Message-ID: <cd011982-df6a-7182-8906-dde3cdbea802@sec-consult.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 12:44:38 +0100
From: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab <research@...-consult.com>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20201217-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities
 in Trend Micro InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA)

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20201217-0 >
=======================================================================
              title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities
            product: Trend Micro InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA)
 vulnerable version: < IWSVA 6.5 SP2 EN Patch 4 Build 1919
      fixed version: IWSVA 6.5 SP2 EN Patch 4 Build 1919
         CVE number: CVE-2020-8461, CVE-2020-8462, CVE-2020-8463, CVE-2020-8464
                     CVE-2020-8465, CVE-2020-8466
             impact: critical
           homepage: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/products/user-protection/sps/web-security/interscan-web-security-virtual-appliance.html
              found: 2019-07
                 by: Wolfgang Ettlinger (Office Vienna)
                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                     An integrated part of SEC Consult
                     Europe | Asia | North America

                     https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:
-------------------
"The web has rapidly become a top threat vector for business. In addition to
blocking malicious code, inappropriate websites, and targeted attacks, security
managers are also being asked to secure the expanding use of Web 2.0 and
cloud-based applications, while reducing overhead and bandwidth costs.

Trend Micro™ InterScan™ Web Security Virtual Appliance is an on-premises secure
web gateway that gives you superior protection against dynamic online threats,
while providing you with real-time visibility and control of employee internet
usage. Interscan Web Security is also available in the cloud as a service."

URL: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/products/user-protection/sps/web-security/interscan-web-security-virtual-appliance.html


Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.

Customers should also adhere to security best practices such as network
segmentation, limiting access to the admin panel or admins not being logged
on while surfing the web for CSRF mitigation.

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of this
and similar Trend Micro products conducted by security professionals to
identify and resolve all security issues. Based on the identified issues
it is possible that further critical issues exist in those products.


Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) CSRF Protection Bypass (CVE-2020-8461)
The IWSVA web interface checks that every request contains a valid CSRF token.
However, this check does not apply if the request contains a body that is
encoded as multipart/form-data. Therefore, an attacker can simply get the
victim's browser to send any request encoded as multipart/form-data without
requiring a valid CSRF token.

2) Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2020-8462)
Several stored and reflected Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities have been
identified in the IWSVA web interface.

3) Authorization Bypass (CVE-2020-8463)
A global authorization check is performed to allow anonymous users access to
a very restricted set of paths (e.g. the login page). This check is performed by
checking that the first part of the requested path matches one of the allowed
paths (e.g. logon.jsp). This verification can be bypassed by sending request paths
in the form of /logon.jsp/../<actual path> which allows accessing other scripts.

4) Authentication Bypass/SSRF (CVE-2020-8464)
The IWSVA administration web interface does not perform all authentication
checks if the request is sent from localhost. However, as the IWSVA also operates
as an HTTP proxy, an attacker can send requests that appear to come from
localhost by accessing the admin interface through the proxy. This behavior
also exposes the administration interface to users that would normally only have
access to the HTTP proxy of the appliance.

5) Command Execution (CVE-2020-8465)
The IWSVA's update functionality allows administrators to upload system updates
provided by Trend Micro™ to the web interface. The code contained in these
updates is executed as root. No code authenticity checks are performed before
applying the update. Therefore, by combining this behavior with the previous
vulnerabilities an unauthenticated attacker can execute code as user root.

6) Unauthenticated Command Injection (CVE-2020-8466)
When the improved password hashing method is enabled (see release notes for
Service Pack 2 Patch 3 for instructions how to enable it) the appliance is
vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability affecting the password
submitted during login. Therefore, an unauthenticated attacker is able to
execute commands by providing a manipulated password.


Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) CSRF Protection Bypass (CVE-2020-8461)
The following fragment demonstrates this issue by adding the user "attacker" by
using the form enctype "multipart/form-data":

<form
action="https://<host>:8443/servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.updateaccountadministration?accountop=add&allaccount=admin&accountType=local&accountnamelocal=attacker&accounttype=0&password_changed=true&PASS1=test&PASS2=test&description=&role_select=1&roleid=1"

    method="POST"
    enctype="multipart/form-data">
  <input type="hidden" name="x" value="y" />
  <input type="submit" value="Send" />
</form>


2) Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2020-8462)
The following instances of stored and reflected cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities have been identified (all of these can be combined with CSRF
protection bypass).

