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Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 11:03:00 +0200
From: "Sandro \"guly\" Zaccarini" <>
Subject: [FD] Aerohive HiveManager Classic privilege escalation and auth
 code execution vulnerability


Aerohive Networks HiveManager Classic Online NMS is a cloud-enabled
enterprise-class management system for Aerohive networking products.
HiveManager Classic Online offers simple policy creation, firmware
upgrades, and centralized monitoring of thousands of Aerohive access
points, switches, and branch routers.

Responsible disclosure with Aerohive: Aerohive has a very reactive
security staff.

Their response to our communication was pretty fast, we received the
first ack within 24hrs and an official statement in 4days.

The latest version of the software at the time of writing can be
obtained from support portal at


The vulnerability allows a local user, even restricted as a Tenant, to
upload a backup archive that contain jsp webshell, therefore to execute
code on underlying system.

The affected component is Backup Archive Handler.


The HiveManager Classic backup is a plain .tar.gz file with a very
simple structure.

Once the archive is extracted, you will see two folders:

- HiveManager
- dbxmlfile

"dbxmlfile/" contains the HM/VHM configuration, an interesting file to
work on. Anyway our interest moved to "HiveManager/" as it contains a
directory named "tomcat/webapps" which is the default Tomcat web app.

The full tree is something like:

── tomcat
    └── webapps
        └── hm
            └── domains
                └── MyTenant
                    └── maps
                        ├── ca.png
                        ├── campus.png
                        ├── map_floorplan.png
                        ├── us.png
                        └── world.png

If such directory is tampered, tar gzipped and then restored using the
backup/restore functionality, an attacker can gain code execution on the

As Proof of Concept a "webshell.jsp" file has been added at maps/ level,
then we created a new .tar.gz archive and tried to restore it.

No error has been thrown and jsp file was available under the docroot at
URI /hm/domains/MyTenant/maps/

Further analysis pointed out that full path was writable so it's
possible to upload a jsp shell even outside the Tenant scope.

Code will be executed as tomcat (uid/gid 501) allowing a full compromise
of the web UI and access to other Tenant files and configurations as


We are not aware of any workaround.


Vendor is moving to a completely new release of the product called
HiveManager-NG, which has a different architecture and is not affected
by this vulnerability. We did not perform any audit on such version of
the product.


Mitre assigned the CVE-2017-14105 for this vulnerability.


20170828 Bug discovered
20170829 Vulnerability disclosed to Aerohive
20170829 First reply from Aerohive
20170901 The vendor reply with a wontfix
20170901 Request for CVE to Mitre
20170901 Got CVE-2017-14105 from cve-assign
20170902 Full disclosure


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