lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 08:23:26 +0000
From: "Julien Ahrens (RCE Security)" <info@...security.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [CVE-2020-25203] Frame Preview
 "com.framer.viewer.FramerViewActivity" Arbitrary URL Loading

RCE Security Advisory
https://www.rcesecurity.com


1. ADVISORY INFORMATION
=======================
Product:        Framer Preview
Vendor URL:     https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.framerjs.android
Type:           Improper Export of Android Application Components [CWE-926]
Date found:     2020-09-06
Date published: 2020-09-22
CVSSv3 Score:   5.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)
CVE:            CVE-2020-25203


2. CREDITS
==========
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from
RCE Security.


3. VERSIONS AFFECTED
====================
Framer Preview 12


4. INTRODUCTION
===============
Framer Preview is the best way to view and interact with your Framer X and Framer 
Classic projects on Android phones and tablets.

(from the vendor's homepage)


5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS
========================
The "Framer Preview" app for Android exposes an activity to other apps called
"com.framer.viewer.FramerViewActivity". The purpose of this activity is to show
contents of a given URL via an fullscreen overlay to the app user.

However, the app does neither enforce any authorization schema on the activity
nor does it validate the given URL. 

This can be abused by an attacker (malicious app) to load any website/web content 
into the fullscreen overlay. An exemplary exploit could look like the following:

Intent i = new Intent();
i.setComponent(new ComponentName("com.framerjs.android", "com.framer.viewer.FramerViewActivity"));
i.setAction("android.intent.action.VIEW");
i.setData(Uri.parse("https://www.rcesecurity.com"));
startActivity(i);


6. RISK
=======
A malicious app on the same device is able to exploit this vulnerability to lead
the user to any webpage/content. The specific problem here is the assumed trust
boundary between the user having the Framer Preview app installed and what the app
is actually doing/displaying to the user. So if the user sees the app being
loaded and automatically loading another page, it can be assumed that the loaded 
page is also trusted by the user.


7. SOLUTION
===========
-


8. REPORT TIMELINE
==================
2020-09-06: Discovery of the vulnerability
2020-09-06: CVE requested from MITRE
2020-09-07: Contacted vendor via their security@, no response
2020-09-08: MITRE assigns CVE-2020-25203
2020-09-09: Informed vendor about the CVE assignment, no response
2020-09-22: Public disclosure due to unresponsive vendor


9. REFERENCES
=============
-

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists