Message-ID: <ZRAP278MB0160688433A61B833A48FC4BBA9C9@ZRAP278MB0160.CHEP278.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 09:21:08 +0000
From: Emanuel DUSS <emanuel.duss@...pass-security.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] CVE-2021-44033: Ionic Identity Vault PIN Unlock Lockout Bypass
 (Android & iOS)

#############################################################
#
# COMPASS SECURITY ADVISORY
# https://www.compass-security.com/research/advisories/
#
#############################################################
#
# Product:  Identity Vault
# Vendor:   Ionic
# CSNC ID:  CSNC-2021-020
# CVE ID:   CVE-2021-44033
# Subject:  PIN Unlock Lockout Bypass (Android & iOS)
# Severity: Medium
# Effect:   Authentication Bypass
# Author:   Emanuel Duss <emanuel.duss@...pass-security.com>
# Date:     2021-11-19
#
#############################################################

Introduction
------------

Ionic Identity Vault is a secure storage solution for Android and iOS mobile
apps which can e.g. be used to store authentication information like access
tokens [1]. This information can be protected, so that the user must
authenticate first, before the information is unlocked.

Identity Vault provides different authentication methods:

- Memory only storage (not persisted at all)
- Secure storage (without user authentication)
- Passcode (PIN) authentication
- Biometric authentication (optionally with device PIN fallback)

The Passcode (PIN) authentication mechanism can be configured with a lockout
counter, which will clear the secure storage after a specified number of failed
unlocks.

During a customer project, we could bypass the PIN unlock lockout mechanism.
This allows an attacker with physical access to the device to brute force all
possible unlock PIN combinations without being blocked.


Affected
--------

- Vulnerable: Ionic Identity Vault <= 5.0.4
- Not vulnerable: Ionic Identity Vault >= 5.0.5


Description
-----------

The failed unlock counter is only stored in memory and can therefore be
bypassed. An attacker with physical access to the phone is therefore able to
brute force the PIN of the user without being blocked.

For example, if the lockout threshold is set to 5, an attacker can perform 4
failed unlocks and close the app to clear the failed unlock counter. The app can
then be opened again to get 4 more unlock attempts. This can be repeated until
the correct PIN was found.


Technical Description
---------------------

# Vulnerability

On Android, the logic of the lockout functionality is implemented in the
`getData` method of the `com.ionicframework.IdentityVault.VaultBase` class.
This method tracks the count of failed authentication attempts and clears the
vault after the configured amount of possible failed unlocks is reached:

    public void getData() throws VaultError {
        try {
            if (this.data == null) {
            // [...]
            }
        } catch (AuthFailedError e) {
            lock();
            int I = this.failedUnlockAttempts + 1;
            this.failedUnlockAttempts = I;
            if (I ≥ this.allowedInvalidUnlockAttempts) {
                clear();
                this.failedUnlockAttempts = 0;
                throw new TooManyFailedAttemptsError();
            }
            throw e;
        } catch (Exception e2) {
            throw new VaultError(e2.getLocalizedMessage());
        }
    }

This shows that the failed unlock count `failedUnlockAttempts` is not stored
anywhere and only kept in memory.

The code on iOS looks similar and therefore the same vulnerability applies to
both Android and iOS.


# Exploit

The following steps can be performed to bypass the number of unlock
attempts and get endless tries:

- Open the app
- Try several PIN unlock attempts until before the last possible attempt which
  would clear the secure storage
- Close the app (this will clear the `failedUnlockAttempts`)
- Start at step 1 again and try the next PINs.

All these steps can be automated by using the Android Debug Bridge (adb) [2].


Vulnerability Classification
----------------------------

CVSS v3.1 Metrics [3]:

- CVSS Base Score: 5.9 (Medium)
- CVSS Vector: AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N


Workaround / Fix
----------------

# Ionic Identity Vault Library Vendor

A counter of the failed unlock attempts should be stored on the phone. This
counter should only be readable by the app itself and not by other apps. It can
e.g., be stored in the application directory.

Note: An attacker with root access on the phone can always bypass such lockout
mechanisms by hooking the functions which perform the check. A lockout counter
stored in the application directory still protects against non-root attackers.
It's therefore not necessary to specially protect/encrypt the failed unlock
counter.


# Ionic Identity Vault Library Users

Customers of the Ionic Identity Vault should use the updated version Identity
Vault 5.0.5 which fixes the issue [4].


Timeline
--------

2021-08-05: Vulnerability discovered
2021-09-06: Informed Ionic about the vulnerability
2021-09-07: Ionic told they will fix it and inform me when the fix is available
2021-10-25: Asked Ionic about the current state
2021-10-25: Ionic told it's already fixed.
2021-11-18: Requested CVE ID @ MITRE
2021-11-19: Assigned CVE-2021-44033
2021-11-19: Coordinated public disclosure


References
----------

[1] https://ionic.io/docs/identity-vault
[2] https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N&version=3.1
[4] https://ionic.io/docs/identity-vault/changelog --> [5.0.5] (2021-09-30)


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