - Security Advisory
Can you post a link to a patch for this issue, or to a bug entry with
additional details, or the download site at a minimum? Thanks!
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 6:58 PM, Nathan McCauley <nathan.mccauley@...ker.com
> wrote:
> Docker Engine version 1.12.6 has been released to address a vulnerability
> and is immediately available for all supported platforms. Users are advised
> to upgrade existing installations of the Docker Engine and use 1.12.6 for
> new installations.
>
> Please send any questions to security@...ker.com.
>
>
> ==============================================================
> [CVE-2016-9962] Insecure opening of file-descriptor allows privilege
> escalation
>
> ==============================================================
>
> RunC allowed additional container processes via `runc exec` to be ptraced
> by the pid 1 of the container. This allows the main processes of the
> container, if running as root, to gain access to file-descriptors of these
> new processes during the initialization and can lead to container escapes
> or modification of runC state before the process is fully placed inside the
> container
>
>
> Credit for this discovery goes to Aleksa Sarai from SUSE and Tõnis Tiigi
> from Docker.
>
--
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert@...hat.com
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