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Message-ID: <96dec32c-62f4-aa23-11b3-78a7422e5b2c@syss.de>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 08:00:12 +0200
From: Patrick Hener <patrick.hener@...s.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [SYSS-2020-024] Qiata FTA - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Advisory ID: SYSS-2020-024
Product: Qiata FTA
Manufacturer: Secudos GmbH
Affected Version(s): <= Qiata FTA 1.70.19
Tested Version(s): Qiata FTA 1.70.19
Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Solved
Manufacturer Notification: 2020-06-17
Solution Date: 2020-08-12
Public Disclosure: 2020-09-28
CVE Reference: CVE-2020-14294
Author of Advisory: Patrick Hener, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

Qiata FTA is a secure file transfer appliance.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"Qiata File Transfer Appliances (FTAs) provide the ability to easily and
securely exchange files with internal or external users."

Due to insufficient input validation of user-provided input, it is
vulnerable
to cross-site scripting.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

Within every transfer initiated, both the sender and the receiver of the
transfer are able to communicate via a comment function.

This comment function does in fact alter user input and change appearances
of the special characters '<' and '>' by flipping the direction of the
special
character. Also, quotation marks are escaped properly.

An attacker can use the behavior to construct a malicious string, which will
embed persistent cross-site scripting within the transfer comments. The
exploit will be executed when viewing the transfer comments.

For a user not registered within the file transfer appliance, the
exploit will
be executed directly when opening the provided transfer URL.

This vulnerability is also discovered at the global notice board where
no escaping could be identified.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

The following string will result in persistent cross-site scripting
displaying the message "Persistent XSS by SySS GmbH" when executed. All an
attacker needs to do is to enter the malicious string as a comment to a
transfer.

">img src=x
onerror=alert(String.fromCharCode(80,101,114,115,105,115,116,101,
110,116,32,88,83,83,32,98,121,32,83,121,83,83,32,71,109,98,72)) /<"


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

The vulnerability was fixed with version Qiata FTA 2.00.00. Update to at
least this version.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2020-06-02: Vulnerability discovered
2020-06-17: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2020-08-12: Patch released by manufacturer
2020-09-28: Public disclosure of vulnerability

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product Website for Qiata FTA
    https://www.secudos.de/en/products/qiata-file-transfer
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2020-024
   
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2020-024.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
    https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Patrick Hener of SySS
GmbH.

E-Mail: patrick.hener@...s.de
Public Key:
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Patrick_Hener.asc
Key ID: 5C708555930AA477
Key Fingerprint: 9CB7 1E87 BD83 64B7 38F2  3434 5C70 8555 930A A477

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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