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Message-ID: <CAAnZqX8eqy0m_brufathLuB=Wg+Um=uDhtMqFCwjpKsq2UC=-Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2017 10:13:11 +0300
From: Maor Shwartz <maors@...ondsecurity.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Cc: SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure <ssd@...ondsecurity.com>
Subject: [FD] SSD Advisory – ZTE uSmartView DLL Hijacking
SSD Advisory – ZTE uSmartView DLL Hijacking
Full report: *https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3457
<https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3457>*
Twitter: @SecuriTeam_SSD
Weibo: SecuriTeam_SSD
Vulnerability summary
The following advisory describes an DLL Hijacking found in ZTE uSmartView.
ZTE uSmartView offers: “ZTE provides full series of cloud computing
products (including cloud terminals, cloud desktops, virtualization
software, and cloud storage products) and end-to-end integrated product,
which can be applied to different scenarios such as office, training
classroom, multimedia classroom, and business hall.”
Credit
An independent security researcher has reported this vulnerability to
Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program
Vendor Response
ZTE has been notified on the 13th of August 2017, several emails were
exchanged, but no ETA for a fix or workaround have been provided for the
following vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability details
When uSmartView starts on a Windows machine it tries to load a DLL
(pcacli.dll) from the C:\Program Files (x86)\vdc\ientry directory, if a
malicious attacker puts the DLL in that directory uSmartView will load it
and run the code found in it – without giving the user any warning of it.
This happens because uSmartView does not provide file pcacli.dll.
Furthermore, writing in C:\Program Files (x86)\vdc\ientry doesn’t require
any special privileges.
Since uSmartView can require admin privileges an attacker can place the
pcacli.dll and cause command execution as the current user (usually admin).
--
Thanks
Maor Shwartz
Beyond Security
GPG Key ID: 93CC36E2DE7FF514
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