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Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:24:52 +0100
From: Florian Bogner <>
Subject: [FD] Local Privilege Escalation in CrashPlan’s Windows Client Version 4

Local Privilege Escalation in CrashPlan’s Windows Client Version 4

Release Date: 15-Feb-2018
Author: Florian Bogner //
Affected product: CrashPlan's 4-series and earlier Windows client
Fixed in: CrashPlan's version 4.8.3 Windows client; version 5 was never affected by this issue
Tested on: Windows 7
CVE:  Not requested
Vulnerability Status: Fixed with new release (13.6.2017)

Product Description
CrashPlan offers the most comprehensive online backup solution to hundreds of thousands of consumers and tens of thousands of businesses around the world. Our highly secure, automatic and continuous service provides our customers the peace of mind that their digital life is protected and easily accessible. [citing]

Vulnerability Description
This advisory is about a local privilege escalation vulnerability affecting CrashPlan’s Windows application. It can be abused by any local user to gain full control over the system.

The underlying issue is that the Windows Service "CrashPlan Backup Service" loads and executes files from the insecure filesystem location C:\ProgramData\CrashPlan. Any local authenticated user can abuses this behaviour by dropping a malicious Java CLASS file there. After the system is rebooted this Java class is loaded and the code is executed as SYSTEM. This causes a local privilege escalation from authenticated user to SYSTEM.

Suggested Solution
End-users should update to the latest available version.

Disclosure Timeline
18.5.2017: The issues has been identified
22.5.2017: The issues has been documented and reported to the vendor
25.5.2017: Vendor confirmed vulnerability and is working on a fix
13.6.2017: New version containing a fix has been released. The release notes have been published here: <>
15.2.2018: Public disclosure

A working PoC is available here:

Florian Bogner

eMail: <>
Web: <>
LinkedIn: <>
Xing: <>

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