Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 15:12:13 +0200
From: Karsten König <kk@...hron.de>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] CIPH-2017-1: Advisory for StashCat

1. Introduction
===============

* CIPHRON-ID: CIPH-2017-1
* Product: heinekingmedia StashCat
* Status: Patch available
* Affected versions:
     * Android: <= 1.7.5
     * Web: <= 0.0.80w
     * Desktop <= 0.0.86
* Vendor-URL: https://www.stashcat.com/
* CVE: CVE-2017-11129 bis CVE-2017-11136

During an independent investigation researchers of CIPHRON found 
vulnerabilities in cryptographic and security functions of the instant 
menssenger StashCat of heinekingmedia GmbH.

CIPHRON follows the principle of responsible disclosure and has informed 
heinekingmedia beforehand. heinekindmedia has reacted to the disclosure 
and has developed patches. These patches are available and will be 
distributed in successive.

CIPHRON follows an own disclosure policy. This is available at

https://ciphron.de/vulnerability-disclosure-policy

2. Description of software
==========================

StashCat is developed by heinekingmedia GmbH and has the aim to give 
customers an instant messenger which encrypts the communication between 
clients End-to-End like it is known, for example, from WhatsApp or 
Telegram. It is worth mentioning that the messenger provides a web and a 
desktop client in addition to the Android and iOS app.

According to heinekingmedia the messenger aims especially at the use by 
the police and authorities.

More information are available at

https://www.stashcat.com/

According to the web client website at

https://app.stashcat.com

we investigated version v0.0.80w

The investigated Android versions were the versions 1.5.18 and 1.7.5.

According to the installation file we investigated the version 0.0.86 of 
the desktop client.

3. Description of vulnerabilities
=================================

The vulnerabilities were found during a half-day code review of the web 
client. This was possible because the client is written in angular and 
the client-side JavaScript code is directly available on

https://app.stashcat.com

The desktop client is build with Electron and is based on the web client 
code for the base functionality.

We found vulnerabilities in the Android app via reverse engineering, 
too. The finding from the code review of the web client were verified 
through the reverse engineering if the protocol is affected.

The vulnerabilities have assigned CVEs. These are CVE-2017-11129 to 
CVE-2017-11136.

CIPHRON has asked an independent third party, the Niedersachsen-CERT 
(N-CERT), to verify the findings, what they did.

We gave heinekingmedia the change to comment the findings.

3.1 Communication decryptable through vendor
--------------------------------------------

CVE-2017-11136

One can see that the private key of the RSA-key pair, which is created 
on the clients and is used to exchange passwords for symmetric 
encryption of the communication channel, is transmitted to the 
StashCat-server.

The password which is used to encrypt the private key are the first 32 
bytes of the SHA512 hash of the user passsword. But this is transmitted 
to the vendor server, too, as it is the login password.

This allows to decrypt the private key of StashCat users and therefore 
the formaly encrypted communication channel for everyone which has 
access to the vendor server because the password for the symmetric 
encryption can be eavesdropped.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Passwords to secure the private key are now independent of the used 
account password.

RSA keys are now 4096 bit in addition.

3.2 No key derivation function used
-----------------------------------

CVE-2017-11131

Instead of using a key deriviation function to create the password for 
authentication, the user password is hashed directly with SHA512. 
Moreover, only the first 32 bytes are used. State-of-the-art is to use a 
key derivation function like PBKDF2 to generate from a source of low 
entropy a password with high entropy.

Moreover, rainbow table attacks are mitigated through this

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

RSA-keys are encrypted according to PKCS#8. PBKDF2 is used internally.

3.3 Passwords generated with math.random()
------------------------------------------

CVE-2017-11133

The communication ist encrypted with AES in CBC-mode. The passwords to 
encrypt the communication channel and the IV which are exchanged by the 
communicating parties with RSA-key pairs are generated with math.random.

Newer versions are using CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() which uses 
math.random() internal as well. This method ist not secure in a 
cryptographic sense. Instead such generated passwords have to be treated 
as deterministic what could lead to a compromise of the communication 
channel.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Channel and conversation secrets are are no longer generated by 
CryptoJS.

