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Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2019 23:50:36 -0400
From: tim@...atti.com
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Hard-coded credentials on ProGrade/Lierda Grill Temperature
 Monitor [CVE-2019-15304]

[Author:] Tim Tepatti
[Website:] tepatti.com

[Title:] Hard-coded credentials on ProGrade/Lierda Grill Temperature
Monitor [CVE-2019-15304]

[Product:] Grill Temperature Monitor
[Manufacturer:] ProGrade / Lierda
[Affected Version(s):] V1.00_50006
[Tested Version(s):] V1.00_50006
[Vulnerability Type:] Use of hard-coded credentials (CWE ID 798)
[CVE Reference:] CVE-2019-15304


[TL;DR:]

ProGrade/Lierda Grill Temperature Monitor V1.00_50006 has a default
password of admin for the admin account, which allows an attacker to
cause a Denial of Service or Information Disclosure via the
undocumented access-point configuration page located on the device.

[Long Info:]

ProGrade/Lierda Grill Temperature Monitor V1.00_50006 has a default
password of admin for the admin account, which allows an attacker to
cause a Denial of Service or Information Disclosure via the
undocumented access-point configuration page located on the device.

The access point configuration page is never made known to the end
user - the user is never supposed to access it or change any of the
options, and as such, the end user has no idea that an attacker could
access this page. This is different than a normal access point or
internet router where the administration page is required for setup
and configuration, and the end user is made aware of the risk of
default credentials. This makes the vulnerability more severe because
the attack vector is something which the end user wasn't aware even
operated on their device.

Additionally, there were two vendors provided because Lierda is a
wholesaler who actually created the device, and ProGrade simply
re-branded the device for the American market. This way, both
customers will be aware of the security vulnerabilities in the
product.

[Technical Info:]

[Default Web Server IP:] 11.11.11.254
[Default Web Server Port:] 80

[Reference(s):] http://progradegrill.com/wifi-grilling-thermometer/

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