Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2017 09:48:34 +0200
From: Maor Shwartz <maors@...ondsecurity.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Cc: SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure <ssd@...ondsecurity.com>
Subject: [FD] SSD Advisory – Huawei P8 wkupccpu debugfs Kernel Buffer Overflow

SSD Advisory – Huawei P8 wkupccpu debugfs Kernel Buffer Overflow

Full report: https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3580
Twitter: @SecuriTeam_SSD
Weibo: SecuriTeam_SSD

Vulnerability Summary
The following advisory describes a buffer overflow found in Huawei P8 Lite
ALE-21 HI621sft, operating system versions EMUI 3.1 – wkupccpu debugfs
driver.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. is “a multinational networking and
telecommunications equipment and services company, it is the largest
telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world and the second
largest smartphone manufacturer in the world”

Credit
A security researcher from, TRUEL IT, has reported this vulnerability to
Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program

Vendor response
Huawei confirmed that the vulnerability is not present on their most
current version (with EMUI 4.0 or later), the only affected version is 3.1
and prior, it is recommended that all customers of Huawei upgrade to the
latest version of their OS.


Vulnerability details
The vulnerability allows an attacker with root privileges in an
unprivileged SELinux domain to execute arbitrary code in the kernel context.

The vulnerable code can be found in the wkupccpu debugfs driver.

File Kernel Binary Image – function pwrctrl_debug_init() @ 0xf9c714:3

See Image 005

The instructions at offset 0xf9c78c and 0xf9c7b8 in the pwrctrl_debug_init
function are the one responsible of registering the debugfs directory and
file in the filesystem, which is then mounted within the /sys/kernel/debug/
system directory

The driver implements the write handler in its wkupccpu_dbgfs_write
function:

See image 007

It is good to have in mind the signature of a typical write implementation,
which is:

===

ssize_t (*write) (struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);

===

The first basic block shown above prepares the stack and reserves 0xb0
(176) bytes for the local variables: register X1 will contain the pointer
to const char * argument buffer provided by the user.

Lines from offset 0x666208 to 0x666218 are the one responsible to check if
the pointer to const char * argument provided by the user and its size
provided as the size_t argument can cause an arithmetic overflow.

In case of arithmetic overflow, the flow will be redirected to the basic
block at offset 0x666234 and the vulnerability will not be triggered;
otherwise, the execution will proceed to basic block at offset 0x666220,
which contains the vulnerable copy_from_user call.

The following is the state of the registers when this call is reached:

X0 will hold the pointer to the destination buffer: the analysis highlights
that the buffer is 0x8b (128) bytes longs and resides locally to the
function
X1 will hold the pointer to the source buffer, which resides in user space
and is usersupplied
X2 register will hold the number of bytes to copy, which is determined by
the size ofthe buffer pointed by X1

Since we control the value of X2 register, we can provide a buffer wider
than 128 bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write on the stack that could lead
to memory corruption.




--
Thanks
Maor Shwartz
Beyond Security
GPG Key ID: 6D273779F52A9FC2

Download attachment "image007.png" of type "image/png" (458992 bytes)

Download attachment "image005-1.png" of type "image/png" (375413 bytes)

Download attachment "SSD Advisory – Huawei P8 wkupccpu debugfs Kernel Buffer Overflow.pdf" of type "application/pdf" (249898 bytes)


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