Message-Id: <E1dYqFV-0003ec-Bq@rmmprod07.runbox>
Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 10:58:57 +0200 (CEST)
From: "Hal Martin" <hal.martin@...chmysys.com>
To: "fulldisclosure" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] CVE-2017-9457 CompuLab Intense PC lacks firmware signature
	validation

Credits: Hal Martin
Website: watchmysys.com
Source: https://watchmysys.com/blog/2017/07/cve-2017-9457-compulab-intense-pc-lacks-firmware-validation/


Vendor:
====================
CompuLab (compulab.com)


Product:
====================
Intense PC / MintBox 2


Vulnerability type:
====================
Platform lacks signature verification and does not validate firmware update before flashing


CVE Reference:
====================
CVE-2017-9457


Summary:
====================
Since 2013 CompuLab manufactures and sells the Intense PC (also sold under the name "MintBox 2"), which is a small Intel-based fanless PC sold to end-users and industrial customers. It was discovered that there is no signature validation of the UEFI firmware update file before flashing, allowing an attacker to silently flash a modified UEFI firmware to flash using the standard Phoenix update utility.

CompuLab have indicated via email that capsule signature validation is disabled by default by the IBV (Phoenix) for this platform. No timeline was provided to implement capsule signature verification.


Affected versions:
====================
All firmware versions since product release (latest public firmware is 21 May 2017)


Attack Vector:
====================
An attacker tricks the user into running a malicious executable with local administrator privileges, which updates the system firmware to include the attacker's code. The attacker may instead use a known OS exploit to perform the upgrade remotely (without user interaction or notification).


Proof of concept:
====================
I have created a modified firmware update which replaces the stock UEFI shell with the UEFI shell from EDK2. The update can be flashed from within Windows without any user interaction or notification. Firmware updates are not signed by CompuLab or verified by the existing firmware before upgrade.

The modified update, based on the 21 May 2017 firmware, can be downloaded here: https://watchmysys.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/update-IPC-20170521-edk2.zip

Details of the full proof of concept can be found at the Source link above.


Mitigation:
====================
At this time there is no means for the end user to enable Capsule Signature verification or to prevent the Phoenix update utility from updating the system firmware.

Therefore Intense PC owners should consider the following options:

- Ensure your operating system is up to date with the latest security patches. Do not run software from untrusted sources.
- Do not connect your Intense PC to any networks with internet access (i.e. air-gap the computer).
- Discontinue your use of the Intense PC and consider replacing the computer with one from a different manufacturer who implements signature validation for firmware updates.


Disclosure timeline:
====================
6 June 2017: Issue reported to CompuLab
6 June 2017: CompuLab confirms that “Default settings of this source tree [Phoenix SecureCore Tiano Enhanced Intel Ivy Bridge CPU Panther Point M] has disabled Capsule Signature option.”
6 June 2017: Issue is reported to MITRE
6 June 2017: Vulnerability is assigned CVE-2017-9457
7 June 2017: CompuLab are informed that the vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2017-9457 and details of the vulnerability will be published after 45 days
22 July 2017: Details of the vulnerability are published

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