full-disclosure - [FD] [CVE-2021-40149] Reolink E1 Zoom Camera <= 3.0.0.716 Unauthenticated Private Key Disclosure

Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 08:43:39 +0000
From: "Julien Ahrens (RCE Security)" <info@...security.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [CVE-2021-40149] Reolink E1 Zoom Camera <= 3.0.0.716
 Unauthenticated Private Key Disclosure

RCE Security Advisory
https://www.rcesecurity.com

1. ADVISORY INFORMATION
=======================
Product:        Reolink E1 Zoom Camera
Vendor URL:     https://reolink.com/product/e1-zoom/
Type:           Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor [CWE-200]
Date found:     2021-08-26
Date published: 2022-06-01
CVSSv3 Score:   7.5 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
CVE:            CVE-2021-40149

2. CREDITS
==========
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from
RCE Security.

3. VERSIONS AFFECTED
====================
Reolink E1 Zoom Camera 3.0.0.716 (latest) and below

4. INTRODUCTION
===============
Meet new generation of Reolink E1 series. Advanced features - 5MP Super
HD & optical zoom are added into this compact camera. Plus two-way audio,
remote live view and more smart capacities help you connect with what you
care. Be closer to families and be away from worries.

(from the vendor's homepage)

5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS
========================
The web server of the E1 Zoom camera through 3.0.0.716 discloses its SSL private
key via the root web server directory.

An unauthenticated attacker can abuse this with network-level access to the
camera to download the webserver's private SSL key by simply going to the
following URL:

http://[CAM-IP]/self.key

6. RISK
=======
An unauthenticated attacker can download the webserver's SSL private key and
thereby attack the encrypted network traffic to and from the camera, which might
lead to the disclosure of the administrative access credentials and other
sensitive information.

7. SOLUTION
===========
None.

8. REPORT TIMELINE
==================
2021-08-26: Discovery of the vulnerability
2021-08-26: Sent notification to Reolink via their support channel
2021-08-26: Response from vendor asking for vulnerability details
2021-08-26: Sent all the vulnerability details
2021-08-31: Vendor is still looking into the issue
2021-09-03: Vendor states that the issue will be fixed by the end of September.
2021-10-01: Since no firmware has been released, we've sent another notification
2021-10-02: Vendor states that the new firmware is delayed
2022-02-01: Since there is still fix, sent another notification
2022-02-02: Vendor states that the firmware with the fix hasn't been released yet.
2022-03-03: Since there is still fix, sent another notification
2022-03-12: Vendor states they're still working on the issue (internal update awaits testing)
2022-05-24: Since there is still fix, sent another notification
2022-05-24: Vendor states that the update still hasn't been released yet.
2022-06-01: Almost a year should be enough to fix this. Public disclosure.

9. REFERENCES
=============
https://github.com/MrTuxracer/advisories

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