lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <fe49426b-fed9-404b-9c4d-6520015aacdf@korelogic.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 18:53:23 -0500
From: KoreLogic Disclosures via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] KL-001-2024-009: Journyx Reflected Cross Site Scripting

KL-001-2024-009: Journyx Reflected Cross Site Scripting

Title: Journyx Reflected Cross Site Scripting
Advisory ID: KL-001-2024-009
Publication Date: 2024.08.07
Publication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2024-009.txt


1. Vulnerability Details

      Affected Vendor: Journyx
      Affected Product: Journyx (jtime)
      Affected Version: 11.5.4
      Platform: GNU/Linux
      CWE Classification: CWE-81: Improper Neutralization of Script in an Error
                          Message Web Page
      CVE ID: CVE-2024-6892


2. Vulnerability Description

      Attackers can craft a malicious link that once clicked
      will execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of
      the Journyx web application.


3. Technical Description

      During the active directory login flow, if an error
      occurs, the user is redirected to a page containing
      an error message outlining the problem. The error
      message shown in the page response is derived from
      the "error_description" query parameter that appears
      in the URL. This parameter is not sanitized or validated
      prior to being reflected, allowing for an attacker to
      insert malicious HTML/JavaScript into the "error_description"
      parameter.

      This vulnerability can be exploited regardless of whether
      active directory authentication has been configured for the
      Journyx instance.


4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation

      The vendor reports that this issue was remediated in Journyx
      v13.0.0.

      For self-hosted instances of JournyX, additional security
      measures (such as input sanitization) can be added by monkey
      patching the PYC file responsible for handling request
      parameters (mycgi.pyc).

      1) Rename "mycgi.pyc" to an alternative name, e.g. mycgi_original.pyc.
           $ mv wt_tar/pi/pylib/wtlib/mycgi.py wt_tar/pi/pylib/wtlib/mycgi_original.py

      2) Create a file named "mycgi.py" in the same directory.
           $ touch wt_tar/pi/pylib/wtlib/mycgi.py

      3) Insert the following code into the newly created "mycgi.py"

           from mycgi_original import *
           from html import escape

           def patch():
               pdata = _parse()

               # force the value of "end_URL" to always be "wte"
               if pdata.get('end_URL'): pdata['end_URL'] = ['wte']

               # sanitize user-controlled error messages
               for parameter in ['error', 'error_description']:
                   if not pdata.get(parameter): continue
                   pdata[parameter] = [escape(value) for value in pdata[parameter]]

               return pdata

           _parse = parse
           parse  = patch

      Once these changes have been made, the JournyX native "mycgi.parse()"
      function will be overwritten with the "patch()" function located in the
      "mycgi.py" file. Relevant to this advisory, the patch provided above
      will replace special characters with their respective HTML entity
      representation for the "error" and "error_description" parameters. This
      list of parameters can be extended as needed.

      Additionally, if SSO is not required, requests to /jtcgi/r/adlogin/sso
      could be dropped without forwarding invoking FastCGI via a ModSecurity
      rule like the one below:

           SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains adlogin/sso" "id:4,phase:2,deny,log,auditlog"


5. Credit

      This vulnerability was discovered by Jaggar Henry of KoreLogic, Inc.


6. Disclosure Timeline

      2024.01.31 - KoreLogic notifies Journyx support of the intention to
                   report vulnerabilities discovered in the licensed,
                   on-premises version of the product.
      2024.01.31 - Journyx acknowledges receipt.
      2024.02.02 - KoreLogic requests a meeting with Journyx support to share
                   vulnerability details.
      2024.02.07 - KoreLogic reports vulnerability details to Journyx.
      2024.02.09 - Journyx responds that this vulnerability has been remediated
                   in the cloud-hosted version of the product.
      2024.02.21 - KoreLogic offers to test the cloud version to confirm
                   the fix; no response.
      2024.07.01 - KoreLogic notifies Journyx of impending public disclosure.
      2024.07.09 - Journyx confirms version number of the remediation.
      2024.08.07 - KoreLogic public disclosure.


7. Proof of Concept

     The following URL contains the "error_description"
     parameter with a value of "%3Csvg%2fonload%3dprompt(%27KoreLogic%27)%3E":

http://redacted.com:8080/jtcgi/r/adlogin/sso?code=1337&state=foobar&id_token=zoinks&error_description=%3Csvg%2fonload%3dprompt(%27KoreLogic%27)%3E&error=error

     This value is automatically URL decoded to "<svg/onload=prompt('KoreLogic')>"
     and reflected into the page response:

         <div class="errorMessage">
             Unable to complete sign-on attempt. This is possibly a configuration error in the application registration 
on the Identity Provider (IdP) side. The IdP server said:
             <p>error <b><svg onload="prompt('KoreLogic')"></svg></b></p>
         </div>

     Once this link is clicked or visited in a browser, the
     javascript function "prompt()" is executed, and a display
     box is presented, thereby validating the execution of
     arbitrary JavaScript.


The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2024
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a
proven track record of providing security services to entities
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.
https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html

Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:
https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy


Download attachment "OpenPGP_signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (841 bytes)

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists