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Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:12:40 +0100
From: X41 D-Sec GmbH Advisories <advisories@...-dsec.de>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [FD] X41 D-Sec GmbH Security Advisory X41-2021-001: Multiple
 Vulnerabilities in YARA

X41 D-Sec GmbH Security Advisory: X41-2021-001

Multiple Vulnerabilities in YARA
================================
Highest Severity Rating: Medium
Confirmed Affected Versions:  YARA v4.0.3 and earlier
Confirmed Patched Versions: YARA v4.0.4
Vendor: VirusTotal (Google Inc.)
Vendor URL: https://virustotal.github.io/yara
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, Luis Merino
Status: Public
Advisory-URL: https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2021-001-yara


Summary and Impact
------------------
An integer overflow and several buffer overflow reads in
libyara/modules/macho/macho.c in YARA v4.0.3 and earlier could allow an
attacker to either cause denial of service or information disclosure
via a malicious Mach-O file.


Product Description
-------------------
According to the official project description:


Integer overflow in macho_parse_fat_file()
==========================================
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Mach-O file sample
CVE: Pending
CWE: 190


Analysis
--------
An integer overflow in macho_parse_fat_file() while processing the
fat Mach-O file header can lead to arbitrary read.

    if (size < arch.offset + arch.size)
      continue;

    /* Force 'file' array entry creation. */
    set_integer(YR_UNDEFINED, object, "file[%i].magic", i);

    /* Get specific Mach-O file data. */
    macho_parse_file(
        data + arch.offset,
        arch.size,
        get_object(object, "file[%i]", i),
        context);

When the arch.offset + arch.size result does not fit in the uint64_t type
the result will wrap around and might allow to bypass the
size < arch.offset + arch.size sanity check. Afterwards,
macho_parse_file() will be called with buffer and size values that
could be invalid, resulting in arbitrary read and plausible infoleakage or a
denial of service.

Proof of Concept
----------------
Parse the
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/int-overflow-macho-parse-fat-file
sample via yr_rules_scan_mem().


Out-of-bounds reads in macho_parse_file() and others
====================================================
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Mach-O file sample
CVE: Pending
CWE: 125


Analysis
--------
Two for-loops iterate over input buffer data to extract and process
segments and other commands. Incorrect sanity checks lead to out of
bounds reads in several places.

It is also recommended to perform a sanity check on
command_struct.cmdsize, discarding those values where
command_struct.cmdsize<sizeof(yr_load_command_t).

   for (unsigned i = 0; i < header.ncmds; i++)
   {
- -    if (command - data < sizeof(yr_load_command_t))
+    if (data + size < command + sizeof(yr_load_command_t))
       break;

     memcpy(&command_struct, command, sizeof(yr_load_command_t));

    if (should_swap)
      swap_load_command(&command_struct);

- -    if (size < header_size + command_struct.cmdsize)
+    if (size - (command - data) < command_struct.cmdsize ||
command_struct.cmdsize < sizeof(yr_load_command_t))
       break;

Please note that this needs to be patched in the two similar for-loops.


Proof of Concept
----------------
Parse the
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/oob-macho-parse-file
sample via yr_rules_scan_mem().


Out-of-bounds reads in macho_handle_segment_64() and others
===========================================================
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Mach-O file sample
CVE: Pending
CWE: 125


Analysis
--------
macho_handle_segment_64() reads sizeof(yr_segment_command_64_t) bytes
from command without checking if the buffer is big enough.

  memcpy(&sg, command, sizeof(yr_segment_command_64_t));

This results in an out of bounds read when command is not big enough.
Infoleak
or denial of service could be a plausible outcome.

It is recommended to check at least sizeof(yr_segment_command_64_t)
bytes are available in command before calling macho_handle_segment64().

The same issue occurs when calling macho_handle_segment(),
macho_handle_unixthread() and macho_handle_main().

{
     case LC_SEGMENT:
+      if(command_struct.cmdsize < sizeof(yr_segment_command_32_t))
+        break;
       macho_handle_segment(command, seg_count++, object);
       break;
     case LC_SEGMENT_64:
+      if(command_struct.cmdsize < sizeof(yr_segment_command_64_t))
+        break;
       macho_handle_segment_64(command, seg_count++, object);
       break;
}

{
    case LC_UNIXTHREAD:
+     if(command_struct.cmdsize < sizeof(yr_thread_command_t))
+         break;
      macho_handle_unixthread(command, object, context);
      break;
    case LC_MAIN:
+     if(command_struct.cmdsize < sizeof(yr_entry_point_command_t))
+         break;
      macho_handle_main(command, object, context);
      break;
    }

}

Please note that we rely here on cmdsize having a safe value, which is
checked in the fix proposed for the previous finding.


Proof of Concept
----------------
Parse the
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/oob-macho-handle-segment,
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/oob-macho-handle-segment-64
samples via yr_rules_scan_mem().