 * Adding a user e.g. with the description <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
   Executed in the user overview (login_accounts.jsp)
 * Sending a POST request like /logon_report.jsp?"><script>alert(1)</script>
   (this only works in Internet Explorer as other browsers URL-encode some
   of these characters)
 * The following path demonstrates a reflected XSS:
   /change_status.jsp?settings=--><script>alert(1)</script>


3) Authorization Bypass (CVE-2020-8463)
The following path demonstrates how the global authorization filter can be
bypassed. The effects of this vulnerability alone were not further investigated.
Only the effects when combined with vulnerability #4 were researched.

/logon.jsp/../<anything>.jsp


4) Authentication Bypass/SSRF (CVE-2020-8464)
The following script demonstrates how the proxy of the appliance at port 8080
can be used to access the administration interface. Vulnerability #3 was used
to bypass the global authorization filter. The request is being sent through
the proxy and because it appears to come from localhost other security
mechanisms are bypassed. This script adds a user "attacker".

[ Python exploit script removed from this advisory ]


5) Command Execution (CVE-2020-8465)
Updates to the IWSVA are released as Tar-Gz files that are structured as follows:

update.tgz
 MD5SUM.txt                 contains the output of md5sum *
 stargate_patch.tgz
  stargate_patch.ini        contains metadata
  stargate_patch_apply.sh   executed during update

The file contains no signature that is checked before the update is applied. The
code in stargate_patch_apply.sh can be executed with a single request.

Note: As file uploads are always sent as multipart/form-data the CSRF filter
is ineffective for system updates.


6) Unauthenticated Command Injection (CVE-2020-8466)
The following request demonstrates this issue:
--- snip ---
POST /uilogonsubmit.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: testhost:8443
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 36

uid=admin&passwd=`id`+>/tmp/test+%23
--- snip ---

After this request has been executed, the file /tmp/test contains the following:

   uid=498(iscan) gid=499(iscan) groups=499(iscan)


When combining these vulnerabilities the following attack chains are possible:
 * An attacker on the internet could abuse the CSRF and Command Execution
   vulnerability to take over the appliance as root.
 * An attacker with access to the HTTP proxy port could abuse the
   authentication/authorization bypass vulnerabilities and the Command Execution
   vulnerability to take over the appliance as root without user/admin interaction.

A python exploit script that demonstrates the latter attack scenario has been
developed and provided to Trend Micro, which will not be released. Instead,
a short PoC video showing that an unauthenticated attacker can take over the
appliance as root has been made:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Chl2OeIi2xI


Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The version IWSVA 6.5 SP2 EN Patch 4 Build 1844 with Patch cpb1852 was tested.
This was the latest version at the time of discovery.


Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2019-08-14: Contacting vendor through security@...ndmicro.com
            Submitting advisory information encrypted (PGP).
2019-08-14: Vendor reply, they will take a look at the issue.
2019-08-14: SEC Consult provides additional information/notes and potential
            other security issues not included in the advisory as more
            internal product information & time would be necessary to further
            investigate them.
2019-09-02: Vendor reviewed and analyzed the advisory reports, having difficulties
            and needing more detailed steps to recreate and exploit the vulnerabilities
            CSRF could not be exploited/simulated internally, as a "CSRF token"
            is required.
2019-09-02: SEC Consult explained how and why CSRF is exploitable again, e.g.
            when the user admin is logged in and the PoC form is sent, a new
            user is automatically created.
            Asking the vendor whether we tested the latest available version
            (IWSVA 6.5SP2 EN Patch 4 Build 1844 (w/cpb1852)).
2019-09-03: Vendor is asking about more details on the other reported vulnerabilities;
            More detailed steps in recreating and exploiting the issues are
            requested. Furthermore, info on how the form data for the CSRF PoC
            is being sent.
2019-09-03: SEC Consult provides video how the CSRF issue can be exploited easily.
            Asking what further details would be necessary for the other vulnerabilities
            as we believe the proof of concepts to be sufficient to verify them
2019-09-17: No reply; asking vendor about the status.
2019-09-19: Vendor was able to verify only two vulnerabilities (CSRF & XSS)
            Claimed CSRF attack might not be feasible as attacker would require an
            authenticated admin's cookie.
            First fixes for XSS have been implemented by vendor.
            Issue 3, 4 and 6 could not be reproduced by vendor, PoC similar to the video
            requested. Analysis of issue 5 is ongoing.
2019-09-19: Explaining to the vendor what CSRF is and also providing external
            info such as OWASP;
            Requesting specifics on why vulnerabilities could not be reproduced.
            Asking for information when vendor expects to be able to provide
            a patch.
2019-09-25: Trend Micro PSIRT: no timeline can be provided currently as issues could not be
            reproduced yet.
2019-09-27: SEC Consult postpones advisory release, asking whether further support
            is needed.
2019-10-11: Asking if vulnerabilities could be reproduced by now.
2019-10-11: Trend Micro PSIRT: development team worked on the last three vulnerabilities (4-6),
            update will follow next week.
2019-10-21: Vendor sends PGP encrypted message that can't be decrypted.
2019-10-23: Vendor re-sends message unencrypted; vendor made some progress. Further
            info regarding the additionally provided notes requested.
2019-10-23: SEC Consult: providing more info again.
2019-10-30: Asking vendor again regarding release date
2019-11-04: Trend Micro PSIRT: Testing completed, patch should be ready today, localization
            needs more time.
            Discussing further responsible disclosure steps.
2019-11-09: Trend Micro PSIRT: No ETA yet on final patch because of localization.
2019-11-29: Asking for a status update.
2019-12-10: Trend Micro PSIRT: unexpected issues encountered, intended fix has been rolled back.
            Should know further information by end of the week.
2020-01-08: Asking for a status update.
2020-01-13: Trend Micro PSIRT: development team committed to complete the new fix ETA on or
            before Feb 4
2020-01-16: SEC Consult confirms release date for 4th February.
            Proposing to schedule our advisory release for 19th February to give
            end users more time to patch the highly critical issues.
2020-01-27: No reply yet; SEC Consult informs vendor that we expect the patch
            to be released on 4th February and plan the advisory release for 19th February.
2020-01-29: Vendor sends PGP-encrypted email only for their email address; asking to
            resend it.
            Vendor resends email:
            Vendor is still working on patch (localization for different regions), should be
            available by February "if all goes well". Cannot commit to disclosure date yet,
            new date will be proposed.
2020-01-29: Taking next responsible disclosure steps, contacting CERT-Bund and CERT.at
            regarding scheduled release.
2020-01-29: Asking vendor for further patch information (fixed & affected versions) and
            regarding CVE numbers.
2020-01-30: Telephone call with Trend Micro Germany.
2020-02-03: Telephone call with Trend Micro Germany.
2020-02-04: Trend Micro Germany: CP 1884 will be ready on 7th February.
2020-02-04: Asking whether all security issues have been fixed, postponing security advisory
            release to 24th February, asking again for affected versions, CVE numbers, etc.
2020-02-06: Trend Micro Germany: Hotfix is now available
2020-02-06: Asking whether all issues have been fixed, based on the release notes it seems
            to us that XSS has not been fixed properly and only the "X-XSS-Protection"
            header has to be configured by admins now.
            Asking vendor for further info on this.
2020-02-07: Trend Micro Germany: The patch addresses all identified security issues:
                1) CSRF Protection Bypass            > VRTS-3552
                2) Cross-Site Scripting              > VRTS-3257
                3) Authorization Bypass              > VRTS-3554
                4) Authentication Bypass/SSRF        > VRTS-3555
                5) Command Execution                 > VRTS-3556
                6) Unauthenticated Command Injection > VRTS-3557
2020-02-09: Trend Micro PSIRT: there will be a security bulletin by the vendor which
            includes the CVE numbers, no date yet because of localization.
2020-02-11: Asking vendor again regarding the new "xss_protect" key in the configuration and
            to please share the CVE numbers when they are available.
2020-02-14: No answer from vendor yet. Performed recheck of the critical patch b1884
            and identified that most of the security issues have not or improperly
            been fixed.
            Notifying BSI/CERT-Bund, CERT.at and Trend Micro PSIRT & Trend Micro Germany
            to discuss next steps, providing a detailed recheck analysis report.
2020-02-15: Trend Micro PSIRT: issue has been escalated with highest priority.
            Defective patch has been removed from download center.
2020-02-18: Trend Micro PSIRT provides analysis on submitted recheck report,
            SEC Consult provides feedback why some of the issues are still exploitable.
2020-02-20: Trend Micro PSIRT: feedback is reviewed by developers.
2020-03-04: Asking for a status / schedule update.
2020-03-04: Trend Micro PSIRT: the patch will be a major rework (similar to service pack)
            20th April is being targeted for patch validation, 30th April for release.
2020-03-05: Informing Trend Micro that we have reserved some time for patch validation
            end of April
2020-04-09: Asking for a status update if the patch is still planned for 20th April
2020-04-15: Trend Micro PSIRT: patch delayed, new patch ETA is 30th April
2020-04-29: Trend Micro PSIRT: IWSVA CP pre-release build is ready for verification.
2020-05-03: Informing Trend Micro that most identified vulnerabilities could still
            be easily bypassed and were not patched properly, review not finished yet.
2020-05-05: Sending Trend Micro the revised, detailed recheck report outlining that
                VRTS-3552 - CSRF Protection Bypass (#1) => not fixed properly
                VRTS-3257 - XSS => fixed but new XSS filter has not been reviewed
                                   (new "xss_protect_all" config value)
                VRTS-3554 - Authorization Bypass => not fixed properly
                VRTS-3555 - Authentication Bypass/SSRF (#3) => not fixed properly
                VRTS-3556 - Command Execution => not fixed properly
                VRTS-3557 - Unauthenticated Command Injection => fixed
2020-05-06: Clarifying questions regarding the document
2020-05-26: Asking if patch will be available on 2020-06-02
2020-05-26: Patch will be available for verification on 2020-06-01
2020-05-29: Trend Micro PSIRT provides debug patch
2020-06-08: Sending recheck report document
                VRTS-3552 - CSRF Protection Bypass (#1) => fixed
                VRTS-3554 - Authorization Bypass => fixed
                VRTS-3555 - Authentication Bypass/SSRF (#3) => not fixed properly
                VRTS-3556 - Command Execution => partially fixed
2020-07-07: Trend Micro PSIRT provides debug patch
2020-07-09: Sending recheck report document
                VRTS-3555 - Authentication Bypass/SSRF (#3) => partially fixed
                VRTS-3556 - Command Execution => partially fixed
2020-07-16: Contacting vendor, coordination of patch & advisory release date
2020-08-04: Asking for a status update
2020-08-24: Asking for a status update
2020-09-18: Asking for a status update; Answer: "The hotfix is ready, however, the
            official critical patch to be used for public disclosure is still being
            finalized"; disclosure date will be communicated later
2020-10-23: Asking for a status update
2020-10-29: Trend Micro PSIRT: dev team is still working on a fix, integrating some other
            components/solutions
2020-11-11: Asking for estimated patch release date; no response
2020-11-27: Asking again for estimated patch release date
2020-11-29: Trend Micro PSIRT: Patch should be available in a few weeks
2020-12-10: Trend Micro PSIRT: Patch is available, provides CVE numbers, security bulletin
            will be released on 15th December
2020-12-10: Informing German BSI/CERT-Bund and CERT.at about the patch release and
            bulletin date, TLP GREEN.
2020-12-10: Asking vendor about the new "xss_protect_all" config value to enable the XSS
            filter, if it is enabled by default now, as it is not mentioned in the
            latest release notes and only the variable "xss_protect" in previous builds.
            Telling the vendor that we are releasing our advisory on 17th December.
2020-12-13: Trend Micro PSIRT: "xss_protect_all" is enabled by default.
            Adjusting solution in advisory, follow-up question about "xss_protect".
2020-12-15: Trend Micro security bulletin release
2020-12-17: Coordinated release of security advisory