3.4 Integrity and authenticity not ensured
------------------------------------------

CVE-2017-11130

The integrity and authenticity of encrypted messages is not ensured. 
This allows, for example, replay attacks in man-in-the-middle scenarios.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Responses created by the server are signed and can be verified by the 
public key of the server.

3.5 Logout without authorisation
--------------------------------

CVE-2017-11135

Logouts of users can be done without authorisation because only the 
device ID is needed.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

The logout needs only the device_id. This is intentional and leads to 
the deletion of of data on the logouted device.

This is by no means a vulnerability.

__Remark of CIPHRON__

 From our point of view this can lead to a problem if an attacker could 
enumerate all device IDs. This could be used for a denial of service 
attack.

3.6 Android-keystore uses hard coded password
---------------------------------------------

CVE-2017-11129
The Android-keystore uses a hard coded password. This allows to read out 
contained passwords through third parties which gained access to the 
keystore.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

A hard coded password is not used from now on.

The previously hard coded password for the Android-keystore is now 
replaced by a randomly generated password. The password is created by a 
random string of 32 characters which is generated by a secure random 
method. The random string is stored in the shared preferences of Android 
and is deleted with every logout. The stored random string is XORed with 
the manufacture and model code of the device. The result is used as the 
encryption key. From this the keystore password is derived in 
conjuncture with the device ID.

3.7 No certificate pinning
--------------------------

CVE-2017-11132

The Android-app uses no certificate pinning. Instead, only the signature 
of the Certificate Authority is checked. This eases man-in-the-middle 
attacks.

Remark: This finding was fixed independently of the disclosure process 
in Android-versions after 1.5.18.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

All apps use certificate pinning or HPKP to complicate man-in-the-middle 
attacks.

3.8 Login data in the logs
--------------------------

CVE-2017-11134

The Android-app saves login data in the logs what could help attackers 
to gain access to this data.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

In the case of exceptions the request was saved to the log on the 
device.

The log entries are now cleared beforehand.

4. Solution
===========

heinekingmedia has accepted the findings and will distribute patches 
successively which are already available.

5. Credits
==========

The code review and the reverse engineering was done by Karsten König of 
CIPHRON. Sebastian Horzela and Lennart Henke supported.

The Niedersachen-CERT verified the findings of CIPHRON as an independent 
party.

6. Greets
=========

Greets to the team of CIPHRON, especially Martin, Jan and Frithjof for 
the good discussions and the good atmosphere in the office.

7. Timeline
===========

10.03.2017 Vendor contacted

15.03.2017 Second contact attempt because no response received

15.03.2017 Phone call with heinekingmedia

15.03.2017 Findings communicated

06.06.2017 Note that findings are solved

28.06.2017 Communication of the prepared advisory for coordination

11.07.2017 Advisory communicated to N-CERT because CIPHRON received no 
response

17.07.2017 Coordination with heinekingmedia about further procedure

18.07.2017 Commentary of the vendor about the findings received by 
heinekingmedia

19.07.2017 Remarks about the commentary communication to heinekingmedia

19.07.2017 Communication of the updated advisory draft including the 
commentary

19.07.2017 Coordindation of the advisory publication

19.07.2017 Note that the findings will be fixed until the end of next 
week

28.07.2017 Note that patches of the findings are ready

28.07.2017 Discussion of the patches

31.07.2017 Publication of the advisory

8. About CIPHRON
================

The CIPHRON GmbH was founded in 2003 and is a consultancy for 
information security with its central office in Hannover, Germany. As a 
consultancy for information security, CIPHRON does penetration tests, 
code reviews and individual research about security topics.

More information are available at

http://ciphron.de


-- 
Karsten-Kai König, IT Security Consultant
CIPHRON GmbH

Tel.: +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 0   Fax:       +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 29
Web: http://www.ciphron.de/     Support:   +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 11

Ust.Id.: DE263362886            Geschäftsführer:  Sebastian Horzela
                                 Amtsgericht Hannover, HRB 203590Dear

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