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Message-ID: <c00cdb9e-11ba-8179-5c6c-e306f2a7ff53@korelogic.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 16:06:52 -0500
From: KoreLogic Disclosures via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] KL-001-2021-003: CommScope Ruckus IoT Controller Hard-coded
System Passwords
KL-001-2021-003: CommScope Ruckus IoT Controller Hard-coded System Passwords
Title: CommScope Ruckus IoT Controller Hard-coded System Passwords
Advisory ID: KL-001-2021-003
Publication Date: 2021.05.26
Publication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2021-003.txt
1. Vulnerability Details
Affected Vendor: CommScope
Affected Product: Ruckus IoT Controller
Affected Version: 1.7.1.0 and earlier
Platform: Linux
CWE Classification: CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password
CVE ID: CVE-2021-33218
2. Vulnerability Description
Hard coded, system-level credentials exist on the Ruckus IoT
Controller OVA image, and are exposed to attackers who mount
the filesystem.
3. Technical Description
Ruckus vRIoT server software is available from the software
library at: https://support.ruckuswireless.com/software/
Once the OVA is imported into VirtualBox, a VMDK file is
created. The VMDK file can be mounted and the directory
structure and its contents can be perused. The virtual appliance
contains three system accounts with password hashes. The three
accounts are 'root', 'admin', and 'vriotha'. The 'admin'
account is documented in vendor documentation, but not the
other two accounts.
The password for 'admin' is documented and can be changed
by the user. The password for the 'vriotha' account is
'nplus1user'. The password for the 'vriotha' account
is hardcoded into support scripts. The root hash is still
undergoing password cracking attempts. The 'admin' and 'vriotha'
accounts are restricted in terms of their shell, they do
not drop to typical Unix shell access. The virtual appliance
does not appear to offer a mechanism for changing the default
password from the vendor for the 'root' or 'vriotha' accounts.
4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
The vendor has released an updated firmware (1.8.0.0) which
remediates the described vulnerability. Firmware and release
notes are available at:
https://www.commscope.com/globalassets/digizuite/917216-faq-security-advisory-id-20210525-v1-0.pdf
5. Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Jim Becher (@jimbecher)
of KoreLogic, Inc.
6. Disclosure Timeline
2021.03.30 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to
CommScope.
2021.03.30 - CommScope acknowledges receipt and the intention
to investigate.
2021.04.06 - CommScope notifies KoreLogic that this issue,
along with several others reported by KoreLogic,
will require more than the standard 45 business
day remediation timeline.
2021.04.06 - KoreLogic agrees to extend disclosure embargo if
necessary.
2021.04.30 - CommScope informs KoreLogic that remediation for
this vulnerability will be available inside of the
standard 45 business day timeline. Requests
KoreLogic acquire CVE number for this
vulnerability.
2021.05.14 - 30 business days have elapsed since the
vulnerability was reported to CommScope.
2021.05.17 - CommScope notifies KoreLogic that the patched
version of the firmware will be available the week
of 2021.05.24.
2021.05.19 - KoreLogic requests CVE from MITRE.
2021.05.19 - MITRE issues CVE-2021-33218.
2021.05.25 - CommScope releases firmware 1.8.0.0 and associated
advisory.
2021.05.26 - KoreLogic public disclosure.
7. Proof of Concept
With the VMDK file mounted at the current working directory:
$ sudo cat etc/shadow
root:$1$root$.6wlmowMW0KVjst8z6Yqa.:17393:0:99999:7:::
...
admin:$6$AwyhYDBW$KS5q63LZBuQxPM2RG1N/.TvbaKC5gnoq8ERgMSBGms1EL9IZPrM4SscOvsF/FsoD1fgFjYrJF1as0BSYM0SVa0:17667:0:99999:7:::
vriotha:$6$c4jEcmjj$uDjuSxfkzd0QHt/MAGnPJ798izuVhq11MSmkS3iXtDg.iqSumzou4.HauYOrSIYl5JdQlrbZAL7PAkPfrxcxH0:18626:0:99999:7:::
$ egrep '^root|^admin|^vriotha' etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
admin:x:1001:1001::/home/admin:/VRIOT/ops/scripts/ras
vriotha:x:1003:1003::/home/vriotha:/usr/bin/rssh
/VRIOT/ops/scripts/haN1/n1_ha.py:
scpstr = "vriotha@"+slave_ip+":/tmp/authkey >/dev/null 2>&1"
#call(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr])
os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr]))
...
### Call slave API to create user #####
# HOTST_URL = "https://"+replace_ip+"/service/v1/createUser"
# json_request = {
# "username":"vriotha",
# "password":"nplus1user"
...
os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr]))
/VRIOT/ops/scripts/entrypoint.py:
userpwd = 'useradd vriotha ; echo vriotha:nplus1user | chpasswd >/dev/null 2>&1'
os.system(userpwd)
call(['usermod','-aG','sudo','vriotha'],stdout=devNullFile)
call(['chsh','-s','/usr/bin/rssh','vriotha'],stdout=devNullFile)
/VRIOT/ops/scripts/haN1/ha_slave.py:
scpstr = "vriotha@"+master_ip+":/VRIOT/ha/"
os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','-r',scpstr,'/VRIOT/'+master_ip+'/']))
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2021
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a
proven track record of providing security services to entities
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.
https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:
https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.3.txt
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