Solution:
---------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. The release
notes can be found here:
https://files.trendmicro.com/documentation/readme/iwsva_65-sp2_en/iwsva_6.5-sp2_ar64_en_criticalpatch_b1919_EN_Readme.txt

Patch download:
https://files.trendmicro.com/products/iwsva_65-sp2_en/iwsva_65_sp2_ar64_en_criticalpatch_b1919.zip
(According to vendor, ensure that you have installed IWSVA 6.5 Service Pack 2 Hotfix 1912)

Download center URL:
https://downloadcenter.trendmicro.com/index.php?regs=de&prodid=86

Trend Micro Security Bulletin:
https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000283077

Important: There are new XSS protection config values "xss_protect" and "xss_protect_all"
in order to enable the new XSS filter. "xss_protect_all" is enabled by default
according to the vendor.

Description from Trend Micro to enable the "xss_protect" variable from previous
release notes:
                  1. Install the hotfix
                  2. SSH to the IWSVA shell.
                  3. Open the "/var/iwss/intscan.ini" file.
                  4. Locate the "http" section.
                  5. Add the following key and set it to "enable".
                     [http]
                     xss_protect=enable
                  6. Save the changes and close the file.
                  7. Restart the web console service.


Customers should also adhere to security best practices such as network
segmentation, limiting access to the admin panel or admins not being logged
on while surfing the web for CSRF mitigation.


Workaround:
-----------
None


Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It
ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network
and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult
Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation
of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our
customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid
recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/contact/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com
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Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF W. Ettlinger, J. Greil / @2020


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