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Message-ID: <CAFD2FDOXC7WLsKH9sdGut+P+_qaSoKVK02ENLqviht8NYmSgXA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2017 20:53:28 -0400
From: hyp3rlinx <apparitionsec@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Spiceworks 7.5 TFTP Improper Access Control File Overwrite /
	Upload

[+] Credits: John Page AKA HYP3RLINX
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source:
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/SPICEWORKS-IMPROPER-ACCESS-CONTROL-FILE-OVERWRITE.txt
[+] ISR: APPARITIONSEC



Vendor:
==================
www.spiceworks.com



Product:
=================
Spiceworks - 7.5


Provides network inventory and monitoring of all the devices on the network
by discovering IP-addressable devices.
It can be configured to provide custom alerts and notifications based on
various criteria. it also provides a ticketing system,
a user portal, an integrated knowledge base, and mobile ticket management.



Vulnerability Type:
==============================================
Improper Access Control File Overwrite / Upload



CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-7237



Security Issue:
================
The Spiceworks TFTP Server, as distributed with Spiceworks Inventory 7.5,
allows remote attackers to access the Spiceworks "data\configurations"
directory by leveraging the unauthenticated nature of the TFTP service for
all clients who can reach UDP port 69. This allows remote attackers to
overwrite files within the Spiceworks configurations directory, if the
targeted file name is known or guessed.

Remote attackers who can reach UDP port 69 can also write/upload arbitrary
files to the "data\configurations", this can potentially become a
Remote Code Execution vulnerability if for example an executable file e.g.
EXE, BAT is dropped, then later accessed and run by an unknowing
Spiceworks user.




References - released April 3, 2017:
====================================
https://community.spiceworks.com/support/inventory/docs/network-config#security



Proof:
=======

1) Install Spiceworks
2) c:\>tftp -i VICTIM-IP PUT someconfig someconfig
3) Original someconfig gets overwritten

OR

Arbitrary file upload
c:\>tftp -i VICTIM-IP PUT Evil.exe  Evil.exe




Network Access:
===============
Remote




Severity:
=========
High




Disclosure Timeline:
======================================================================
Vendor Notification: March 13, 2017
Sent vendor e.g. POC : March 23, 2017
Request status : March 30, 2017
Vendor reply: "We are still working on this" March 30, 2017
Vendor reply :"Thanks for bringing this to our attention"
and releases basic security note of issue on website : April 3, 2017
April 5, 2017  : Public Disclosure




[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the
information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author
prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).

HYP3RLINX

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