lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <19f851ee-b608-bd72-f690-a58cd5952544@sec-consult.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 22:13:21 +0100
From: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab <research@...-consult.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20191202-0 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities
 in SALTO ProAccess SPACE

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20191202-0 >
=======================================================================
              title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities
            product: SALTO ProAccess SPACE
 vulnerable version: <= v5.5
      fixed version: >= v5.6
         CVE number: CVE-2019-19457, CVE-2019-19458, CVE-2019-19459,
                     CVE-2019-19460
             impact: critical
           homepage: https://www.saltosystems.com/en/
              found: 2019-05-22
                 by: Werner Schober (Office Vienna)
                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                     An integrated part of SEC Consult
                     Europe | Asia | North America

                     https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:
-------------------
"SALTO ProAccess SPACE Software is a powerful access control management
tool that enables you to program access time zones for each user,
manage different calendars and obtain audit trails from each door
to see who has passed through it. The software includes special
functions such as automatic door status changes, anti-passback
and relay management.

Thanks to its advanced software features, SALTO ProAccess SPACE is also
one of the most user-friendly and powerful software products for the
access control management of stand-alone wireless devices, and IP
online devices in one converged complete access control platform
for the user, keys and doors management."

Source: http://proaccess-space.saltosystems.com/features/


Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.

SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by
security professionals to identify and resolve all security issues.


Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1. Path Traversal (CVE-2019-19458)
Path traversal vulnerabilities allow attackers access to files
and directories outside the application root through relative file paths
in the user input. During a quick security check, multiple locations
in the web application were identified, which allow an attacker
to traverse outside of the application root. The vulnerabilities got
identified in the "Data Export" as well as "Database Export"
functionality. Those vulnerabilities can for example be used to dump the
whole database into the web root, by traversing outside of the application
root.

2. Arbitrary File Write (CVE-2019-19459)
By further exploiting the path traversal vulnerability inside of the
"Data Export" feature, an attacker is able to traverse into arbitrary paths
and write arbitrary files with arbitrary contents. Some examples are files
to the web root, or bat files into auto start. This allows an attacker to
execute arbitrary commands on the server.

3. Stored Cross-Site-Scripting (CVE-2019-19457)
By adding devices to the SALTO network with a JavaScript payload inside of
certain parameters, an attacker is able to permanently embed arbitrary
JavaScript payloads inside of the web application.

4. Webserver running as SYSTEM (Windows Service) per Default (CVE-2019-19460)
The webserver of the SALTO ProAccess SPACE is running as a Windows Service with
local SYSTEM permissions per default. This is against the principle of least
privilege. An attacker, who is able to exploit the path traversal, or arbitrary
file write vulnerability, is basically able to write to every single path
on the file system, because the webserver is running with the highest
privileges available.

5. Authorization Issues
Multiple API calls were identified in the SALTO ProAccess SPACE web application,
that could normally only be called by high privileged users. Nevertheless, by
directly calling the API with the OAuth token of a low privileged user, it was
possible to call some API calls that shouldn't be available to them.

6. Cleartext transmission of sensitive data
The SALTO ProAccess SPACE web application allows their users to create so called
event streams. Those streams can be used to log events centrally. The stream
is transmitted via TCP/UDP in JSON, or CSV format. The stream is transmitted in
cleartext and leaks sensitive data such as who opened which door and when
including card ids etc.


Proof of concept:
-----------------
1. Path Traversal (CVE-2019-19458)
The "Data Export" as well as the "Database Export" features in
SALTO ProAccess SPACE allow users to specify a filename for the different
exports. By using special characters inside of the filename, an attacker is
able to traverse outside of the designated export path and place the exports
in arbitrary locations. For example, the following filename can be used
in the database export to store the database backup inside of the webroot:

..\..\..\..\SALTO\ProAccess Space\bin\webapp\backup.db

The file can then be easily retrieved via the following link without
authentication:

http(s)://$IP/backup.db


2. Arbitrary File Write (CVE-2019-19459)
The vulnerability described above can be further developed into an arbitrary
file write vulnerability by using the "Data Export" functionality. The webapp
lets their users choose an export filename and the fields, which should be
exported (e.g. Username, Notes field). To store a file with arbitrary contents
on the file system the following steps have to be conducted:

 a. Store the payload inside of an arbitrary field, that can be manipulated by the
    user. (E.g. Username is set to "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.location)>"
    as an example for stored XSS)
 b. Create a new export with the following export file name
    "..\..\SALTO\ProAccess Space\bin\webapp\sectest.html"
 c. Finalize the export
 d. Access the file without authentication via http(s)://$IP/sectest.html


3. Stored Cross-Site-Scripting (CVE-2019-19457)
By injecting arbitrary JavaScript payloads inside of the name of a SALTO
network device (e.g. RFID Wall Reader) an attacker is able to permanently
embed malicious JavaScript code inside of the web application that is
executed as soon as certain pages are visited.


4. Webserver running as SYSTEM (Windows Service) per Default (CVE-2019-19460)
In a standard configuration the SALTO service, which is also serving the
webserver on port 8100 is running as a local windows service. Naturally, this
results in multiple issues. One of them is, that the webserver is automatically
running with SYSTEM privileges.


5. Authorization Issues
The following API calls can be accessed by a low privileged user without any
permissions (except login permissions) set:

/rpc/DirectoryExists
/rpc/GetLicense

Those API calls can be perfectly used to evaluate, which folders exist on the
file system.


6. Cleartext transmission of sensitive data
No PoC available.


Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following versions have been tested:
* SALTO ProAccess SPACE 5.4.3.0
* Service Binary Version 4.13.3.404


Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2019-05-24: Contacting vendor through info@...tosystems.com
2019-05-24: Initial response from Salto Systems; providing a PGP public key for
            encrypted communication
2019-05-24: Sending the encrypted advisory to Salto Systems
2019-06-11: Requesting a status update.
2019-06-12: Vendor responded with a detailed plan on how and when
            the vulnerabilities are going to be fixed.
2019-09-02: Requesting status update.
2019-09-04: Vendor provides version information and further release plan updates
2019-09 - 2019-11: Multiple emails exchanged and telephone conferences discussing
            the vulnerabilities
2019-12-02: Coordinated advisory release.


Solution:
---------
Update to SALTO ProAccess SPACE 5.6 which is available to customers through the
vendor's software area.


Workaround:
-----------
No workaround available.


Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It
ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network
and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult
Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation
of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our
customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid
recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/career/index.html

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/contact/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF Werner Schober / @2019


Download attachment "smime.p7s" of type "application/pkcs7-signature" (3995 bytes)


_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