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Message-ID: <2025030635-CVE-2025-21834-d92c@gregkh> Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 17:22:40 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: linux-cve-announce@...r.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> Subject: CVE-2025-21834: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering Description =========== In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log] The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-21834 to this issue. Affected and fixed versions =========================== Issue introduced in 6.11 with commit ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c and fixed in 6.12.14 with commit 5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c Issue introduced in 6.11 with commit ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c and fixed in 6.13.3 with commit fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed Issue introduced in 6.11 with commit ff474a78cef5cb5f32be52fe25b78441327a2e7c and fixed in 6.14-rc2 with commit cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6 Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported kernel versions by the kernel community. Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-21834 will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most up to date information about this issue. Affected files ============== The file(s) affected by this issue are: kernel/seccomp.c Mitigation ========== The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this issue can be found at these commits: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a262628f4cf2437d863fe41f9d427177b87664c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa80018aa5be10c35e9fa896b7b4061a8dce3eed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf6cb56ef24410fb5308f9655087f1eddf4452e6
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