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Message-ID: <CA+a=Yy6pi5rUv2GJtsvH1=O+WAawWg03S_ORpVfwnVzYa4tPqA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 19:34:41 +0800
From: Peng Tao <bergwolf@...il.com>
To: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, tytso@....edu, zab@...hat.com,
dmonakhov@...nvz.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] ext4: Prevent race while waling extent tree
On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 4:22 PM, Lukas Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com> wrote:
> Currently ext4_ext_walk_space() only takes i_data_sem for read when
> searching for the extent at given block with ext4_ext_find_extent().
> Then it drops the lock and the extent tree can be changed at will.
> However later on we're searching for the 'next' extent, but the extent
> tree might already have changed, so the information might not be
> accurate.
>
> In fact we can hit BUG_ON(end <= start) if the extent got inserted into
> the tree after the one we found and before the block we were searching
> for. This has been reproduced by running xfstests 225 in loop on s390x
> architecture, but theoretically we could hit this on any other
> architecture as well, but probably not as often.
>
> Fix this by extending the critical section to include
> ext4_ext_next_allocated_block() as well. It means that if there are any
> operation going on on the particular inode, the fiemap will return
> inaccurate data. However this will also fix the concerns about starving
> writers to the extent tree, because we will put and reacquire the
> semaphore with every iteration. This will not be particularly fast, but
> fiemap is not critical operation.
>
> However we also need to limit the access to the extent structure to the
> critical section, because outside of it the content can change. So we
> remove extent and next block parameters from ext4_ext_fiemap_cb()
> function and pass just flags instead.
>
> Also we have to move path reinitialization inside the critical section.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@...hat.com>
> ---
> v3: reworked
>
> fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h | 5 ++---
> fs/ext4/extents.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h b/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h
> index cb1b2c9..356ad9f 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h
> +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h
> @@ -149,9 +149,8 @@ struct ext4_ext_path {
> * positive retcode - signal for ext4_ext_walk_space(), see below
> * callback must return valid extent (passed or newly created)
> */
> -typedef int (*ext_prepare_callback)(struct inode *, ext4_lblk_t,
> - struct ext4_ext_cache *,
> - struct ext4_extent *, void *);
> +typedef int (*ext_prepare_callback)(struct inode *, struct ext4_ext_cache *,
> + unsigned int, void *);
>
> #define EXT_CONTINUE 0
> #define EXT_BREAK 1
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c
> index 7011ac9..c097acf 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
> @@ -1968,7 +1968,8 @@ static int ext4_ext_walk_space(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
> struct ext4_extent *ex;
> ext4_lblk_t next, start = 0, end = 0;
> ext4_lblk_t last = block + num;
> - int depth, exists, err = 0;
> + int exists, depth = 0, err = 0;
> + unsigned int flags = 0;
>
> BUG_ON(func == NULL);
> BUG_ON(inode == NULL);
> @@ -1977,9 +1978,16 @@ static int ext4_ext_walk_space(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
> num = last - block;
> /* find extent for this block */
> down_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
> +
> + if (path && ext_depth(inode) != depth) {
> + /* depth was changed. we have to realloc path */
> + kfree(path);
> + path = NULL;
> + }
> +
> path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, block, path);
> - up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
> if (IS_ERR(path)) {
> + up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
> err = PTR_ERR(path);
> path = NULL;
> break;
> @@ -1987,6 +1995,7 @@ static int ext4_ext_walk_space(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
>
> depth = ext_depth(inode);
> if (unlikely(path[depth].p_hdr == NULL)) {
> + up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
> EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "path[%d].p_hdr == NULL", depth);
> err = -EIO;
> break;
> @@ -2037,14 +2046,21 @@ static int ext4_ext_walk_space(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
> cbex.ec_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
> cbex.ec_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
> cbex.ec_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
> + if (ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex))
> + flags |= FIEMAP_EXTENT_UNWRITTEN;
> }
> + up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
>
> if (unlikely(cbex.ec_len == 0)) {
> EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "cbex.ec_len == 0");
> err = -EIO;
> break;
> }
> - err = func(inode, next, &cbex, ex, cbdata);
> +
> + if (next == EXT_MAX_BLOCKS)
> + flags |= FIEMAP_EXTENT_LAST;
> +
> + err = func(inode, &cbex, flags, cbdata);
You may want to include func() in the critical section as well, to fix
the cp data corruption reported by Roger Niva. It looks to be the same
race.
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.ext4/35393
--
Thanks,
Tao
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