Message-ID: <2451682e-11be-c4b7-2b5f-780a9ebf0ce2@syss.de>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 15:43:19 +0200
From: Matthias Deeg <matthias.deeg@...s.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [SYSS-2022-004]: Verbatim Keypad Secure USB 3.2 Gen 1 Drive -
 Expected Behavior Violation (CWE-440) (CVE-2022-28386)

Advisory ID:               SYSS-2022-004
Product:                   Keypad Secure USB 3.2 Gen 1 Drive
Manufacturer:              Verbatim
Affected Version(s):       Part Number #49428
Tested Version(s):         Part Number #49428
Vulnerability Type:        Expected Behavior Violation (CWE-440)
Risk Level:                Low
Solution Status:           Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-01-27
Solution Date:             -
Public Disclosure:         2022-06-08
CVE Reference:             CVE-2022-28386
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

The Verbatim Keypad Secure is a USB drive with AES 256-bit hardware
encryption and a built-in keypad for passcode entry.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows:

"The AES 256-bit Hardware Encryption seamlessly encrypts all data on the
drive in real-time with a built-in keypad for passcode input. The USB
Drive does not store passwords in the computer or system's volatile
memory making it far more secure than software encryption. Also, if it
falls into the wrong hands, the device will lock and require
re-formatting after 20 failed passcode attempts."[1]

The security feature for locking and requiring to reformat the USB drive
after 20 failed unlock attempts does not work as specified.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

When analyzing the USB drive Verbatim Keypad Secure, Matthias Deeg found
out that the device will not lock and require reformatting after 20
failed passcode attempts, as described in the product description[1]
and the corresponding user manual[2].

Thus, an attacker with physical access to such a USB drive can try more
passcodes in order to unlock the device.

During the security analysis, SySS could not find out how many failed
passcode attempts would actually lock the device and require
reformatting it, as this device state was never reached.

Additionally, trying to find out the correct passcode by either manually
or automatically entering them via the provided keypad is rather
insufficient compared to an equally possible offline brute-force attack
described in SySS security advisory SYSS-2022-001[3].

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

SySS tried to unlock the Verbatim Keypad Secure USB drive with more than
20 consecutively entered wrong passcodes.

Afterwards, contrary to the product description, the USB drive could
still be successfully unlocked with the correct passcode, and access to
the previously stored data was possible without any issues.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for the described security issue.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-01-27: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2022-02-11: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again
2022-03-07: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again
2022-06-08: Public release of security advisory

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for Verbatim Keypad Secure
 
https://www.verbatim-europe.co.uk/en/prod/verbatim-keypad-secure-usb-32-gen-1-drive-64gb-49428/#
[2] Verbatim Keypad Secure USB Manual
 
https://www.verbatim-marcom.com/image_Verbatim-49428_Keypad-Secure-USB-User-Manual_548705.pdf
[3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-001
 
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-001.txt
[4] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-004
 
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-004.txt
[5] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key: 
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en


Download attachment "OpenPGP_signature" of type "application/pgp-signature" (841 bytes)

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