Message-ID: <87572015.50338.1511840824613@ichabod.co-bxl>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 04:47:04 +0100 (CET)
From: IOT Sec <iot_sec@...lfence.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] CVE-2017-14953 - Hikvision Wi-Fi IP Cameras associate to a
 default unencrypted rogue SSIDs in a wired configuration

Hikvision Wi-Fi IP Cameras associate to a default unencrypted rogue SSIDs in a wired configuration
Full disclosure
Nov 27, 2017

Synopsis:
---
HikVision Wi-Fi IP cameras come with a default SSID "davinci", with a setting of no WiFi encryption or authentication. Depending on the firmware version, there is no configuration option within the camera to turn off Wi-Fi. If a camera is deployed via wired ethernet, then the WiFi settings won’t be adjusted, and a rogue AP with the SSID "davinci" can be associated to the camera to provide a new attack vector via WiFi to a wired network camera.

Risk:
---
The security exposure provides an unexpected attack surface via Wi-Fi in a camera deployed in a wired environment.  Devices running a firmware prior to v5.4.5 can be attacked via an access control bypass.  http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Sep/23
The camera will also do a DHCP on its wireless interface, so the rogue AP subnet would get preference versus a L3 adjacent NVR/viewer, performing a denial of service.

Mitigation:
---
The mitigation since the Wi-Fi cannot be turned off, is to specify a complex WPA2-PSK AES key.  With this the camera will try to associate to a wireless PSK that doesn’t exist, and it is unlikely that the attacker will be able to guess the complex key.
Via the web interface:
Configuration -> Network -> Advanced Settings -> Wi-Fi
Set Security Mode to: “WPA2-personal”
Set Encryption Type to: “AES”
Set Key 1 to: A random long string of characters
Enable WPS: Uncheck

Vulnerability details:
---
Tested Model Number (Confirmed): DS-2CD2432F-IW
Tested Firmware Versions (Confirmed): 5.3.0, 5.4.0, 5.4.5
Exploit:  Camera is hardwired via ethernet.  Wi-Fi is unconfigured (by default).
Set up a rogue Wi-Fi access point with an SSID of "davinci" with no encryption.
The camera will associate with the rogue access point.  There is no configuration option for the administrator to turn off WiFi. If the rogue access point offers DHCP the camera will get a dynamic address and be remotely accessible within Wi-Fi range. Combined with previous firmware exploits an attacker could remotely exploit or disable the camera simply by being within Wi-Fi range.  The attack also circumvents any wired network security that may have been deployed on that segment, such as Firewalls, ACLs, turning off UPnP.

Timeline:
---
June 1, 2017 - Reported to security.usa@...vision.com - No Response
June 6, 2017 - Reported again to security.usa@...vision.com - No Response
September 29, 2017 - Reported again to security.usa@...vision.com - No Response
September 29, 2017 - Reported to techsupport.usa@...vision.com - Automated Response only - No follow up
September 29, 2017 - Reported to CERT. Tracking as VU#768573.
September 29, 2017 - Reported to MITRE. Assigned CVE-2017-14953.
October 3, 2017 - Reported to ICS-CERT upon CERT's recommendation - No response.
October 3, 2017 - Hikvision responds.
November 27, 2017 - Mutually agreed disclosure date.  Exposure details released in the full disclosure distribution list.

Possibly affected camera model numbers (Wi-Fi) [unconfirmed]:
DS-2CD2112F-IWS
DS-2CD2132F-IWS
DS-2CD2522FWD-IWS
DS-2CD2542FWD-IWS
DS-2CD2412F-IW
DS-2CD2422FWD-IW
DS-2CD2432F-IW
DS-2CD2023G0D-IW2
DS-2CD2123G0D-IW2
DS-2DE2204IW-DE3/W

Rebranded products possibly affected [unconfirmed]:
ANNKE I61DR IP Camera 2MP 1080P HD Two-way audio
Amazon Name: ANNKE Wireless Cube Camera 1080P 2.0 Megapixel WiFi Network IP Camera

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