Several out-of-bounds reads in macho_handle_unixthread()
========================================================
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Mach-O file sample
CVE: Pending
CWE: 125


Analysis
--------
macho_handle_unixthread() reads from command buffer without checking if
the buffer is big enough.

Firstly, sizeof(yr_thread_command_t) bytes are skipped in command,

  command = (void*) ((uint8_t*) command + sizeof(yr_thread_command_t));

which could result in command pointing out of bounds and triggering
invalid reads in subsequent command dereferences. It is recommended
to check at least sizeof(yr_thread_command_t) bytes are available
before calling macho_handle_unixthread().

    case LC_UNIXTHREAD:
+     if(size - (command - data) < sizeof(yr_thread_command_t))
+         break;
      macho_handle_unixthread(command, object, context);
      break;

Secondly, when reading the entry point for the different architectures,
it is
assumed the buffer is big enough to read the corresponding
yr_*_thread_state_t object. A not big enough buffer would lead to out
of bounds reads and maybe denial of service or infoleaks. It is
recommended to check at least enough bytes are available.

  int should_swap = should_swap_bytes(get_integer(object, "magic"));
  bool is64 = false;
  uint32_t s = ((yr_thread_command_t*)command)->cmdsize -
sizeof(yr_thread_command_t);
  command = (void*) ((uint8_t*) command + sizeof(yr_thread_command_t));
  uint64_t address = 0;

  switch (get_integer(object, "cputype"))
  {
   case CPU_TYPE_MC680X0:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_m68k_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_m68k_thread_state_t* m68k_state = (yr_m68k_thread_state_t*) command;
     address = m68k_state->pc;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_MC88000:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_m88k_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_m88k_thread_state_t* m88k_state = (yr_m88k_thread_state_t*) command;
     address = m88k_state->xip;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_SPARC:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_sparc_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_sparc_thread_state_t* sparc_state = (yr_sparc_thread_state_t*)
command;
     address = sparc_state->pc;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_POWERPC:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_ppc_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_ppc_thread_state_t* ppc_state = (yr_ppc_thread_state_t*) command;
     address = ppc_state->srr0;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_X86:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_x86_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_x86_thread_state_t* x86_state = (yr_x86_thread_state_t*) command;
     address = x86_state->eip;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_ARM:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_arm_thread_state_t))
+      break;
     yr_arm_thread_state_t* arm_state = (yr_arm_thread_state_t*) command;
     address = arm_state->pc;
     break;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_X86_64:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_x86_thread_state64_t))
+      break;
     yr_x86_thread_state64_t* x64_state = (yr_x86_thread_state64_t*)
command;
     address = x64_state->rip;
     is64 = true;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_ARM64:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_arm_thread_state64_t))
+      break;
     yr_arm_thread_state64_t* arm64_state = (yr_arm_thread_state64_t*)
command;
     address = arm64_state->pc;
     is64 = true;
   }
   case CPU_TYPE_POWERPC64:
   {
+    if (s < sizeof(yr_ppc_thread_state64_t))
+      break;
     yr_ppc_thread_state64_t* ppc64_state = (yr_ppc_thread_state64_t*)
command;
     address = ppc64_state->srr0;
     is64 = true;

Please note that we rely here on cmdsize having a safe value, which is
checked in one of the fixes proposed above.

Proof of Concept
-----------------
Parse the
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/oob-macho-handle-unixthread
sample via yr_rules_scan_mem().


Out-of-bounds read in macho_is_32()
===================================
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Mach-O file sample
CVE: Pending
CWE: 125


Analysis
---------
macho_parse_file() calls macho_is_32(data) without checking that size is at
least 4 bytes. An out of bounds read happens when size < 4. Depending on
the initial parsed file size, data buffer could come from a mmaped
region and the OOB read could lead to a denial of service.

It is recommended to return from the function when size < 4.

+  if (size < 4)
+    return;
+
   size_t header_size = macho_is_32(data) ? sizeof(yr_mach_header_32_t)
                                          : sizeof(yr_mach_header_64_t);


Proof of Concept
----------------
Parse the
https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/tree/master/X41-2021-001/yara-reproducers/oob-macho-is-32.v2
sample via yr_rules_scan_mem().


Timeline
========
2021-01-16 Issues found
2021-01-20 Issues and patches reported to the vendor
2021-01-21 Vendor reply with acknowledge and final patches
2021-01-22 CVEs request (pending)
2021-01-27 Fixed release (v4.0.4)
2021-01-28 Advisory published

About X41 D-SEC GmbH
====================
X41 is an expert provider for application security services.
Having extensive industry experience and expertise in the area of
information security, a strong core security team of world class
security experts enables X41 to perform premium security services.

Fields of expertise in the area of application security are security
centered code reviews, binary reverse engineering and vulnerability
discovery. Custom research and IT security consulting and support
services are core competencies of X41.



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