linux-ext4 - [PATCH] ext4: ext4_fill_super shouldn't return 0 on corruption

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Message-ID: <20101115214831.GA18195@tux1.beaverton.ibm.com>
Date:	Mon, 15 Nov 2010 13:48:31 -0800
From:	"Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...ibm.com>
To:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
	"Patrick J. LoPresti" <lopresti@...il.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-ext4 <linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org>,
	Mingming Cao <mcao@...ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: ext4_fill_super shouldn't return 0 on corruption

At the start of ext4_fill_super, ret is set to -EINVAL, and any failure path
out of that function returns this ret.  However, the generic_check_addressable
clause sets ret = 0 if it passes, which means that a subsequent failure (e.g.
a group checksum error) returns 0 even though the mount should fail.  This
causes vfs_kern_mount in turn to think that the mount succeeded (because
PTR_ERR(0) is false), leading to an oops.

A simple fix is to avoid using ret for the generic_check_addressable check,
which was last changed in commit 30ca22c70e3ef0a96ff84de69cd7e8561b416cb2.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@...ibm.com>
---

 fs/ext4/super.c |    5 ++---
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 40131b7..a44bc59 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3257,9 +3257,8 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	 * Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
 	 * and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
 	 */
-	ret = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
-					ext4_blocks_count(es));
-	if (ret) {
+	if (generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
+				      ext4_blocks_count(es))) {
 		ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
 			 " too large to mount safely on this system");
 		if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
--
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